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24 October 1975–22 September 2016
Part One
Dr Chikara Hashimoto died suddenly on 22 September 2016 
at the age of forty. The Twilight of the British Empire: British 
Intelligence and Counter-Subversion in the Middle East, 1948–63 
was completed in 2016 and is here taken forward to publica-
tion in Edinburgh University Press’s Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Secret Warfare series. Some drafting amendments were made by 
the series editors, Richard J. Aldrich, Michael S. Goodman, Hugh 
Wilford and, in particular, Rory Cormac. These efforts, and 
those of Jen Daly at Edinburgh University Press, have expedited 
 publication of Dr Hashimoto’s first and, tragically, last book.
Chikara arrived at Aberystwyth University with his wife, Sawa, 
in 2004. He studied intelligence as an undergraduate and as a 
Master’s student, before embarking on his PhD in 2009, the year 
that Sawa gave birth to their daughter, Miyaka. The family lived 
in Aberystwyth until they moved to the University of Sharjah 
when Chikara become an Assistant Professor in the Department 
of International Relations. At Aberystwyth he established himself 
as a central figure in the Centre for Intelligence and International 
Security Studies in the Department of International Politics. At 
Sharjah his academic career flourished as a teacher and scholar, 




The Twilight of the British Empire: British Intelligence and 
Counter-Subversion in the Middle East, 1948–63 is an important 
book for three main reasons. Firstly, it is a notable contribution 
to understanding Britain’s role in the Middle East. It provides 
the first systematic study of the neglected aspect of intelligence 
and counter-subversion policy during a critical phase of the Cold 
War and the demise of British imperialism. It provides significant 
insights into Britain’s relationship with states that were mostly 
tangential to Britain’s colonial heritage but whose potential Cold 
War role London sought to cultivate.
Secondly, it casts light on the intelligence perspectives and 
practices of countries whose domestic and regional agendas were 
often at variance with British Cold War priorities. The book 
illuminates the development of bilateral and multilateral secu-
rity and intelligence relationships and provides new perspectives 
on intelligence liaison within the region. The analysis of the 
relationships between Western democracies and non-democratic 
states resonates with contemporary challenges in international 
relations. Much of the research is drawn from Chikara’s doctor-
ate, which won the prestigious Leigh Douglas Memorial Prize in 
2014, awarded by the British Society for Middle East Studies to 
the best PhD thesis on a Middle Eastern topic.
Thirdly, it demonstrates Chikara’s formidable qualities as 
a researcher, including his commitment to multi-archival and 
international research, and to meeting the challenges of studying 
secret intelligence. The book is both testimony to his academic 
vision and evidence of his ambitions to further the scope and 
 methodological horizons of intelligence studies.
At Aberystwyth, and in his work as Assistant Editor of the 
journal Intelligence and National Security, Chikara became a very 
highly respected and well-liked figure, admired for his integrity, 
kindness and exemplary diligence. As a colleague he was univer-
sally popular and unfailingly dependable. His commitment to the 
life of the PhD community in the Department of International 
Politics was recognised by his receipt of the Jana Fritzsche Award 
in 2012 for his outstanding contribution to the community.
Notwithstanding the tragedy of his early death and the sense of 
loss felt by his family, friends and colleagues, Chikara achieved 
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so much in so short a time in his professional and in his per-
sonal life. The Twilight of the British Empire: British Intelligence 
and Counter-Subversion in the Middle East, 1948–63 is an 
important contribution to international history and intelligence 
studies and testament to Chikara Hashimoto’s ability, efforts and 
achievements.
Len Scott





Chikara Hashimoto’s untimely death is a terrible loss to his 
devoted wife, Sawa, his beautiful young daughter, Miyaka, 
his loving mother, Shoko, brother, Makoto, and wider family, 
friends, students, colleagues and the world of intelligence studies. 
Chikara was a historian of much promise and this book should 
have been only the beginning of a fine career; instead, it must 
serve as a memorial to him. He greatly admired scholarship, loved 
his research and was fascinated by the history and current opera-
tions of intelligence agencies. His dream was to become a scholar 
and teacher. He achieved it – but for too short a time.
This book began as a third-year undergraduate dissertation and 
became a Master’s dissertation and then a PhD thesis. I supervised 
all three, and it was an honour to mentor such a kind, good-
humoured, thoughtful, diligent and intelligent man. I will cherish 
Chikara’s memory for as long as I live.
Chikara’s determination is reflected in his career path. He 
began undergraduate study relatively late in life, at Aberystwyth 
University in 2004, at the age of twenty-eight. He prepared for 
his undergraduate studies by learning English for two years, 
first in Salisbury and then in Reading. It was in Salisbury in 
2002 that he met his wife, Sawa, who gave unstinting support 
to his efforts to become, first, a student and then a scholar in 
the field of international history. His PhD thesis, entitled ‘British 
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Intelligence, Counter-Subversion and “Informal Empire” in the 
Middle East’, was awarded the Leigh Douglas Memorial Prize in 
2014 for the best PhD thesis on a Middle Eastern topic by the 
British Society for Middle Eastern Studies. The Society’s judges 
rightly considered it to be ‘an original and thoughtful explora-
tion of a little-studied subject’ and praised the good judgement it 
displayed and the ‘exemplary determination’ with which it had 
been researched.
Chikara’s thesis would eventually become this book, which 
sheds much new light on Britain’s attempts in the early Cold War 
to use security cooperation with the police forces and security ser-
vices of key Middle Eastern states to combat Soviet Communism 
and maintain British influence. It is an important addition to the 
historical literature on British intelligence and the international 
relations of Middle Eastern states in the early Cold War.
Had Chikara lived longer, he would have become a signifi-
cant historian of intelligence. When he died, he was already a 
successful teacher, admired by his students and valued by his 
colleagues. In 2012 he won an award for teaching excellence 
at Aberystwyth University, where he taught for several years as 
a graduate teaching assistant (2009–14), before moving to the 
University of Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates, where he 
worked for the last two years of his life as an Assistant Professor 
of International Relations.
The key to Chikara’s success as both teacher and colleague 
was his outstandingly pleasant and considerate nature. I never 
heard him say a bad word about anyone. In their tributes to him 
after his death, his students said how fondly they remembered his 
‘bright smile’, and they recalled a question he often asked them 
in his classes: ‘Are you with me?’ His colleagues remembered him 
as a man with a striking concern for their welfare. This remark-
able consideration for others was the source of Chikara’s great 
charm. Every supervision with him was a pleasure; his presence 
 brightened up every room he was in.
Chikara was ambitious, both intellectually and professionally. 
His ambition helped him to write an original and significant 
book. Sawa’s help was also valuable to him; she photographed 
the documents on which this book is based. He could not have 
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found a better partner. He leaves behind him friends from all over 
the world who valued his great qualities and will miss him for the 
rest of their lives. May he rest in peace.
Dr Paul Maddrell





An enquiry into state secrets inevitably faces methodological 
hurdles. It is a risk of a journey to unknown destinations. My 
journey could not have been completed without a lot of help. 
My journey would have not been embarked upon without the 
financial support of the Department of International Politics, 
Aberystwyth University, which funded my PhD research sub-
stantially through an E. H. Carr Studentship. I was also sup-
ported by generous grants: the Caroline Adams Travel Bursaries 
of the Department (twice in row); the Aberystwyth Alumni 
Student Hardship Fund; the Royal Historical Society; and the 
Founders Fund Award for 2012 of the British International 
Studies Association.
I would secondly like to thank my PhD supervisors, Len Scott, 
Paul Maddrell and James Vaughan, for their invaluable expertise 
and their support throughout my studies in Aberystwyth. Their 
experiences and expertise helped me a lot in finding the right way 
in a dark tunnel where I was often unsure of which direction I 
should take. Particular thanks also go to Len, not as my supervi-
sor, but as my employer for his generosity in sustaining my family 
in the final year of my PhD.
I would also like to acknowledge my friends, colleagues and 
others whose identities remain anonymous for their assistance 
and support for my research. Amongst these, Peter Jackson, Gerry 
Hughes, Martin Thomas, Michael Goodman, James Simpson, 
Mustafa Ozcan, Hamid Soorghali and Youmna Asseily have 
helped me in one way or another in invariably shaping my research 
project. Any mistakes that may appear in the book are of course 
entirely my own.
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I am much obliged to the publishers and editors who have 
kindly allowed republication. This book is derived in part from 
articles published in Intelligence and National Security on 30 
October 2012, available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527
.2012.722763>; The International History Review on 7 January 
2014, available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2013.82
8644>; and Middle Eastern Studies on 27 May 2016, available at 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2016.1175344>.
Last, but not least, I would like to thank my family for their 
support. Thanks must go to my mother, Shoko, for her financial 
and moral support for my academic career in the UK. Above all, 
my deepest gratitude goes to my wife, Sawa, who trusted me and 
accompanied me even before this journey started, for her continu-
ous and dedicated support for my entire academic career, without 
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Introduction
The history of the British presence in the Middle East between 
1948 and 1963 is one of failure. During this period, from a time 
of much British influence to the twilight of its Empire, various 
socio-political factors challenged – and ultimately brought down 
– most of the partner regimes over which the British had enjoyed 
their influence. By the late 1950s, despite its once imperial posi-
tion, Britain had lost all reliable allies, such as Egypt and Iraq, 
as well as other friendly regimes, such as Jordan and Iran, them-
selves also increasingly challenged by domestic and international 
political upheavals. The culmination of the British preoccupation 
with maintaining influence in the region can be seen in the Suez 
Crisis of 1956, where Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s personal 
endeavour against the Egyptian leader, Colonel Gamal Abdul 
Nasser, included collusion with France and Israel.1
Intelligence and security was a vital realm in which Britain 
sought to engage with the Middle East, maintain its regional 
influence and support friendly regimes. Britain’s intelligence 
and security services and its secret propaganda apparatus – the 
Information Research Department (IRD) of the Foreign Office – 
conducted counter-subversion across the Middle East, including 
in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iran. Such activity 
in foreign countries inevitably raised sensitive issues surrounding 
cooperation with local authorities, and the murky world of intel-
ligence liaison between British intelligence and security services 
and their Middle Eastern counterparts. Based on newly declassi-
fied and hitherto unexploited records, as well as Middle Eastern 
sources, this book reveals the history of Britain’s subterranean 
engagement in the post-war Middle East.
The Twilight of the British Empire
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At the end of the Second World War, the Middle East consisted 
of both colonial territories (Cyprus, Aden Colony, the Palestine 
Mandate and the Arabian/Persian Gulf) and independent states. 
Britain’s interactions with the latter, and its desire to influence 
their policies, have sometimes been referred to by imperial his-
torians as Britain’s ‘informal empire’.2 Despite the loss of the 
British mandate in Palestine in 1948, Britain enjoyed unparal-
leled political influence throughout the Arab world, where many, 
according to Sir Anthony Parsons, a former British diplomat 
who served there, heralded Britain as ‘the lion’.3 Enjoying such 
reputation and influence, Britain strove to maintain close connec-
tions with Middle Eastern governments – and their intelligence 
services.
Britain’s role in the region has long caught the attention of 
diplomatic, imperial and military historians emphasising the 
importance of the Middle East to Whitehall.4 Indeed, defend-
ing the region against Soviet attack formed one of the pillars of 
post-war strategy,5 whilst the retention of the British Empire was 
‘part of the habit and furniture’ of Whitehall minds.6 And yet 
these histories rarely consider the role of intelligence and coun-
ter-subversion when discerning the long-term trends of Britain’s 
engagement with the post-war Middle East.7 Even academics 
specialising in secret affairs have neglected Britain’s intelligence 
power. The authorised history of the British Security Service, 
MI5, only covers the colonies in the region,8 when, in reality, its 
activities expanded beyond the imperial boundary to cover liaison 
with Middle Eastern governments and collaboration with MI6 
(Secret Intelligence Service).9 Some discussion of signals intelli-
gence in the Middle East exists,10 whilst special political actions, 
or attempts to covertly shape internal developments, in the region 
have begun to attract some serious scholarly attention; the most 
famous example being the 1953 coup in Iran, which Britain’s 
foreign intelligence service – MI6 – orchestrated with its American 
counterpart.11 Other cases of event shaping, such as in Syria and 
Yemen, have recently come to light12 but remain underexplored. 
Meanwhile, the literature is particularly thin on the important, 




This book reveals that, in the twilight of the Empire in the 
Middle East, British policymakers saw intelligence as a tool to pre-
serve strategic and economic interests in the region. In particular, 
intelligence could supposedly counter the spread of Communism; 
a goal shared by many of the regional governments. Sensing 
their common interest, the British pushed for secret liaison with 
Middle Eastern security agencies. However, the friendly Arab 
States as well as Iran struggled to reciprocate. The regimes faced 
more imminent socio-political challenges and battled even to 
retain legitimacy. As British influence faded during the period 
between 1948 and 1963, intelligence liaison with Middle Eastern 
 counterparts was a short-term success but a long-term failure.
In revealing the hidden history of intelligence liaison with 
Middle Eastern regimes, this book demonstrates three core ideas. 
Firstly, the relationships bridged democratic and non-democratic 
governments, thereby reflecting differences in political and cul-
tural values which extended to counter-subversion. Secondly, and 
following on from this, the nature and activities of the Middle 
Eastern intelligence and security partners were important in the 
relationship. It is necessary to move intelligence studies beyond 
the overwhelming focus solely on Western intelligence organi-
sations.14 Thirdly, intelligence liaison encompassed more than 
merely sharing resources or information. It also could – and did 
– influence foreign governments. Accordingly, Britain sought to 
influence the policies of Middle Eastern governments through 
clandestine means.
These are important matters, shedding light on both past and 
present. In recent years, the ‘War on Terror’ has raised the public 
profile of controversial British intelligence liaison with Middle 
Eastern governments.15 This is not a new phenomenon, however. 
Sir Stephen Lander, former Director-General of MI5, for instance, 
reminds us that the British intelligence services maintained a 
relationship with their Middle Eastern counterparts long before 
2001.16 Yaacov Caroz, a former Deputy-Chief of the Israeli 
Intelligence Service, Mossad, also testified over three decades 
ago that the British intelligence services had been instrumental in 
developing the Arab security services.17 In the post-war period, 
this took place against the backdrop of anti-Communism.
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The significance of Britain’s counter-subversive measures in 
the Middle East cannot be underestimated. Referring to MI5’s 
domestic role, Bernard Porter once remarked that without coun-
ter-subversion, ‘we would be a very different country from what 
we are today’.18 This idea is also applicable to the Middle East. 
Local counter-subversion efforts, conducted by strong domes-
tic security forces in secret partnership with British intelligence, 
ensured that Communist Parties were largely prohibited. As a 
result of counter-subversion efforts, Communist influence in the 
region was less prominent than elsewhere throughout the Cold 
War.19
Counter-subversion liaison extended to multilateral coop-
eration. The Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), formerly 
known as the Baghdad Pact (1955–8), was a military alliance 
which has received far less attention than its European equiva-
lent, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).20 Even Air 
Marshal Sir Neville Stack, who served as British Representative of 
the Permanent Military Deputy (1970–2) to CENTO, described 
it as ‘the unknown alliance’.21 Few realise that CENTO states’ 
security forces in fact worked together to contain internal sub-
versive activities within the Pact area. Below the highest body, 
the Council of Ministers, CENTO was primarily comprised of 
four ‘major’ Committees: the Military Committee, the Economic 
Committee, the Counter-Subversion Committee and the Liaison 
Committee.22 The latter two are particularly interesting. They 
were distinctively political, incredibly secretive and, more impor-
tantly, targeted the internal affairs of the Pact signatories.
Unaware of the significance of these two committees, mili-
tary historian Panagiotis Dimitrakis argues that, unlike NATO, 
CENTO was a ‘failed alliance’, asserting, above all, that ‘there 
was no real threat to be deterred in the first place’.23 Owing to 
the nature of the Middle East, however, where political intrigues, 
assassinations and coups d’état were commonplace, most regional 
governments were more concerned about internal subversion 
than Soviet invasion. In addition, the Middle Eastern leaders’ 
perceptions of regional affairs were driven by what Daniel Pipes 
has called the ‘conspiracy mentality’.24 Nevertheless, although 
some works on the importance of the Cold War to post-war 
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British imperial strategy have suggested that these Cold War and 
End of Empire historiographies overlap,25 the significance of the 
potential danger that these movements might be exploited by 
Communists, or that they might adopt Communist tactics – a per-
ception resulting from the complex picture of the Cold War and 
the decolonisation process in the region – has yet to be adequately 
addressed by historians.26 Moreover, little is known about how 
the local police and security services dealt with Communists and 
subversive activities.27
Finally, British intelligence has also been in the spotlight over 
the last few years in the context of its alleged complicity in human 
rights abuse during the so-called War on Terror.28 At the same 
time, a darker side of decolonisation has emerged with evidence of 
torture and excessive violence during Britain’s counter-insurgency 
campaigns, for example in Kenya.29 Historians now know about 
how MI5 sought to export a ‘Commonwealth intelligence culture’ 
throughout the British Empire, often through training courses,30 
and how particular techniques and methods were transported 
with the movement of MI5 officers from one colony to another.31
This dark side of the Cold War is not confined to the territories 
of the British Empire. Britain also facilitated the development of 
security advising and police training in anti-Communist measures 
in the post-war Middle East. A distinct characteristic of Middle 
Eastern states was that they were politically non-democratic in 
the Western sense, with domestic politics dominated by a strong 
security force, often labelled a secret political police.32 This raises 
important questions surrounding the extent to which Britain was 
involved in training Middle Eastern security services, alongside 
their level of complicity in oppressive anti-Communist meas-
ures conducted by Middle Eastern governments, which often 
engaged in human rights abuses. These issues remain relevant and 
 controversial today.
Counter-Subversion
Subversion is sometimes treated as an area of irregular warfare 
and the term is often interchangeably used with insurgency.33 
The Twilight of the British Empire
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However, according to Frank Kitson, a first-hand practitioner 
as well as classic theorist, insurgency refers to ‘the use of armed 
force by a section of the people against the government’, whereas 
subversion means ‘all measures short of the use of armed force’ 
to overthrow the government.34 Subversive activities therefore 
include political and economic pressure, strikes, protest marches, 
propaganda and ‘the use of small-scale violence for the purpose 
of coercing recalcitrant members of the population into giving 
support’.35 Importantly, the British government also made this 
distinction during the period.
Counter-subversion is political in nature, which makes it inher-
ently subjective. As a result, Britain and Middle Eastern gov-
ernments understood and applied counter-subversive measures 
differently. For the British, they were primarily directed against 
Communist activities in the region, whereas for Middle Eastern 
governments, counter-subversion targeted any anti-governmental 
political activities. The difference becomes more apparent when 
countering subversion through propaganda. For the British, the 
purpose of propaganda was essentially to broadcast and publicise 
information to expose the methods and tactics of Communist 
subversive propaganda. It was meant, by exposing the reality 
of life in the Communist bloc, to dispel any illusion about the 
Soviet Union as a ‘workers’ paradise’ throughout the world.36 For 
Britain, counter-subversion was purely a reactive and defensive 
concept.
However, Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan adopted a more 
aggressive definition: they believed that proactive counter- 
subversion was necessary to eradicate the threats coming from 
outside the Pact area – from not only the Soviet Union, but also 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia – as well as the activities of minority 
groups, such as the Kurds. Counter-subversion was above all 
understood by the regional members as more physical activity, 
such as imprisoning targets.37 Thus, the inherent nature of the term 
itself, counter-subversion, connotes both offensive and defensive 
meanings. In addition, owing to the subjectivity of the meaning, 
the demarcation line between subversive elements and anti-British 
sentiment also caused confusion even among MI5 officers in the 
region, who were responsible for counter-subversion but found it 
Introduction
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difficult to distinguish between anti-British nationalist movements 
and legitimate anti-British governments.38
The core forms of counter-subversive activities to be addressed 
in this book are: policing, intelligence sharing, protective security, 
security training, special political action (so-called covert action) 
and propaganda, all of which were pursued and clandestinely 
implemented through MI5, MI6 and the IRD. These services had 
different roles in counter-subversion. MI5 was responsible for 
defensive counter-subversive activities, such as collecting security 
intelligence, protective security and security training. Similarly, 
the IRD exclusively conducted propaganda campaigns. MI5 and 
the IRD did not engage in special political action, such as para-
military operations and overthrowing a foreign government by 
clandestine means, for which MI6 was responsible. These services 
were engaged in different degrees of intelligence sharing with 
local authorities. As the book illustrates, these defensive and 
offensive counter-subversive activities sometimes overlapped or 
were incompatible with one another.
Organisation of Book and Chapters
This book considers Britain’s relationship with independent coun-
tries in the early Cold War. It excludes Britain’s colonies and 
protectorates, such as Cyprus, the Aden Colony and the Arabian/
Persian Gulf. Britain’s engagement in these colonies is mainly 
a story of counter-insurgency rather than counter-subversion.39 
Archival research indicates that MI5 was also involved in the 
protective security of oil companies in the Arabian/Persian Gulf, 
but its involvement was passive and minimal – mainly advising on 
their vetting procedures (i.e. excluding Communist elements from 
the oil companies).40 Meanwhile, MI5’s security liaison intended 
to maintain law and order, such as in cases of disturbances and 
riots, rather than to achieve political goals – fighting Communist 
activities there.41
Likewise, this book does not cover Israel. Although some infor-
mal personal connections existed between British intelligence and 
its Israeli counterparts after 1948, there was not much official 
The Twilight of the British Empire
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cooperation in counter-subversion during the period.42 According 
to Tom Bower, the biographer of Sir Dick White, both former 
Director-General of MI5 and Chief of MI6, ‘anti-Semitism’ 
amongst senior MI6 officers and ‘pro-Arab sentiments’ within 
the Foreign Office prevented MI6’s cooperation with the Israeli 
Intelligence Service, Mossad.43
The book consists of six chapters, divided into thematic topics. 
Chapter 1 shows the development of Britain’s anti-Commu-
nist policy overseas from the Attlee Government of 1945–51 
to the Macmillan Government of 1957–63, and how the role 
of intelligence was understood by policymakers when dealing 
with the difficulties Britain faced in maintaining its positions and 
influence overseas, and especially in the Middle East. Based on 
records declassified under the Freedom of Information Act of 
2001 (FOIA), the chapter demonstrates that counter-subversion – 
anti-Communist measures, in other words – preoccupied British 
thinking throughout the period, and shows that policymakers 
such as Prime Minister Harold Macmillan saw intelligence as the 
solution. 
Chapter 2 investigates the introduction of British security/police 
liaison officers and their role in instituting anti-Communist meas-
ures on the part of Middle Eastern governments up to the mid-
1950s. With the Chiefs of Staff contemplating a potential war 
against the Soviet Union, this was the period in which police 
training became particularly necessary.
Chapter 3 examines the role of a hitherto unexplored organisa-
tion, Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME), the regional head-
quarters of MI5, in counter-subversion in the region. It shows 
how SIME operated in the region to liaise with local authorities, 
and examines its relationship with MI6.
Chapters 4 and 5 reveal the nature of intelligence and propa-
ganda cooperation with the Baghdad Pact countries. Chapter 4 
examines the preconditions for intelligence sharing. It shows that 
one of the British concerns about operational security contrib-
uted to establishing the Iranian National Intelligence and Security 
Organisation, known as SAVAK. Chapter 5 demonstrates con-
flicting interests between Britain and Middle Eastern governments 
in counter-subversion through propaganda. It shows that the 
Introduction
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British were primarily concerned with Communist activities, but 
this did not necessarily accord with the concerns of the regional 
members. A schism in propaganda approaches can be seen as a 
microcosm of the problems affecting regional cooperation as a 
whole.
Based on the findings from the preceding chapters, Chapter 6 
examines the general extent to which Britain was involved in the 
conduct of anti-Communist measures by Middle Eastern govern-
ments, and Britain’s attitudes towards their security measures 
which often violated of human rights. It also discusses the efficacy 
and limitations of the intelligence liaison.
10
1  Fighting the ‘Communist Menace’ 
Overseas1
The term ‘counter-subversion’ is used in this paper to mean clan-
destine activities, whether by propaganda or by operations, directed 
against Communism or, in the Colonies, against subversive forms of 
nationalism.
Prime Minister’s Memorandum, 10 December 19552
The principal object of our Middle East policy has recently been stated 
by Ministers to be the security of the oil on which the United Kingdom 
so greatly depends. The main instrument by which we hope to achieve 
our policy is the Baghdad Pact. Its value to the United Kingdom is 
primarily as a means of improving the Western position in the cold 
war and retaining the goodwill of two of the oil producing countries, 
namely, Iran and Iraq.
The Chiefs of Staff Committee, 13 July 19563
Introduction
The British government was greatly concerned by subversive 
activities. In 1958, for example, the Joint Intelligence Committee 
(JIC) viewed ‘subversive threats’ to ‘British interests throughout 
the world’ as the highest priority intelligence targets, alongside a 
strategic nuclear attack by the Soviet Union against Great Britain.4 
This chapter looks at the development of Britain’s post-war over-
seas anti-Communist policy and the organisational structures that 
shaped it. Since anti-Communist, or counter-subversion, policy 
in the Middle East developed in parallel with other foreign and 
colonial territories, this chapter starts with the origins of Britain’s 
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post-war anti-Communist policy overseas in the late 1940s. It 
shows that Whitehall departmental infighting over waging Cold 
War included stark disagreement about the role, conduct and 
severity of anti-Communist measures. The chapter then outlines 
the mechanisms of counter-subversion in the Middle East and 
discusses Britain’s relationship with the United States in anti-
Communist measures in the region.
The Origins of Post-War Counter-Subversive Activities 
Overseas
The origins of Britain’s counter-subversive activities overseas 
can be traced back to the late 1940s. The first post-war British 
government envisaged a potential war against the Soviet Union 
and adopted a very strong anti-Communist policy to fight the 
‘Communist menace’ overseas.5 Britain’s first post-war Foreign 
Secretary, Ernest Bevin, decided to establish three bodies within 
the Foreign Office directing anti-Communist activities in order to 
fight the Cold War against the Soviet Union: one committee and 
two departments. The first, in 1946, was the Russia Committee, 
a body in charge of political warfare activities and consisting 
of senior FO officials.6 The second, established in 1948, was 
the IRD, an anti-Communist propaganda apparatus, which one 
historian dubbed ‘Britain’s secret Cold War weapon’. The IRD 
was responsible for researching and conducting anti-Communist 
propaganda activities overseas.7 The third was the Permanent 
Under-Secretary’s Department (PUSD), created in 1949, to liaise 
with MI6 and MI5 and coordinate their activities in accordance 
with Foreign Office policy.8
An even more secret body has only recently come to light. 
Records declassified in October 2010 reveal that an interdepart-
mental official committee, the Official Committee on Communism 
(Overseas), or AC (O), was established in December 1949.9 
The AC (O) Committee replaced the existing interdepartmental 
committee, named ‘Committee on Communism’ at the Cabinet 
Office,10 and was formed in response to mounting pressure from 
the Chiefs of Staff, specifically Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor, 
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who suggested that the Attlee Government take stronger action 
against the spread of International Communism movements 
overseas.11 According to Bevin, it conducted both ‘offensive and 
defensive’ actions against the ‘Soviet and Communist menace in 
all spheres, political, military, economic and social, at home and 
abroad’.12
The AC (O) was chaired by a senior official from the PUSD 
of the Foreign Office: Sir Gladwyn Jebb (1949–50); Sir Pierson 
Dixon (1950–3); Sir John Ward (1954–5); and Sir Patrick Dean 
(1955–6).13 The permanent members included the Chairman of 
the JIC, the Chief of MI6, and representatives of the Ministry of 
Defence and of the Chiefs of Staff, and were later joined by a rep-
resentative of MI5.14 Members of relevant departments, including 
the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Office, were invited 
to committee meetings on an ad hoc basis. The purpose of the 
committee was the coordination and initiation of ‘any measures’ 
which ‘appeared desirable in the conduct of the Cold War’. ‘Any 
measures’ included propaganda by the IRD; clandestine para-
military operations by MI6; and security training of both foreign 
and colonial police forces supervised by MI5.15 The activities of 
the committee were supervised by a newly established Ministerial 
Committee on Communism, or the AC (M), chaired by Prime 
Minister Clement Attlee himself.16
Britain’s planners learned techniques from their own wartime 
experience, but also borrowed from Britain’s post-war enemies, the 
Soviet Union and International (Soviet-sponsored) Communism. 
Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor, an influential figure in setting 
up the AC (O) Committee, who was also one of the architects 
of Britain’s plans for the liberation of the Eastern bloc through 
special operations in the late 1940s, for instance, commented on 
countering Communist threats overseas that, although ‘we should 
never descend to their levels’, it would be ‘profitable to borrow 
certain methods from our enemies’ and ‘we should not hesitate to 
adopt measures against them which would not be warranted in 
dealing with a Civilized Power’.17
The AC (O) produced myriad proposals, including, in December 
1950, for MI6 to conduct ‘certain activities’ behind the Iron 
Curtain in ‘full co-operation with the Americans’.18 Around this 
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period, the Chiefs of Staff were lobbying to use MI6 as a tool for 
‘Cold War fighting’ through special political action, including 
paramilitary operations against Albania, codenamed Operation 
VALUABLE.19 A parallel development, and also very similar 
thinking to that of the Doolittle Report (a report on covert 
activities of the United States), was also taking place on the 
other side of the Atlantic, where the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) was empowered in 1948 under National Security Council 
(NSC) Directive 10/2 to engage in special operations, including 
‘subversion against hostile states’, in other words, what is well 
known as ‘covert action’.20 This was also largely a response of 
American policymakers to the threats from the Soviet Union and 
International Communism.
Quarrelling over the Conduct of the ‘Cold War’
There was no major development in anti-Communist policy and 
its underpinning machinery from the Attlee Government to the 
Churchill Government. After Stalin’s death in March 1953, the 
Soviet Union adopted the traditional Leninist critique of the West; 
the rise of nationalism in the colonial territories and the emer-
gence of the non-alignment movement loomed large, and ‘colo-
nialism’ became the pretext under which the Soviet Union was 
attacking European empires. Accordingly, in the mid-1950s, there 
was an important shift in British government anti-Communist 
policy overseas.
Despite the committee approach, and the broader appearance 
of consensus and collegiality,21 departmental infighting over 
Britain’s conduct of the Cold War was a common occurrence. In 
fact, Britain’s post-war foreign, defence and security policies often 
arose from civilian–military disputes, especially in the early period 
of the Cold War.22 Richard Aldrich argues that while the Chiefs 
of Staff had dominated Britain’s foreign policy and MI6’s special 
political action after the war, the Foreign Office took control of 
the conduct of the Cold War from 1950 onwards.23 However, this 
departmental infighting continued in the first half of the 1950s up 
until February 1956, when the AC (O) was officially disbanded.
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In October 1955, echoing the point made by Air Chief Marshal 
Sir John Slessor five years earlier, the Chiefs of Staff pointed out 
the need for ‘a world-wide strategic policy’, including foreign and 
colonial territories and also at home, to initiate ‘whole-hearted’ 
counter-offensive operations against ‘communist subversion’. 
Noting a change of the Soviet tactics from direct military con-
frontation with the West to ‘the intensification of subversion’ all 
over the world, the Chiefs of Staff considered that their anti-Com-
munist measures so far had largely been ‘by way of ad hoc meas-
ures aimed half-heartedly at the stopping of gaps’, and warned 
that this was ‘the reverse of a winning policy’.24 As one of the 
‘fundamental requirements for our success in the cold war’, the 
Chiefs of Staff noted, ‘we should vigorously combat and counter-
attack subversion by clandestine and all other related means’.25 
However, while this recommendation by the Chiefs of Staff trig-
gered a change in anti-Communist policy, it took the policy in a 
different direction from what they actually desired.
This recommendation preceded by a week a separate suggestion 
by Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan for forming new anti-
Communist committees.26 Macmillan sought to revise Britain’s 
anti-Communist policy overseas and to review the activities of 
MI6, MI5 and the IRD in the context of decolonisation and on 
the basis of Britain’s financial limitations. Around this time, anti-
Communist measures were chiefly targeted at Eastern European 
countries. Similar to Operation VALUABLE in Albania, MI6 had 
conducted paramilitary operations through various émigrés, and 
the IRD had attempted to destabilise the legitimacy of these newly 
established Communist regimes. Such anti-Communist ‘rolling-
back’ measures were also conducted with the Americans.27 Instead 
of directing anti-Communist measures behind the Iron Curtain, 
which were yielding unfruitful results and only wasting Britain’s 
resources, Macmillan suggested Eden pay more careful atten-
tion to colonial problems as well as maintaining British interests 
abroad, especially in the Middle East, where the Soviet Union was 
exploiting anti-British nationalist movements.28
Sir Norman Brook, the influential Cabinet Secretary, supported 
Macmillan’s proposals as being ‘more cautious’ than those of the 
Chiefs of Staff, which he labelled ‘rather feverish and muddled’.29 
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In line with Macmillan’s framework, Brook made more specific 
and clearer recommendations on subsequent anti-Communist 
policy, officially termed ‘counter-subversion’ from this point (thus 
the terms ‘counter-subversion’ and ‘anti-Communist measures’ 
were used interchangeably in official papers hereafter). Firstly, 
anti-Communist activities conducted by MI6 and IRD against the 
countries behind the Iron Curtain were to be suspended for the 
time being.30 Secondly, Whitehall was to mobilise ‘all our avail-
able resources’ to distinguish between Communist and nation-
alist movements and ensure ‘Communism is held in check and 
nationalist movements are guided along sound lines’. In order to 
counter ‘Communist encroachment’ in the colonies, Brook noted 
that ‘sound’ colonial administration, ‘good’ police forces and an 
‘efficient’ intelligence system were necessary.31
Brook also expressed his views on the way in which the AC 
(O) Committee, and more specifically the Chiefs of Staff, handled 
counter-subversion abroad, and noted that ministerial responsi-
bility was ‘being weakened by allowing the clandestine activities 
in this field to be “stimulated” by an interdepartmental commit-
tee of officials including a representative of the Chiefs of Staff’.32 
Around the same time, the Chiefs of Staff also attempted to initi-
ate a survey under the pretext of the ‘Cold War’ on ‘Communist 
infiltration in schools, both in the United Kingdom, and all foreign 
and colonial territories’ as a ‘general exercise by the JIC’.33 Once 
this was known to Brook, who thought it an inappropriate action 
by the Chiefs of Staff, he intervened in the matter and stopped it.34 
He then insisted to Eden that the use of the term ‘Cold War’ in 
any official minutes and memoranda should be banned as the term 
was, in Brook’s words, ‘responsible for a lot of muddled thinking 
– or, worse still, lack of thinking’, which ‘led the Chiefs of Staff to 
suppose that they are in some way responsible for matters which 
are essentially the business of the Foreign Secretary’.35
Senior officials in the Foreign Office shared Brook’s frustra-
tion with the Chiefs of Staff. As a result of ‘a clear cleavage’ in 
the AC (O) Committee between the Chiefs of Staff, who wanted 
to ‘get cracking’, and those representing the Foreign Office, who 
preferred ‘a more cautious approach’, Sir John Ward, Chairman 
of the AC (O) Committee (1954–5), consequently found himself 
The Twilight of the British Empire
16
in the ‘invidious position of acting as a brake rather than an 
accelerator on the Committee machine’.36 In addition, Sir Patrick 
Dean, the successor to Sir John Ward as Chairman of the AC (O) 
Committee (1955–6), who also chaired the JIC, recorded in his 
minute in December 1955 to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State, that:
there would be no objection to telling General Templer and the Chiefs 
of Staff generally about what was going on [about counter-subversive 
policy in the FO], but the trouble was that they conceived it their 
duty to ‘stimulate’ action and were always interfering in the details of 
the special operations which were not their concern. We are always 
having difficulty on this with the Chiefs of Staff representative.37
Moreover, ‘in my experience’, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick noted to the 
Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, when the Chiefs of Staff were 
arguing that stronger counter-subversive activities were neces-
sary, they mostly relied on ‘hearsay’ from their low-level repre-
sentatives and did not ‘always know what they [were] talking 
about’.38
The reforms revised the inappropriate machinery of the AC 
(O) and, by extension, revised the meaning of counter-subversion 
itself by emphasising that it must be directed by broader foreign 
or colonial policy: it was stated that the Foreign Secretary must 
be responsible for all counter-subversion in foreign countries, and 
the Colonial Secretary must be similarly responsible for coun-
ter-subversion in the colonies.39 Following Cabinet approval on 
24 February 1956, the AC (O) Committee was disbanded and 
replaced by new counter-subversive committees.40 Unlike the old 
AC (O) Committee, these new committees excluded the Chiefs of 
Staff.
The Official Committee on Counter-Subversion in the Colonial 
Territories was formed as an interdepartmental committee at 
the Cabinet Office to cover the colonial territories, supervis-
ing all counter-subversive activities in the colonies, and some 
Commonwealth countries, under the direction of the Colonial 
Policy Committee.41 The other committee, the Overseas Planning 
Committee (1956–7), often referred to as the ‘special’ committee, 
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was established in the Foreign Office and was directly concerned 
with foreign countries, including Middle Eastern states. From 
1957, after absorbing the Russia Committee, it was renamed the 
Political Intelligence Committee.42
The newly appointed Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, who had 
been the Minister of Defence until December 1955, was, however, 
concerned about the exclusion of the Chiefs of Staff, who were 
‘very strongly opposed’ to Eden’s memorandum which proposed 
the formation of these committees, and decided to include Major-
General William G. Stirling on the Overseas Planning Committee 
as a representative of the Ministry of Defence and the Chiefs of 
Staff.43 Despite an earlier decision that the new committee be 
chaired by a senior official from the PUSD, Selwyn Lloyd instead 
selected his Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Douglas 
Dodds-Parker, as chairman.44 Lloyd thought that ‘it would be 
useful for a Minister to be closely concerned because he could 
then talk to the Chiefs of Staff and the Minister of Defence as well 
as discussing with the Secretary of State himself’.45 The chairing 
of the Foreign Office’s special committee by Dodds-Parker was 
formally accepted by the same Cabinet meeting that approved 
Eden’s memorandum on 24 February 1956.46 Ministerial respon-
sibilities and positions in directing counter-subversion overseas 
would become consolidated and enhanced.
These developments are important: they shaped broader British 
thinking and action in numerous ways. Firstly, they established 
a clear government policy to maintain British interests over-
seas, shifting the focus of anti-Communist measures away from 
the Soviet Union and its satellite countries to other territories, 
most notably Middle Eastern states, where Britain had national 
 interests – oil in particular.47 Eden stated that in shifting the 
focus from the Eastern bloc, ‘we should be ready to make more 
use of counter-subversion in the smaller countries in the Middle 
East and in South-East Asia which are seriously threatened with 
Communist infiltration’.48 Secondly, the Eden Government recog-
nised that while nationalist movements in the colonies were not 
necessarily Communist, they had the potential to be exploited by 
the Soviet Union or local Communist Parties. The recognition 
of this long-standing problem at the highest level not only led 
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to developments in the Foreign Office, but was also a prelude to 
the subsequent 1957 development that saw the JIC placed in the 
Cabinet Office with a representative from the Colonial Office as 
an official member.49
Around the same time, there had been a parallel shift of empha-
sis in Foreign Office intelligence from ‘a possible global war’ 
against the Soviet Union and its satellite countries to ‘present and 
increasing’ subversive activities overseas, such as in the Middle 
East. Observing this shift, Sir Patrick Dean, the JIC Chairman, 
noted that ‘nearly all the intelligence now considered by the 
Joint Intelligence Committee in its weekly review is of a political/ 
economic nature’ rather than to do with military threats.50 Dean 
also commented that:
the JIC are considering whether some part of the considerable effort 
put by our collecting agencies (particularly JIB [Joint Intelligence 
Bureau], our friends [MI6] and GCHQ) into obtaining intelligence 
about the military organisation, capabilities, state of preparedness, 
etc., of the Sino-Soviet bloc could not be switched more profitably and 
successfully to these ‘grey’ territories [such as the Middle East and the 
colonies] where the politico/economic/cultural threat is more immi-
nent. If some of the effort directed to obtain order of battle and similar 
types of intelligence could be dropped, the resources thus freed could 
be used to obtain intelligence about Communist plans for subverting 
and penetrating the ‘grey’ areas.51
While a possible change in the allocation of intelligence collection 
efforts was being discussed at the JIC level, Dean noted that:
there is a strong case for seeing what steps can be taken by the 
Foreign Office to improve immediately the organisation for collat-
ing and assessing Sino-Soviet intentions and plans, both general and 
particular, for attacking and increasing their influence in these ‘grey’ 
territories.52
Thirdly, the developments defined counter-subversion as one 
of the ‘clandestine activities’ to be conducted by MI6, MI5 and 
the IRD, and reiterated that all counter-subversive activities were 
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to be directed by government policy: the Foreign and Colonial 
Secretaries were ‘responsible for all counter-subversion’ in their 
respective spheres. Eden’s memorandum also noted that ‘subject 
to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary should retain sole 
control over C’s organisation [MI6]. C’s activities in support of 
foreign policy should remain subject to the Ministerial control of 
the Foreign Secretary.’53 This was mainly intended to prevent any 
further interference by the Chiefs of Staff in counter-subversive 
activities conducted by intelligence and security services.
Once the government’s counter-subversive policy was made 
clear, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick despatched a top-secret and personal 
letter by diplomatic bag to all ambassadorial and ministerial posi-
tions in foreign countries, instructing them to pay more careful 
attention to ‘signs of Communist or other subversive activities’. 
He wrote:
We have decided, in view of the new type of threat, that counter-sub-
version, i.e. clandestine activities whether by propaganda or by special 
operations, will have an increasing part to play in support of foreign 
policy . . . We have accordingly tried to draw up a broad list of priori-
ties for such action . . . Action is most urgently required in the Middle 
East and South-East Asia . . . Her Majesty’s Representatives are in the 
best position to suggest ways of countering dangerous activities and 
of reinforcing the influence of those well-disposed towards us and 
their ability to resist hostile subversive activities; and you should not 
hesitate to put forward such suggestions, whether they are for overt 
anti-Communist measures or for ways in which the policies of Her 
Majesty’s Government might be furthered by clandestine means.54
The Overseas Planning Committee also clearly set out the use of 
‘covert operations’ by MI6 as counter-subversive measures. In his 
minute to the Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, Sir Patrick Dean 
reported that:
We are preparing a circular letter to Her Majesty’s representatives 
abroad informing them that the increased use of clandestine means 
to further foreign policy has been approved and requesting them to 
bear this constantly in mind and to submit recommendations for such 
The Twilight of the British Empire
20
activities in consultation with the local representatives of our friends 
[MI6]. We recommend that this should be followed up by more 
detailed instructions as appropriate to individual posts, asking for 
more reports on Communist penetration and prospects and recom-
mendations for counter-action.55
The approval by the Eden Government of the increased use of 
covert operations suggests that such activity was considered a 
useful and cost-effective tool to implement foreign policy.
Policymakers understood covert operations as being less costly 
than sending troops overseas. This point was made by Harold 
Macmillan – who used the example of sending British troops to 
Kenya, British Guiana and Cyprus, which incurred huge expen-
ditures of money and manpower – to suggest to Anthony Eden 
a wiser use of intelligence.56 Furthermore, Macmillan may even 
have suggested this increased use of covert operations, informing 
Eden in 1955 that:
there is sometimes reluctance to contemplate the use of covert means 
until it is rather too late for the proper planning to take place. I think 
therefore we should examine our present procedures and organisa-
tion to ensure that the possibility of using covert means to achieve 
our ends and in support of our overt policy is constantly borne in 
mind and the necessary planning carried out wherever possible well 
in advance.57
As discussed below, Macmillan saw the use of intelligence services 
as an instrument of policy as a valid proposition. In short, these 
various bureaucratic debates and reforms had real impact: they 
drove an intensification of British covert counter-subversion in 
the Middle East.
Counter-Subversion in the Middle East
Since the post-war Middle East was regarded as, in the words 
of Ernest Bevin, ‘of cardinal importance to the United Kingdom, 
second only to the United Kingdom itself’, British policymakers 
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had a particular attachment to defending British interests against 
subversive activities in the region.58 Until the mid-1950s, mostly 
under the Attlee Government, British interests were more associ-
ated with its defence policy and military planning; Wm. Roger 
Louis describes it as ‘a region honeycombed with British military 
installations’.59
The Middle East consisted of both colonial and foreign territo-
ries with which Britain had military commitments under defence 
treaties, such as Egypt, Jordan and Iraq. The post-war Middle 
East was also a region in turmoil, in which Britain was under 
attack in various ways – the military presence in Egypt was seri-
ously threatened by growing anti-British sentiment; and then by 
the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, under the terms of which 
British military forces were to be evacuated from Egypt. The 
centre of gravity of British foreign and defence policies in the 
region had already shifted from Egypt to the Iraqi–Jordanian 
axis.60 From the mid-1950s, British foreign and defence policies in 
the region depended on the Baghdad Pact, which had been formed 
in April 1955,61 and, through counter-subversion cooperation, 
became ‘the main instrument’ to achieve ‘the security of the oil’ 
and the retention of ‘the good will’ of the oil-producing countries, 
such as Iraq and Iran.62
Although Britain had different defence, foreign and colo-
nial policies towards the various Middle Eastern countries, the 
urgency for anti-Communist measures in the region came from 
the need to prepare for a possible war against the Soviet Union 
in the early post-war period. The defence of the Middle East was 
then considered by the British military as a pillar of Britain’s 
post-war defence strategy.63 The necessity of anti-Communist 
measures in the region was, in essence, primarily guided by the 
Defence Transition Committee (DTC) and the 1948 Government 
War Book.64 The 1948 War Book set procedures for all depart-
ments, including the intelligence and security services, to deal 
with the possible event of war against the Soviet Union.65 In this 
context, the role of MI5 was to inform security authorities of 
‘lists of persons’ who should be detained under draconian defence 
regulations.66 To ready itself, MI5 prepared its own in-house war 
book, which was constantly reviewed and circulated internally.67 
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The 1948 Government War Book was also the key driving policy 
for MI5’s activities in the Middle East. The regional headquarters 
of MI5, SIME, the prime security authority in the region, pre-
pared security measures in case of an emergency or war.68 Since 
the Chiefs of Staff envisaged the possibility of a Soviet invasion of 
the region, SIME was particularly important because the integrity 
of the Middle East was essential for British defence planning.69 In 
the same way, their activities were further directed by foreign and 
colonial policies in the region.70
A distinctive characteristic of the Middle East was that 
Communism had been made illegal in most Middle Eastern coun-
tries by the late 1940s.71 Despite Communist activities being 
prohibited by local authorities, Communism remained a cause 
for concern, especially for the Chiefs of Staff, who had to plan 
a potential war against the Soviet Union. Although Communist 
Parties had not gained popular support in the region, the 
Communist movements were by no means non-existent and 
merely existed underground. According to the first comprehen-
sive post-war survey conducted by the JIC, these underground 
Communist movements sought to exploit nationalist elements for 
‘opposition to the interests of “Anglo-American Imperialism”’.72 
Local Communist Parties and their sympathisers were inevitably 
regarded by the Chiefs of Staff as ‘potential fifth columnists’, 
whose activities might threaten an allied war effort in the event of 
war with the Soviet Union.73
Secondarily, since its establishment in 1949, the AC (O) 
Committee became the most important body not only for coordi-
nating Britain’s anti-Communist activities in the Middle East but 
also for stimulating anti-Communist measures to be conducted by 
local authorities. Countries such as Iran, Syria and Lebanon were 
identified as flashpoints vulnerable to Communist exploitation of 
local conditions, such as low standards of living and unequal dis-
tribution of wealth.74 For instance, Sir Michael Wright, Assistant 
Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office and the chief expert on 
Middle Eastern affairs, was frequently invited to the commit-
tee’s meetings to express his opinion. Wright pronounced in June 
1950 that the danger of the spread of Communist influence in the 
Middle East was ‘very real’.75 In addition, the AC (O) considered 
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the local security services ill-prepared for war, especially as far 
as their anti-Communist security measures were concerned. The 
AC (O) encouraged close security liaisons with Middle Eastern 
countries, as a means of implementing anti-Communist measures 
in the region.
Like the post-war Labour Government, the subsequent 
Conservative (Churchill, Eden, Macmillan) administrations con-
tinued to place particular importance on the region. The Overseas 
Planning Committee of the Foreign Office coordinated counter-
subversive measures in foreign countries and its first meeting 
noted that ‘the Middle East and South-East Asia, in that order, 
are the areas most immediately threatened and where counter-
action both overt and covert is most urgently needed’.76 From the 
mid-1950s, as the possibility of a conventional third world war 
faded away, anti-Communist measures in the region shifted from 
war planning to the pursuance of regional alliances through the 
Baghdad Pact.
Under the umbrella of anti-Communist policy, MI5, MI6 and 
the IRD conducted a range of activities including police training, 
propaganda and disruptive actions. At the regional level, there 
was also a Joint Intelligence Committee in the Middle East, JIC 
(ME), where SIME and MI6 were both represented. Although 
the JIC (ME) was chaired by an FO representative, it was more 
associated with the Chiefs of Staff than the one in Whitehall, 
on which the intelligence services continued to be represented.77 
The relationship between MI5 and MI6 in the region merits 
brief attention here. MI5’s role of defending the realm against 
espionage, subversion and sabotage extended to the colonial ter-
ritories.78 In conditions laid out under the Attlee Directive (also 
known as the ‘Attlee Doctrine’) of 1948, MI6 operated in foreign 
countries.79 Nevertheless, the post-war Middle East, consisting of 
both colonial territories and foreign countries, proved an excep-
tion. MI5 and MI6 operated on an ad hoc basis, partly governed 
by the broadly defined SIME Charter,80 and also directed by the 
objectives set by the AC (O) Committee and the Baghdad Pact.
It is worth mentioning MI6’s anti-Communist activities in the 
region in particular. From 1949, MI6’s link with the Foreign 
Office was maintained through the PUSD.81 In the early post-war 
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period, however, MI6 had an even closer relationship with the 
Chiefs of Staff as the ‘primary customers’,82 who used MI6 for 
‘Cold War fighting’.83 MI6’s special political action was also 
favoured by Prime Ministers, such as Winston Churchill, Anthony 
Eden and Harold Macmillan, as an instrument of foreign policy. 
Winston Churchill’s penchant for secret intelligence and his use of 
it is well known.84 Notable examples include Churchill’s support 
for Operation BOOT/TPAJAX, to overthrow the Iranian Premier 
in 1953.85 Anthony Eden also sought to use MI6 as his personal 
tool against Gamal Abdul Nasser.86
Harold Macmillan was in fact one of the key decision makers 
who set the direction of counter-subversive activities, especially in 
the Middle East. Concerning Macmillan’s approach to defending 
‘British interests in the Middle East’, Nigel Ashton remarked that 
he ‘was not only the foremost of the Cabinet hawks over Suez’ but 
also he was, ‘if anything, even more radical’ than his Cabinet col-
leagues.87 In October 1955, Macmillan told Eden that the ‘supply 
of oil’ from the Middle East was vital for reviving Britain’s 
exhausted economy, and therefore, maintaining Britain’s position 
in the region was necessary ‘at almost any cost’.88 He seemingly 
favoured MI6’s special operations in the Middle East region to 
achieve this.89 In his memoirs, Christopher ‘Monty’ Woodhouse, 
the chief planner on the MI6 side of the 1953 Iranian coup, 
records that it was Macmillan, not Anthony Eden, who was 
keen to know more about the operational details of that coup. 
According to Woodhouse, Macmillan was ‘clearly looking to the 
future possibilities’ of using such an operation elsewhere.90 In 
their conversation about problems with the colonial insurgency in 
Cyprus at a party in the Ministry of Defence in December 1954, 
Macmillan said to Woodhouse, ‘We ought to be trying some of 
your [MI6] stuff there.’91
In addition to the use of special operations, Macmillan also 
had a clearer plan for the conduct of the Cold War. He saw 
intelligence as a cost-effective tool in implementing British policy 
overseas especially when facing Soviet exploitation of anti- 
colonial nationalist movements on the one hand, and the lack of 
economic and defence resources on the other. Macmillan noted 
that:
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To accomplish this our first line of defence in these territories [refer-
ring to the Middle East and South Asia] must be to build up wherever 
possible adequate reliable intelligence/security forces from the local 
population and resources so that . . . these forces are in situ and 
capable of preventing a relapse into Communism or anarchy . . . I am 
convinced that the sooner we get to work in some of these foreign ter-
ritories and British Colonies the easier our task will be and the cheaper 
to us in terms of manpower and money.92
Macmillan was referring to the problems not only in the colo-
nies but also in the Middle Eastern countries on which Britain’s 
national interests depended. He simultaneously decided to ‘make 
available technical advice on Communist subversion’ to members 
of the Baghdad Pact (Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan), and pro-
posed the formation of multilateral intelligence/security coop-
eration for intelligence sharing and fighting against Communist 
problems in the Pact area.93
This proposal was significant in at least two ways. Firstly, by 
consolidating local security services through sharing intelligence 
on the methods of Communist subversion, local authorities were 
more likely to resist it. Thus, pro-British regimes, such as in Iraq, 
would remain in power. Indeed, declassified records from the 
Overseas Planning Committee confirm that bolstering Britain’s 
closest ally, Iraq, against subversion was at the centre of counter-
subversive measures in the region. In addition, the Baghdad Pact 
was considered a defence against the growing influence of the 
Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdul Nasser, who became a symbol of 
anti-British agitation in the region from 1955. The first report by 
the Overseas Planning Committee in March 1956 noted that:
The retention of Iraq as a firm base is of the greatest importance 
to Her Majesty’s Government, and we should ensure that member-
ship of the Baghdad Pact is seen to be more profitable than Egyptian 
‘neutralism’. Although no drastic covert action is urgently needed, 
we recommend that: . . . our friends [MI6] and the Security Service 
should be asked to pay particular attention to forces acting in Iraq 
against Nuri Pasha and our interests, and to put forward suggestions 
for counter-measures.94
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Secondly, liaising with other intelligence/security services allowed 
Britain to obtain intelligence that might not otherwise be avail-
able. Sir Patrick Dean noted that it was ‘one of the functions 
of the Security Service; to obtain secret intelligence by its own 
means’.95 Thus, the arrangement for sharing intelligence with 
local authorities would in turn enable Britain to ‘check the growth 
of Communism’ in the region.96
The nature of the post-war Middle East, which became more 
hostile to British presence and its influence, as well as the multiple 
layers of intelligence customers at different levels directing anti-
Communist measures in the Middle East, made anti-Communist 
measures more difficult to be concerted in practice. Above all, 
while anti-Communist measures in the region were planned by 
policymakers in Whitehall, the policymakers were less concerned 
with the implementation, let alone the implications, of these 
measures in the region. In addition, the compartmentalisation 
of the services also contributed to the lack of coordination in 
 practice on the ground.97
Britain’s Relationship with the Americans in the Middle 
East
Britain’s relationship with the United States in the Middle East 
was not a zero-sum game.98 Britain enjoyed a relatively independ-
ent position in the Middle East, where the United States was seen 
as a new and inexperienced actor soon after the Second World 
War.99 However, Britain’s established ‘paramount power’ was 
rapidly fading away by the mid-1950s, and by Britain’s invita-
tion the transfer of power to the United States was completed by 
the early 1960s.100 In the wider context of British decolonisation, 
the British Empire was also ‘transformed as part of the Anglo-
American coalition’ in the Cold War.101 Harold Macmillan was 
important in cementing the so-called special relationship after the 
Suez debacle and welcomed American interference in the region.102 
When American officials were deliberating possible collaboration 
with the British on clandestine special operations in the Syrian 
Crisis in September 1957, the Secretary of State of the United 
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States, John Foster Dulles, noted that there was ‘genuine, intimate 
and effective cooperation, stemming directly from Macmillan’.103
At departmental and intelligence levels, Britain had a differ-
ent degree of cooperation with the Americans.104 Amongst all, 
perhaps, the closest cooperation was maintained at the military 
level, thanks to the Second World War, which also included 
intelligence sharing.105 This was particularly true in the case of 
the post-war Middle East, where joint military planning saw the 
highest level of cooperation.106 Security intelligence reports on 
Middle Eastern affairs compiled by SIME were periodically shared 
with the Americans after the end of the Second World War.107 
MI6 also enjoyed fairly close cooperation with the Americans. 
A notable example of this is the aforementioned 1953 coup in 
Iran.108 The reasons for cooperation with the Americans on the 
British side were both financial and practical. When diplomatic 
relations were ended in October 1952, the British Embassy staff, 
including the MI6 station, were expelled from Tehran, where 
MI6’s agents were contacted and maintained by the CIA, such as 
Roger Goiran, CIA station chief in Tehran, and Kermit Roosevelt, 
who carried out the operation with American finance.109
The Overseas Planning Committee also referred to future coop-
eration with the Americans. Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick addressed all 
posts abroad, encouraging more active counter-subversion in 
foreign countries, and noted that ‘even in cases where counterac-
tion is not possible by ourselves owing to lack of resources’, ‘it 
may still be possible to do something in consultation with our 
allies, e.g. the Americans’.110 Sir Patrick Dean noted to Foreign 
Secretary Selwyn Lloyd in March 1956 that ‘we must cooperate 
even more closely in all “cold war” activities’ with the Americans, 
and reminded him that the Americans would ‘certainly welcome 
a more robust attitude on our part’, and the British ‘should not 
scruple to ask them for financial help’.111 In the case of counter-
subversive measures in Jordan, for instance, which had main-
tained a close connection with the British since the end of the 
First World War, a number of problems were identified – such 
as an influx of refugees that caused the collapse of the Palestine 
Mandate and the establishment of Israel, growing Communist 
influence, and all forms of hostile propaganda from the Soviet 
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Union and Egypt. In March 1956, Douglas Dodds-Parker, the 
Charmain of the Overseas Planning Committee, suggested to 
Selwyn Lloyd that counter-measures in Jordan be carried out by 
the Americans, which Lloyd approved.
By the beginning of 1958, the United States had assumed ‘finan-
cial responsibility’ from Britain for the Jordanian Army, with 
which the American Military Attaché acted as a liaison officer 
and made ‘successful’ efforts to influence the Jordanians.112 The 
financial assistance to Jordan was indeed a part of the so-called 
Eisenhower Doctrine, which provided American assistance to 
Middle Eastern states that were prepared to resist Communist 
threats.113 Reporting on the American activities in Jordan to the 
Foreign Office, Sir Charles Johnston, the British Ambassador in 
Jordan (1956–60), noted that this caused him ‘no misgivings’ 
since ‘our relations with the Middle Eastern side of CIA are very 
close at present’, and that ‘we are agreed that it is a Western inter-
est to keep the Jordan Arab Army both strong and efficient’.114 
Jack O’Connell, the former CIA station chief in Jordan (1963–
71), who liaised directly with King Hussein of Jordan, recalls that 
the CIA’s long relationship with Jordan started from his arrival in 
Jordan in the summer of 1958.115
Despite American involvement in certain countries, such as 
Egypt and Jordan, their overall policy towards the region was 
mostly dominated by the so-called Project ALPHA from 1954 
until early 1956, concentrating on the means of achieving peace 
between the Arab states and Israel, and their oil interest in Saudi 
Arabia.116 The ambiguous attitude of the Americans towards the 
region was clearly seen in the context of the American attitudes 
towards the Baghdad Pact – while the United States was a full 
member of some important committees of the Pact, such as the 
Economic and Military Committees (it joined in 1957), it was 
not a member of the Pact itself until 1959.117 More importantly 
and specifically, in dealing with subversive activities in the Pact 
area, the United States remained officially neutral as an ‘observer’ 
and its ambiguous attitudes continued throughout the period. 
Elie Podeh has suggested that ‘all these mixed signals created the 
impression that Washington did not consider the Baghdad Pact as 
a major instrument of policy’.118 A report by the British Chief of 
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the Imperial General Staff confirmed in August 1958 that, ‘up to 
the present time’, from their point of view, ‘the United States have 
had no wish to support or protect British interests’.119
The American accession to the Pact in 1959 largely resulted 
from British efforts to maintain the Pact as a regional defence/
security organisation. When the Baghdad Pact lost its headquar-
ters, after Iraqi withdrawal, Britain faced difficulties in persuad-
ing the remaining regional members to maintain the rationale 
for and morale of the Pact. Britain was especially concerned 
about Iran, which belonged to the Baghdad Pact but not to 
any another Western security organisations, unlike Turkey (a 
member of NATO) and Pakistan (a member of the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization, SEATO). The CIA noted that ‘the British 
are anxious to boost the Shah’s morale’, and also recorded that 
Selwyn Lloyd insisted in September 1958 on the United States 
becoming a full member and expressed his concern that ‘Iran 
might go neutralist if the Shah does not receive the material and 
moral support he deems necessary.’120
Until the Iraqi Revolution on 14 July 1958, Britain’s policy 
towards the region had maintained a strong anti-Nasserite stance, 
paying particular attention to ‘the region-wide task of diminish-
ing Egyptian and Saudi influence’ and ‘breaking the Egypt/Saudi 
axis’.121 Soon after Britain ‘lost’ Iraq, its closest ally in the region, 
Harold Macmillan reconsidered Britain’s position, dropping its 
outright anti-Nasserite policy, and reformulated a new policy 
towards the region.122 In order to maintain good relations with 
the Baghdad Pact members, who were unlikely to welcome such a 
policy, the British government decided that the Americans ‘should 
be induced to join the new organisation’.123 Consequently, the 
United States joined CENTO, which was the Baghdad Pact 
renamed, and they participated in counter-subversive activities 
from 1959 onwards.
Conclusion
Anti-Communist measures overseas dominated debates inside the 
British government about the conduct of the Cold War throughout 
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the period between the late 1940s and the mid-1950s. As the Cold 
War intensified, diplomats faced greater pressure to instigate ever 
more active measures, and counter-subversion gradually intensi-
fied. Whitehall planners created elaborate machinery which drove 
the new agenda. Late 1955 was a key date for the Middle East in 
particular. Before then, the Chiefs of Staff prioritised the region, 
given its likely importance in any third world war. From the mid-
1950s, counter-subversion became seen more as a tool of foreign 
policy – under the Baghdad Pact, regional cooperation in counter-
subversion was regarded as necessary to check and prevent the 
spread of Communism in the region. Policymakers in London 
increasingly saw intelligence and security services as having a core 
role to play in anti-Communist measures as a central part of the 
burgeoning Cold War policy. As will be shown in the following 
chapters, MI5, MI6 and the IRD had particularly important func-
tions to play in such activity, but there were also implications for 
the internal security of the regional governments.
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2  Security Training and Liaison in  
Anti-Communist Measures
People in the Arab world were intrigued by the Communists . . . The 
old political parties all over the Arab world were bankrupt of ideas 
and influences because the world was changing and they were not 
prepared for change. So there was a vacuum of power and the idea 
of Communism was potentially attractive . . . When the Communist 
Manifesto was smuggled into Egypt it caused a sensation. Intellectuals 
read it and thought that they had come upon a key which could open 
all the political and social doors.
Mohamed Heikal1
It is in countries where social unrest and resentment may be exploited 
that Communism gains a hold. The Middle East, as long as it 
remains under the imperialist yoke, took the line of least resistance to 
Communism. In Egypt, at this time, we were witnessing the birth of a 
new fanaticism – Communism – and the revival of the old fanaticism 
of the Muslim Brotherhood. At first taking parallel courses, the two 
creeds finally converged and united.
Anwar El Sadat2
Introduction
Mohamed Heikal, an Egyptian journalist writing on the poten-
tial appeal of Communism, illustrates a common sentiment 
amongst Egyptians immediately after the Second World War. 
More importantly, these ideas could be found throughout the 
Middle East, where many dominant political parties enjoyed close 
ties with Britain and were increasingly being challenged by a 
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public growing frustrated with their local politics. While the idea 
of Communism never became popular in the region, as a result 
of measures adopted by the strongly anti-Communist govern-
ments, frustrated nationalists adopted a revolutionary tendency 
often associated with International Communism and engaged in 
subversive activities to change the status quo. Sometimes anti-
colonialists did work with the Communists to achieve shared 
goals. Anwar El Sadat, as quoted above, has pointed out that the 
Muslim Brotherhood, an anti-British militant group, conducted 
subversive activities against the pro-British Egyptian government 
in tandem with Communists.
This chapter reveals firstly, how the British government came 
to conclude that training Middle Eastern security services in anti-
Communist measures was necessary, and secondly, the way in 
which these measures were implemented in Lebanon, Iran, Iraq 
and Jordan. It also shows that British anti-Communist policy 
and concerns about the Communist movements in the region 
dovetailed with the demands of Middle Eastern governments for 
British advice on anti-Communist measures.
Setting a Policy of Security Advising and Police Training
The origins of Britain’s security advice to, and training of, colo-
nial security forces can be traced back to before the Second World 
War when Whitehall despatched a number of security officers to 
the colonies and Commonwealth as a precautionary measure for 
maintaining internal security.3 However, it is wrong to assume 
that the training courses conducted by MI5 in the post-war period 
merely involved the maintenance of law and order. These courses 
were more specifically geared towards enhancing the intelligence 
and security capabilities of local authorities. When General (later 
Field-Marshal) Sir Gerald Templer, the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, conducted a survey of the status of internal secu-
rity machinery throughout the British Empire in the early 1950s, 
intelligence was considered ‘our Achilles heel’.4 Referring to 
the ongoing counter-insurgency in Malaya, he insisted that ‘the 
emergency will be won by our intelligence system – our Special 
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Branch’.5 British advice and training courses were designed spe-
cifically for anti-Communist measures, and MI5 was the chief 
organiser from the outset.
Sir Percy Sillitoe, the first post-war Director-General of MI5, 
made twelve substantial trips to British territories overseas, advis-
ing and liaising with local authorities on enhancing internal secu-
rity.6 MI5 officers were also sent to colonial territories under the 
title of Security Liaison Officer (SLO) to work with local security 
forces to prevent Communist influence and ensure that newly 
independent states would not fall to Moscow’s influence.7 Such 
service formed a sizeable part of the lives of MI5 personnel who 
were expected to spend ‘a quarter to a third of their careers on 
overseas posting in the Empire and Commonwealth’ to advise 
local authorities on security matters.8
Drawing on Templer’s recommendations for enhancing colo-
nial security, the Colonial Office formed its own Intelligence and 
Security Department in 1955. Meanwhile, three MI5 officers 
were seconded to the Colonial Office under the title of Security 
Intelligence Adviser (SIA) and, between 1954 and 1957, paid fifty-
seven visits to twenty-seven colonial territories, helping to found 
some twenty-one Colonial Special Branches.9 A. M. MacDonald, 
a chief SIA (1954–7), noted that:
the aim is to build towards an indigenous professional intelligence 
service, able to stand on its own feet when self-government is attained 
in meeting the intelligence needs of the territory . . . Such an organisa-
tion is not only a valuable legacy to a territory achieving independ-
ence, but the best guarantee of maintaining H.M.G.’s intelligence 
interests in the longer term.10
MI5 regularly organised a series of training courses designed 
for senior police officers, such as the heads of Special Branch 
or equivalent ranks, of all colonial and protectorate territories. 
The total number of colonial and Commonwealth police and 
administrative officers trained in Britain by MI5 averaged 250 
per year from 1954 to 1958; at the height of decolonisation 
the following year, it peaked at 367.11 Colonial security offic-
ers attending the training courses were also greeted by Colonial 
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Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd.12 The purpose of providing such 
training was, in Templer’s words, for the ‘stepping-up of intel-
ligence activity’ against the spread of Communist movements 
overseas.13
MI5’s police training appears mainly to have consisted of 
two different curricula: one was a series of lectures conducted 
by senior MI5 officers, and the other was a number of Special 
Branch training sessions run by Scotland Yard. MI5 designed the 
lectures to foster common understanding of the nature and scale 
of International Communist movements throughout the world 
and included a range of topics, such as ‘Why Communists are 
subversive’.14 Sir Dick White, later the Director-General of MI5 
and Chief of MI6, delivered a lecture on the links between the 
Soviet Intelligence Service and International Communism, enti-
tled ‘The Methods of Soviet Subversion throughout the World’, 
and one on ‘The Objects and Capabilities of the Communist 
Party of Great Britain’ (CPGB).15 According to Peter Wright, 
a former MI5 officer, Dick White ‘believed in the fashionable 
idea of “containing” the Soviet Union, and that MI5 had a 
vital role to play in neutralizing Soviet assets’, meaning that 
successful counter-subversive measures could prevent the spread 
of Communist movements.16 The training sessions run by 
Scotland Yard dealt with tradecraft and techniques of counter-
intelligence and counter-subversion, including how to detect 
secret writing hidden in a letter and how to discreetly open and 
re-seal mail.17
There was an additional development in the colonies. In the 
mid-1950s, again on Templer’s recommendation, several Regional 
Training Colleges, also known as Special Branch Training Units, 
were established for the purpose of anti-Communist training.18 
By November 1957, these colleges hosted the majority of anti-
Communist training courses.19 Such training was not, however, 
confined to Britain and the Empire but also took place in the 
Middle East more broadly.
Security Training and Liaison
35
British Security/Police Liaison in Anti-Communist 
Measures in the Middle East
The British realised that Communists had successfully infiltrated 
Eastern European police forces. As a result, training foreign police 
officers in preventing such infiltration was key to stopping the 
spread of Communist movements overseas. This logic had already 
driven the British to enhance colonial security, but extended to 
the Middle East more broadly.20 The task of prioritising, direct-
ing and supervising Britain’s anti-Communist measures fell to the 
aforementioned highly secret Cabinet committee, the AC (O). 
Target partner countries spanned Western Europe, Southeastern 
Europe, Southeast Asia and Latin America.21 Above all, however, 
Whitehall officials considered the Middle East the most important 
region to be protected and that it required anti-Communist meas-
ures to be implemented most urgently.
In the 1920s and 1930s, local Communist Parties in the Middle 
East were founded under the direction of the Comintern, and 
adhered to a Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideological doctrine.22 While 
using subversive propaganda to undermine the reputation of local 
authorities, these Communist groups attempted to infiltrate armies 
and security services. But the local governments were well aware 
of such activity and authorised rigorous counter-measures against 
them, enforced by domestic laws. According to the Iraqi Penal 
Code, for example, expression of approval or dissemination of 
Communist doctrines would be punished by penal servitude, and if 
the offence occurred in the ‘presence of more than one member of the 
armed forces or the police’, it would be ‘punishable with death’.23 
Similar measures were enforced in other Middle Eastern countries, 
including Egypt and Turkey.24 By the late 1940s, Communist activ-
ities were outlawed throughout the region, except Israel.
Despite these legislative settings, the attitudes of Middle 
Eastern governments towards Communists varied from country 
to country. Iraq, Britain’s closest ally, which had maintained a 
strong policy since the 1920s, was the leading anti-Communist 
government in the region until 1958. Despite being resilient since 
its establishment in the early 1930s, the Iraqi Communist Party 
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(ICP) was consistently suppressed by the Iraqi authorities.25 These 
security measures were conducted by the Criminal Investigation 
Department (CID) of the Iraqi Police, led by Colonel Bahjat Beg 
Attiyah since the 1930s.26
Meanwhile, in Lebanon, which was considered to have the most 
liberal government in the region, the authorities were more reluc-
tant to take firm action. Emir Farid Chehab, the Chef de Sûreté 
(Head of the Lebanese Sûreté Générale) (1948–58), once told a 
Western journalist that ‘They [Lebanese politicians] will tell you 
they are fighting Communism, but it is only because they think 
it will please [the West] to hear that.’27 When Chehab visited 
Captain Guy Liddell, the Deputy Director-General of MI5, at 
Leconfield House in London in 1951, he lamented the fact that he 
had received virtually no support from his Ministers to conduct 
anti-Communist measures in the country. In addition, Chehab 
had only a handful of officers whom he could trust in his organi-
sation, and also believed that the Lebanese Police had been pen-
etrated by Communists or their sympathisers. Whenever Chehab 
warned the police about a forthcoming Communist demonstra-
tion in the country, ‘the information reached the Communist 
Party within an hour’.28
Since the Middle East was considered of paramount impor-
tance to Britain’s post-war strategy, the AC (O) paid close atten-
tion to Communist activities in the region. The problem with 
the Communist movements in the Middle East, from the British 
point of view, was that, since they had been forced underground, 
it was difficult to obtain a clear picture of their extent and 
influence. Regardless of their size and popularity, the danger 
of Communist activities was noted by General Sir John Bagot 
Glubb, Commander of the Arab Legion, known as Glubb Pasha: 
‘communism does not wait until it secures a majority’, and ‘a 
small group of fanatics carry out the coup d’état’.29 This fear 
of the Communist menace was exacerbated by the fact that the 
region was full of intrigue, conspiracies, and assassinations by 
internal opponents and external enemies.30 Glubb Pasha also 
warned the Foreign Office in 1950 with an Arab proverb that ‘the 
enemy of my enemy is my friend’ – both Britain and pro-British 
regimes were easily targeted by propaganda from Communists 
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and the Soviet Union, and Communists could be seen as allies 
by non-Communist anti-British groups.31 In November 1948, 
the Foreign Office had already contemplated sending Graham 
Mitchell of MI5, an expert in International Communist move-
ments, to countries such as Iran, Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon and 
Egypt, to ‘tender advice to those countries on communist methods 
and tactics’.32 This earlier proposal was eventually turned down 
as no requests had been made by the local authorities.
Once the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the AC (O) 
grew particularly concerned about the situation in the region 
as, despite Communist Parties being prohibited, local authorities 
were not deemed particularly aware of the ‘insidious nature of 
methods used by Communists’ outside the region.33 The Foreign 
Office considered that even the most diligent security forces, 
such as those of the Egyptians and Iraqis, were ‘not particularly 
well-conceived or effective’ as they tended to ‘make arrests too 
soon, thus losing valuable intelligence’.34 The AC (O) agreed that 
local authorities lacked experience in anti-Communist security 
 measures in the event of a third world war.35
The first group to attend MI5’s security training courses was 
not colonial police officers but, in fact, an Iranian delegation. 
Convinced of the inefficiency of Iran’s own methods to fight 
Communism in the country, General Hadj Ali Razmara, the Chief 
of the Iranian General Staff, approached the British Embassy 
in Tehran via a British Military Attaché in 1950. He asked the 
British to assist in conducting anti-Communist measures in his 
own security organisation, the Deuxième Bureau (also known 
as the G-2), and also requested his military officers be trained 
in London. Once his request reached policymakers in London 
via the Foreign Office, the AC (O) welcomed Iran’s interest in 
enhancing anti-Communist measures and asked MI5 to meet the 
requests.36 Accordingly, Captain Guy Liddell arranged specially 
designed anti-Communist courses for the Iranians, in consulta-
tion with Jack Easton, the Vice-Chief of MI6.37 The delegation of 
four senior Iranian officers (two from the police and two from the 
G-2), all of whom had also been vetted by MI5 prior to their visit, 
arrived in London in late October 1950.38
During the anti-Communist training course, senior MI5 officers 
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delivered a series of three lectures to the Iranians.39 In order to meet 
their guests’ specific requests, a four-week-long practical training 
session, run by Scotland Yard, was held at the Metropolitan 
Police Training School, Hendon. The Iranians stayed in Britain 
nearly a year as further ad hoc training followed at a War Office 
Field Security course and one of the higher police training courses 
at Hendon.40 However, there was a practical difficulty in train-
ing the Iranians: communication. When Guy Liddell gave the 
lecture to the Iranian officers in November 1950, he had to speak 
‘very slowly’ and repeat it ‘at least three times’ as ‘none of them 
 understood much English’.41
Despite this difficulty, similar training courses were arranged at 
the request of other Middle Eastern governments. Senior Middle 
Eastern security chiefs, such as Emir Farid Chehab, Chief of 
the Lebanese Sûreté Générale, and Colonel Bahjat Beg Attiyah, 
Director of the Iraqi CID, also attended such courses.42 Jordanian 
senior officers were also regular attendees at the request of Glubb 
Pasha.43 These training courses were also made available to Iraqis 
sent by Duncan MacIntosh, the British Police Adviser to the 
Minister of the Interior, in the mid-1950s.44 Britain decided which 
countries to train as a result of both requests from local  authorities 
and strategic consideration within the AC (O).
After providing anti-Communist training to a number of 
Middle Eastern police officers, another approach was adopted 
by 1951. Working to a different standard and practice, anti-
Communist training in Britain had ‘little chance of improving 
national security services’ in the Middle East. Guy Liddell then 
instead suggested the AC (O)’s anti-Communist measures be 
implemented ‘through local liaison by Security Service trained 
personnel or by Police advisers’.45 The introduction of the British 
adviser had at least two objectives: the first objective was to try 
to control the spread of Communism; the second was to obtain 
information on Communist movements in the region. Chairman 
of the JIC, Sir Patrick Reilly, also a permanent member of the AC 
(O), recorded:
Apart from the obvious value of this to our general anti-communist 
effort, any such strengthening of links with foreign police authorities 
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can be of great advantage both to [MI6] and the Security Service, 
by paving the way to the exchange of information and operational 
liaison.46
Thus, a two-track approach was adopted: while providing anti-
Communist training courses to Middle Eastern security services, 
liaison officers visited the region to advise the local authorities on 
measures directly. By 1951, while still providing anti-Communist 
courses in London, posting security advisers to local governments 
had become the preferred method for advising local authorities 
on more effective administrative and legislative measures against 
the local communist problem. It sought to check the spread of 
Communism in the region through liaison with the local police of 
‘strategically important countries’.47
In addition to the introduction of British security advisers in 
the region, the AC (O) decided in June 1951 to use Britain’s 
closest ally in the region, Iraq, to encourage other Middle Eastern 
authorities to take ‘legislative and administrative action to combat 
Communist activities’ through the sharing of Iraqi experience and 
information. The British Ambassador in Baghdad was instructed 
to suggest that the Iraqi government cooperate with other local 
authorities to ‘take steps to segregate and re-educate political 
persons held on charges of Communist activities’.48
In 1956, the importance of security training was restated under 
Eden as one of the pillars of counter-subversive measures. The 
Overseas Planning Committee, the successor to the AC (O), 
quickly stated: ‘We consider that the value of training in security 
and anti-communist techniques cannot be overemphasised.’ The 
Eden memorandum provided the financial resources (£25,000 a 
year) needed for security training especially for foreign security 
forces; a stark contrast to earlier efforts hampered by a lack of 
funding. In addition to arranging such training courses for foreign 
security/police officers either in Britain or in host countries, this 
made it easier to conduct anti-Communist measures through a 
residential security/liaison officer, attached to a foreign govern-
ment, free of charge to the host government. It had previously 
been very difficult for the Foreign Office to persuade the Treasury 
to authorise payments to despatch British advisers to foreign 
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countries to conduct security training on an ad hoc basis.49 By the 
mid-1950s, and demonstrating the importance of the threat, this 
had changed dramatically.
The Lebanese Sûreté Générale and Ousting the French 
Influence
Lebanon is normally regarded as part of the French sphere of 
influence owing to its colonial legacy.50 Nonetheless, the British 
had compelling reasons to undertake robust anti-Communist 
measures in the country. Lebanon housed the highest number of 
Communist Party members (12,000) and sympathisers (50,000) 
in the Middle East.51 The Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) was 
also believed to have been cooperating very closely with the 
Syrian Communist Party (SCP) under a Joint Higher Committee. 
The strength of the SCP was estimated at around 2,000–2,500 
members.52 According to British intelligence, the LCP also ‘kept 
in close touch with the Soviet Legation’, through which it was 
believed that the Soviets maintained close ties with regional 
Communist Parties.53 When the chief expert on Middle Eastern 
affairs, Sir Michael Wright, then Assistant Under-Secretary of the 
Foreign Office, was invited in June 1950 to an AC (O) meeting to 
express his opinion on Communist influence in the Middle East, 
he insisted on the need to ‘stimulate’ the Lebanese government to 
take necessary action as they were showing ‘very little vigour in 
tackling this problem’.54
It is noteworthy that, by the time the anti-Communist meas-
ures in Lebanon were discussed at the AC (O) in London, the 
Lebanese had already approached Britain for advice. In March 
1949, the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hamid Franjieh, 
approached Sir William Houstoun-Boswall, the British Minister 
in Beirut, to ask for a British expert on anti-Communist meas-
ures. Houstoun-Boswall then reported the Lebanese request to 
London with great secrecy, as ‘nobody including the chief of 
secret police knows anything of this move which it is desired to 
keep secret and quite unofficial’.55 The reason for the secrecy was 
mainly due to the presence of a French security adviser to the 
Security Training and Liaison
41
Lebanese government in Beirut. Since 1920, Lebanon had hosted 
French advisers who intervened in every single matter of internal 
security, including operational aspects, recruitment of personnel 
and promotions.56 Since countering French influence in Lebanon 
had been a British concern since before the end of the war, the 
Lebanese approach presented Whitehall with a unique opportu-
nity to establish influence in the French sphere by placing a senior 
police officer in the heart of the Lebanese government with access 
to the Prime Minister and the chance to impart  personal advice on 
anti-Communist measures.57
L. G. Thirkell, a senior official of the Eastern Department of 
the Foreign Office in charge of Syrian and Lebanese affairs, noted 
that appointing such an expert without informing the French 
‘would arouse the worst suspicions’, but it was decided not to 
tell them as notification would ‘invite serious criticism and such 
an appointment would presumably have to be kept secret or have 
some form of cover’.58 A meeting was soon held in the Foreign 
Office, where officials decided that ‘the best man’ for the assign-
ment, an MI5 expert in International Communism, Graham 
Mitchell, was to be sent to keep the Lebanese government on 
track.59 Mitchell’s mission was to secure a position in Lebanon; 
his failure to do so might cause the Lebanese government ‘to 
approach another Power instead, such as the Americans or even 
the French’.60
In post-war Lebanon, the internal security system was inher-
ited from the French Mandate, in which the Sûreté Générale, 
the Lebanese Security Service, was responsible for internal secu-
rity, including counter-espionage and counter-subversion.61 
The Sûreté Générale comprised sectarian factions reflecting the 
structure of the Lebanese government.62 The complexity of the 
Lebanese security apparatus as a result of sectarianism also ham-
pered effective security work. One such ‘petty annoyance’ which 
Emir Farid Chehab, then newly appointed as Head of the Sûreté 
Générale, complained about to Major David Beaumont-Nesbitt, 
Assistant Military Attaché at the British Embassy in Beirut, was 
that his official telephone line in the Sûreté was ‘tapped by agents 
of the President’s brother’.63 Major Beaumont-Nesbitt, serving as 
the representative of MI5 in Lebanon and Syria, seconded from 
The Twilight of the British Empire
42
the Army on a temporary basis, reported to MI5 headquarters 
that ‘the mechanics of this preposterous operation, if true, are, 
as one may imagine, highly complex and there are the usual 
wheels within wheels, the agents concerned being simultaneously 
employed by various organisations’.64
Mitchell’s visit in May 1949 was an appreciable success. During 
the visit, he convinced the Lebanese Prime Minister, Riad el-Solh, 
that the Communist movement was a ‘formidable enemy’, able 
to act as ‘a fifth column in the event of war with Russia’. He also 
managed to obtain an oral promise to appoint a British adviser to 
Farid Chehab. Mitchell wrote in his report that:
Repeated reports from various sources have emphasised that from 
the Russian Legation in Beirut there springs a multitude of espionage 
and other subversive activities . . . British control, direct or indirect, 
of a local Security Service [Sûreté Générale] working on efficient 
lines would therefore hold out a promise of producing material of 
 considerable intelligence value.65
In addition, Mitchell noted that it was essential to meet with 
Farid Chehab, with the permission of Riad el-Solh, to discuss the 
subject, as Farid Chehab was ‘thoroughly friendly to British inter-
ests and ready to co-operate’. He was above all ‘a close contact of 
our [MI5] representative in Beirut’.66
Farid Chehab, still remembered as ‘Bay al Amn al Aam [Father 
of the Sûreté Générale]’ in Lebanon, retained the post of Chef de 
Sûreté for over a decade until September 1958.67 He served his 
country diligently, but most of all, Farid Chehab was an anti-
Communist, believing with Britain that Communism was a real 
threat which was detrimental to the values and traditions of the 
Middle East. He directed and prioritised anti-Communist meas-
ures over other issues, which he considered of lesser importance.68 
He once explained to a Middle East correspondent of TIME, 
Keith Wheelock, the reasons for his, and other Middle Eastern 
governments’, association with the West:
If it comes to war, the Middle East will fall to the Communists inevita-
bly. Just as inevitably you’ll have to take it back. The West could not 
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abide Russia controlling the Middle East. It’ll be a lot easier to take it 
back if the people are on your side. If they’re not on your side it will 
be almost impossible to take it back.69
Moreover, Farid Chehab was clearly pro-British, as opposed to 
being pro-American – he regarded the Americans as being ‘tem-
peramentally incapable of understanding the complexities of the 
Levant’.70 Farid Chehab had an intimate relationship with the 
British: after his imprisonment by the Vichy French, he had, 
though indirectly, cooperated with Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, 
the head of the British Security Mission in Lebanon during post-
war independence from French rule; in August 1947, he attended 
a three-month training course, including counter-espionage, at 
Scotland Yard’s Superior Police Training College in Britain. Once 
he was back from Britain, he was appointed Head of the Sûreté 
Générale.71
Mitchell left written recommendations with Riad el-Solh regard-
ing steps to take in combating Communism. He suggested Riad 
el-Solh enhance the capabilities of the Sûreté Générale – giving 
Farid Chehab a ‘free hand’ for internal security; allowing him to 
have a technical liaison with the Minister of Posts and Telegrams 
with the ‘object of putting at the disposal of the Sûreté means for 
the interception of communications of suspects’; and to set up 
effective control of frontiers and of ‘Russian and satellite aliens’ 
by ensuring that ‘no alien enters or resides in the Lebanon’ without 
the knowledge of the government. These were deliberately written 
in French to conceal ‘evidence of British origin’.72 Wiretapping, as 
recommended by Mitchell, became an integral part of maintain-
ing internal security for the Sûreté Générale under the direction of 
Farid Chehab.73
In his report, Mitchell recommended that the Foreign Office 
respond quickly should the Lebanese formally request an adviser, 
and to make the necessary appointment while ‘the iron is hot’. 
If not, an alternative possibility was to insert a ‘technical officer 
at a lower level’ into the Sûreté to ‘be elevated gradually by 
Farid [Chehab] as opportunity offers’.74 Soon after Mitchell’s 
visit, administrative developments indeed emerged: Farid Chehab 
acquired a new building for the Sûreté Générale and strictly 
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compartmentalised sections were established for organisational 
efficacy.75
After initial hesitation by the Lebanese President, Bechara El 
Khoury, who favoured a French connection, a formal request for 
an adviser from the Lebanese government eventually reached the 
Foreign Office via the British Embassy in Beirut.76 J. M. Kyles – 
the former Commissioner of Police in Sudan, and a fluent Arabic 
speaker with some twenty years of experience in Palestine – was 
appointed Security Adviser in May 1950.77 J. M. Kyles was tasked 
by the AC (O) to ‘stimulate’ the Lebanese government ‘to repress’ 
the Communist menace.78 In September 1950, about four months 
after the appointment of Kyles, Riad el-Solh issued a new secret 
decree for the formation of a special Anti-Communist Bureau, to 
be headed by Farid Chehab as the Chef de Sûreté.79 Shortly after 
its establishment, Farid Chehab was once again in Britain, this 
time for training in anti-Communist measures.80
Nevertheless, anti-Communist measures in Lebanon through 
both J. M. Kyles and Farid Chehab ended with mixed results. 
Following the formation of the Anti-Communist Bureau, Sir 
William Houstoun-Boswall despatched a letter to Ernest Bevin:
Mr Kyles, the Police Adviser whose task, as you can well imagine, 
is not an easy one here, has been trying to influence the authorities 
to work along more systematic lines. The trouble is, as you will not 
be surprised to hear, that Mr Kyles’ advice is very rarely sought and 
when given is not acted upon . . . But now they have at least begun 
– if only dimly – to appreciate the very real danger presented by 
Communism. And I do not propose to allow them again to relapse 
into their pipe dream that Communism must be dead just because it 
is outlawed.81
This indicates that the influence of a British SLO in the implemen-
tation of legislative measures was limited as the final decision was 
always in the hands of the Lebanese government. In fact, the anti-
Communist Lebanese government was short-lived. When Riad 
el-Solh was assassinated in July 1951, the implementation of these 
anti-Communist measures became more strained. It also caused 
the termination of Kyles’s advisory post.82
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As noted earlier, when Farid Chehab met with Guy Liddell 
during his training in Britain in June 1951, he told Liddell that 
Kyles’s advice had rarely been sought owing to constant changes 
in government policy, which also cut the manpower of Chehab’s 
organisation from ‘200 to 100’, of which Chehab felt he could 
rely on ‘barely 5 per cent’ as the organisation, he believed, had 
been penetrated by Communist sympathisers and hampered by 
sectarianism.83 In addition, Farid Chehab noted that he received 
little support from his ministers, and even when he reported that 
someone in the government was ‘working for the Russians’, no 
action was taken.84 Despite the opportunity to challenge French 
influence, and the risk of going behind French backs, British 
attempts to shape Lebanese policy ultimately came to little.
Iranian G-2 and General Razmara
Iran had caused Cold War concerns since the end of the Second 
World War, and, by 1950, the JIC estimated that the strength of 
the Tudeh Party was around 10,000–12,000 members.85 Again 
though, the initial approach for liaison came not from the British 
but instead from Tehran. General Hadj Ali Razmara, the Chief of 
the Iranian General Staff, secretly contacted the Military Attaché 
at the British Embassy in January 1950.86 This was not the first 
attempt. As noted earlier, a proposal to send Graham Mitchell 
of MI5 to Tehran in November 1948 to ‘obtain information 
about Communism’ and share the British experience of combat-
ing Communism in Malaya was rejected due to the lax security 
of the Iranian government and fears that news of the contact 
might leak to the Russians.87 In addition, in March 1949, when 
the Iranian Police informally contacted Scotland Yard requesting 
counter-espionage training, MI5 saw an opportunity ‘to exploit’ 
but the Iranian government never made a formal request.88 The 
1950 approach therefore formed Britain’s opportunity to train 
the Iranians in anti-Communist measures, as well as to obtain 
information about Communist activities in Iran.
Razmara’s decision to approach the British came after debrief-
ing a Soviet walk-in, named ‘Vassilev’, who defected to the Iranian 
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authorities with some documents on the subversive activities of 
the Tudeh Party.89 Convinced that Iran’s own methods of fighting 
Communism had been insufficient, General Razmara hoped to 
improve his own security organisation, the G-2, with help from 
Britain. Razmara regarded the G-2 as ‘the only effective organi-
sation in the country’ in combating the continued underground 
activity of the Tudeh Party, and believed that the police had 
been penetrated by the Communists.90 Despite the presence of a 
large American military mission in Iran, Razmara later noted to 
Haldane-Porter of MI5 that he did not consult with the Americans 
on this matter since the Americans had ‘no understanding of the 
Asiatic mentality’, and it would therefore be ‘a waste of time to 
have a resident American Adviser’ in Tehran.91
Since no one was available from MI5 Headquarters at the time, 
it was considered that Brigadier William Magan, Head of SIME, 
the regional headquarters of MI5, would be an ideal candidate to 
visit Tehran for a discussion with General Razmara, as Magan 
spoke Persian and knew the country well from his experience 
there during the Second World War.92 Magan’s task was to find 
out whether the long-term appointment of a British residential 
adviser was necessary.93 The proposal was, nevertheless, turned 
down by Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who was content to 
advise the Iranians on anti-Communist measures in principle, but 
unhappy with the ‘likelihood that the Russians would know who 
Mr Magan is’.94 It was then decided that Haldane-Porter, a senior 
officer of MI5’s OS (Over-Seas) Division, whose real identity was 
‘certainly not known to the Russians’, would travel to Tehran via 
Cairo in late March 1950 in the guise of ‘a member of the Foreign 
Service’.95 The US Embassy in Tehran was informed of Haldane-
Porter’s visit in advance.96
In the course of his four-day-long discussions with General 
Razmara, which were conducted in French owing to Razmara’s 
lack of fluency in English, Haldane-Porter was fully briefed on 
Razmara’s G-2 organisation with a chart of its organisational 
structure; it had been given particular responsibility for watching 
and countering the activities of the Tudeh Party under a special 
law passed after the attempted assassination of the Shah of Iran 
in February 1949.97 From Haldane-Porter’s view, the G-2 was 
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an ‘ambitiously large’ organisation – while being responsible for 
intelligence collection and analysis for the Iranian military ser-
vices, it also functioned as an internal security service, responsible 
for espionage, counter-espionage, anti-subversive activities and 
censorship. Haldane-Porter also learned of the activities of the 
Tudeh Party and the difficulties Razmara faced in countering 
their activities: ‘Russian agents of all kinds were continually being 
sent across the Persian [Iranian]/ Soviet frontier with money, with 
arms, and with propaganda material.’98 During the discussions, 
he was handed classified up-to-date reports on the activities of the 
Tudeh Party, and on a member of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, 
Daniel Semyonovich Komissarov, a Russian Iranologist who was 
believed to be connected with the Tudeh Party.99
General Razmara then requested his military officers be trained 
in anti-Communist measures in Britain, and a British security 
adviser be stationed in Tehran. This was the context mentioned 
earlier in which Iranian officers were sent to and trained in 
London. The discussion also touched upon what the British gov-
ernment could receive in return. In the current arrangement, the 
British Military Attaché had been granted limited access to ‘some 
Russian defectors’ in Iranian hands. General Razmara agreed 
to extend this to allow the British completely free access to ‘any 
Russians who either defected from the Soviet Union into Iran or 
were captured by the Iranians’. Haldane-Porter was also prom-
ised that General Razmara would prepare for him ‘a long detailed 
report’, setting out ‘the sum of [Razmara’s] knowledge of the 
Tudeh Party’. Haldane-Porter commented on the rationale behind 
this arrangement in his report:
In all our discussions on the subject of Russians, Razmara adopted 
a surprisingly sensible and realist attitude. He said that the Soviet 
Union was a very big, powerful country which could easily occupy 
Persia [Iran] by force; he was therefore not really interested in what 
went on inside the Soviet Union, except in the immediate area of the 
Soviet/Persian frontier. We, however, were extremely interested in 
the Soviet Union and he was glad to help us in obtaining information 
about it.100
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General Razmara’s mentality, which Haldane-Porter described 
as having ‘an exaggerated but understandable phobia of the 
Russians’, perhaps also added to his rationale.101
Besides the appointment of a British security adviser, Haldane-
Porter later proposed to MI5 headquarters that a Russian-
speaking Assistant Military Attaché should be appointed to the 
British Embassy in Tehran for the purpose of this new arrange-
ment, instead of using a representative from either MI5 or MI6. 
This was owing to the fact that, to Haldane-Porter’s surprise, 
General Razmara was unaware of the presence of an MI6 officer 
operating in Tehran at the time.102 Thus, without raising General 
Razmara’s suspicions, Haldane-Porter noted that the appoint-
ment of a ‘genuine’ Russian-speaking Assistant Military Attaché 
was ideal, someone who would be able to use ‘his knowledge of 
Russian to interrogate Russians in Persian [Iranian] hands’ in 
addition to carrying out his normal duties as an Assistant Military 
Attaché.103 The appointment is unclear from documentary evi-
dence, but was probably Alexis Kougoulsky Forter, a former RAF 
officer, who had emigrated from Russia. Alexis Forter had been in 
the Middle East in the late 1940s as a junior SIME officer, and he 
was also present in Tehran in the tumultuous year of 1953 as not 
an MI5 but an MI6 officer. He later became the Head of Station 
in Baghdad in the late 1950s.104
Appointing a British security/police adviser to Tehran, however, 
did prove difficult owing to an agreement with General Razmara, 
who insisted on absolute secrecy about the arrangement, with 
the exception of the Shah. In addition, Razmara made it clear 
that there would never be formal contact between the British and 
Iranian governments. The maison de rendezvous for the intel-
ligence liaison was to be somewhere in Tehran, where an Iranian 
military official, chosen by Razmara, and the British security 
adviser ‘could meet frequently for the discharge of their busi-
ness’.105 Razmara also noted that the adviser should be protected 
by diplomatic immunity as a member of the British Embassy 
staff in case of arrest by the Iranian Police.106 Given the growing 
anti-British sentiment throughout Iran as a result of the internal 
political situation at the time, Razmara’s obsessive secrecy was 
understandable. Razmara was above all a military officer, but 
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also a calculated politician. Intelligence historian Stephen Dorril 
notes that Razmara was ‘well aware that any suspicion of British 
meddling and influence could spell political suicide’.107
The AC (O) strongly endorsed the arrangement as a ‘valuable 
means of combating subversive Russian activities’ in Iran, and 
recommended to Ernest Bevin the appointment of Sir George 
Jenkin as a British adviser to the Iranians on anti-Communist 
measures.108 Bevin was content with the proposal in principle 
but turned it down, as ‘there might be a risk that the Russians 
would be given a good excuse for complaining strongly to the 
Persians [Iranians] about our activities’.109 Nevertheless, consid-
eration was given to the fact that General Razmara was the 
most likely to become the next Prime Minister of Iran.110 On 
26 June 1950, five days after Clement Attlee approved the pro-
posal, General Razmara indeed became Prime Minister.111 The 
main difficulty of this arrangement was MI5’s chosen candi-
date – Sir William ‘George’ Jenkin, former Deputy Director of 
the Intelligence Bureau in India (1930–50).112 There were ‘large 
Indian and Pakistani Embassies in Tehran’ whose staff were well 
aware of Sir George Jenkin’s career in India, and so creating a 
diplomatic cover for him – without exposing his contact with the 
Iranians – was ‘impossible’.113
The substitute for Jenkin was John Albert Briance, the former 
head of the CID of the Palestine Police until 1948.114 Guy Liddell 
noted in his diaries that Briance was operating in the guise of 
Political Adviser in Iran and provided ‘90 per cent’ of the infor-
mation on the internal political situation, mostly concerning the 
activities of the Tudeh Party, in Iran.115 Christopher ‘Monty’ 
Woodhouse also remembers that, when he visited Tehran during 
the turmoil of 1952, there was ‘a useful liaison, approved by the 
Shah, with the chief of the Security Police, who was well informed 
about the Tudeh Party’; Woodhouse was likely also referring to 
John Briance.116
During his tenure as premier, Razmara was an ardent anti-
Communist, acting as the Minister of the Interior and control-
ling the Iranian Police at the same time. Razmara undertook a 
series of both legislative and administrative initiatives to counter 
subversion, including improving prison discipline to control the 
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activities of Tudeh prisoners; giving the government discretion to 
proclaim martial law; and taking action against subversive pub-
lications. Sir Francis Shepherd, British Ambassador to Tehran, 
reported to Bevin that ‘these measures have been  reasonably 
effective’.117
In addition, as noted earlier, under the agreement reached with 
Haldane-Porter, Razmara sent four hand-picked Iranian offic-
ers (two from the police, and two from G-2) to Britain in late 
October 1950 for one year of anti-Communist training. Their 
expenses were paid by the Iranian government, but knowledge 
about what these officers were doing was even concealed from the 
Iranian Embassy in London.118 Sir Francis Shepherd noted to Sir 
Michael Wright that ‘on return they would be capable of setting 
up a competent unit for dealing with subversive activity’.119 He 
also noted that:
we have already provided them [the Iranians], at their request, with an 
expert to advise the General Staff on these matters [anti- Communist 
measures], and he is now busily and successfully at work . . . The 
responsibility for watching and checking Tudeh activities is also 
shared by the Police, and here again we are helping by arranging for 
two police officers (and two army officers) to undergo a course of 
training in the United Kingdom. These two measures should go far to 
keep the Persian Government fully aware of the insidious nature of 
Communist methods and of ways of dealing with them.120
Nevertheless, the Iranians’ effective anti-Communist measures 
did not last long. Razmara was assassinated on 7 March 1951, 
two days after he refused to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company in the face of pressure from the National Front, led 
by Dr Mohammad Mossadeq. This abrupt end to Razmara’s 
premiership was a clear setback for anti-Communist measures in 
Iran. In addition, the appointment of John Briance, presumably 
the security adviser to Razmara, did not last long either. And once 
Briance’s post had been withdrawn by 1952, any intelligence on 
internal political matters ‘practically dried up’.121
Just before Razmara was assassinated, there had been a series of 
propaganda campaigns by the left-wing press, such as ‘cartoons’ 
Security Training and Liaison
51
showing Razmara’s and the Shah’s close and secret association 
with ‘the Union Jack’.122 After his assassination, Pravda, one of the 
main Soviet arms for propaganda, also seized the opportunity to 
damage British influence in Iran, stating that the Razmara’s assas-
sin was largely influenced by ‘imperialist’ – British and American 
– plots, though its reason for stating this was obscure.123 By 
June 1952, correspondence of the Foreign Office indicates that 
the Iranian armed forces had also been penetrated by the Tudeh 
Party.124 The available evidence suggests that neither further secu-
rity training of the Iranians nor the appointment of a new security 
adviser took place at least until the mid-1950s.125
The Iraqi Connection and Concerns about American 
Influence
Iraq had maintained a strong anti-Communist stance from 
the 1920s until 1958. However, there was growing concern in 
Whitehall about the regional influence of the United States, whose 
participation in strengthening the Iraqi Police in anti- Communist 
measures troubled British policymakers and prompted the 
appointment of a security/police adviser to the Iraqi government. 
Before 1953, Britain essentially regarded Iraq as a British prov-
ince and had been wary about cooperating with the Americans 
in security building. Close connections between MI5 and the CID 
of the Iraqi Police formed the foundation of British–Iraqi security 
cooperation and, in the early 1950s, this was further enhanced 
by regional foreign and defence policies until the focus of British 
strategy shifted from Egypt to Iraq.126
Given this robust security cooperation, it is no surprise that Iraq 
was not on the AC (O)’s priority list of countries in need of anti-
Communist measures in the early 1950s. The JIC estimated that 
there were only approximately 2,000 active members of the ICP 
in 1950, far lower than in Lebanon and Iran.127 Since the outlaw-
ing of the ICP in January 1947, its members had been severely 
suppressed with its most influential leaders all imprisoned or 
executed.128 Their foe, the Iraqi CID, was regarded as the ‘most 
efficient’ anti-Communist force in the region and maintained a 
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strong liaison with MI5, which was noted to be ‘probably closer 
than anywhere else in the Middle East’.129 When Sir Henry Mack, 
the British Ambassador in Baghdad, was asked by the AC (O) in 
October 1950 to report any recommendations for strengthening 
legislative and administrative measures against Communists, he 
was content with the measures adopted by the Iraqi authorities, 
and wrote to Ernest Bevin:
In my opinion these laws and administrative measures have proved 
an effective check on communist activity and influence in Iraq . . . 
The Iraqi Criminal Investigation Department, which owes much to 
the tradition established by British officers who served in it up till 
1947, is by Middle Eastern standards a fairly efficient organization. 
Doubtless it could be improved if British officers were reintroduced, 
but the political difficulties in the way of this are very great, and 
moreover to find a suitable man would not be easy. Even if these diffi-
culties were overcome there would be a risk of prejudicing the present 
close relation between the Criminal Investigation Department and the 
 representative of the [Security Service].130
This situation and British attitudes towards the cooperative 
Iraqi CID would, nevertheless, change in 1953, with a growing 
Communist influence in the country and, more importantly, a 
growing American interest in Iraqi affairs.
Despite the ICP’s small membership, underground Communist 
activities persisted in Iraq, and in October 1953 the Iraqi Minister 
of the Interior, Said Qazzaz, approached the British Embassy 
in Baghdad and asked for assistance in reorganising the Iraqi 
Police and the CID. Whitehall was alarmed to learn that Said 
Qazzaz was also prepared to engage the Americans, who were 
able to provide support free of charge through the Truman 
Administration’s Point Four Program, providing financial aid for 
development.131 Sir John Troutbeck, the British Ambassador in 
Baghdad, warned the Foreign Office that this was not only ‘the 
thin edge of the wedge of American penetration in what has been 
our province’, but would also lead to the dislocation of the Iraqi 
CID and Police, with ‘results potentially disastrous to the security 
of the whole country’.132 Troutbeck has been noted as a typical 
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British official: anti-American and distrusting American oil policy 
in the region.133 However, it was not only he who opposed 
American interference in Iraq on this matter, but others too. The 
Iraqi move was also flagged by Roger Lees, MI5’s representative 
in Baghdad, serving in the guise of the Assistant Air Attaché to 
the British Embassy in Baghdad,134 who commented that it would 
be ‘a great pity if the reorganisation of the Iraqi police were to 
fall into the hands of the Americans’.135 Moreover, Sir Hugh 
Stephenson, Chairman of the JIC (ME), also raised his concerns 
about this matter, stating that ‘from an intelligence point of view 
and in our concern with Communism, we are largely dependent 
in Iraq on our CID liaison’.136
The British not only had to provide the advisers free of charge 
if they were to compete with the Americans, but they also 
had to avoid financial and political complications in the Iraqi 
Parliament. Anti-British sentiment in Iraqi politics added to 
a growing concern that the Iraqis were leaning towards the 
Americans. This preceded Eden’s aforementioned approval of 
financial resources (£25,000 a year) for training foreign security 
forces. While waiting for a formal request from the Iraqi govern-
ment, there was a clear increase in British concern over American 
influence in Iraq. In a telegram, Troutbeck commented from 
Baghdad that:
An American might well come as a temporary visitor . . . under the 
cover of ‘Security Adviser to the American Embassy’ or something 
similar rather than as an employee of the Iraq Government . . . The 
most effective way therefore of preventing the appointment of an 
American is for us to evince a more active desire to help the Iraqi 
Minister of the Interior on the issue . . . Otherwise, an American 
adviser – or at least a temporary adviser – may be here before we know 
it. There are various signs that the Americans are prepared to move 
rapidly to redeem their diminished prestige here at our expense.137
Despite the insignificance of Communist activities in Iraq, 
the Foreign Office came to the conclusion that ‘if we do not 
provide free assistance, there is a very strong probability that the 
Americans can and will’, and above all, that the maintenance of 
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order and stability in Iraq was ‘essential for our oil and other 
interests’.138 Indeed, around this time, while the United States 
agreed that Iraq was ‘entirely within Britain’s political sphere’, 
the US Ambassador Burton Berry sought to ‘exert a more positive 
role in guiding Iraq’s future planning’.139
The Foreign Office decided to forestall the appointment of an 
American security adviser to the Iraqi Police and go ahead before 
the budget was settled, asking the Treasury to provide funds 
for the security adviser. This meant that a British adviser would 
be sent to Iraq free of charge.140 Meanwhile, the Foreign Office 
searched for potential security/police advisers, enquiring to the 
Home and Colonial Offices about suitable candidates for the 
post. All enquiries to the Home Office were consistently turned 
down without any positive recommendations, and the case of Iraq 
proved no exception.141
The hunt by the Foreign Office thus relied on the Colonial 
Office, which recommended suitable candidates from the colo-
nial police. Although MI5 only had an advisory capacity in this 
process, the Foreign Office sometimes appeared to expect MI5 
to play a more active role.142 When Said Qazzaz made the initial 
approach in October 1953, MI5’s representative, Roger Lees 
(1951–3), was due to be replaced. Sir John Troutbeck suggested 
to the Foreign Office that a successor to Lees should be able to 
advise the Iraqis on the reorganisation of the CID. In this way, he 
hoped, the Iraqi requirements would be met ‘without any extra 
burden on either their or H.M. Government’s budget’.143
However, MI5 already had its own chosen candidate as Lees’s 
successor in Baghdad, who had served in the ‘British Police on 
Special Branch duties’ and was thus competent to advise on anti-
Communist work, but who had ‘no special qualifications for 
advising on the organisation of the CID or criminal work’.144 The 
MI5 officer being lined up appeared to be Norman Himsworth.145 
Upon his departure, however, Roger Lees made arrangements 
with Said Qazzaz that his successor would take a more active 
role in advising the CID ‘unofficially on anti-communist work’, 
and reported that ‘the head of the CID has been instructed 
accordingly’.146
Both MI5’s and MI6’s suggestion to the Foreign Office for 
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the two posts in Iraq was their favourite candidate, Sir George 
Jenkin, about whom H. P. Goodwyn of MI5, liaising with the 
Foreign Office, commented that ‘a man of his calibre would best 
suit all purpose’ and ‘could do both jobs’.147 Following interviews 
with the candidates conducted by Paul Falla, head of the Levant 
Department of the Foreign Office, with the help of Lloyd Thomas, 
an expert from the Home Office, the Foreign Office decided 
to send, not two, but only one adviser to Iraq due to financial 
limitations. The chosen candidate was not Sir George Jenkin but 
Duncan MacIntosh, the retiring Commissioner of Police in Hong 
Kong (1946–52). The Colonial Office described Jenkin as ‘rather 
too much of a specialist to take the lead of a general mission 
on Police re-organisation’.148 In addition, Jenkin was ‘somewhat 
highly-strung, shy and reserved’, whereas MacIntosh was consid-
ered to have a ‘blend of astuteness and friendliness’, which would 
‘earn the confidence, and goodwill of the Iraqi authorities’. Above 
all, MacIntosh was regarded as a ‘first-class all-rounder’, who 
thus could manage not only the CID but also the police post.149
Although his appointment was delayed due to the dissolution 
of the Iraqi Parliament and general elections in Iraq, MacIntosh 
finally arrived in Baghdad in October 1954 after the thirteenth 
government was formed under the premiership of Nuri el-Said. 
Said Qazzaz remained as the Minister of the Interior and was 
still ‘eager for MacIntosh’s cooperation in his campaign against 
the Communists’.150 Sir Robin Hooper, Counsellor at the British 
Embassy in Baghdad, observed two months after his appointment 
that MacIntosh was liked by the Iraqis and was making progress 
in the Iraqi Police and the CID:
his advice is being sought and readily taken. He has made far-reaching 
recommendations for the re-organisation of the C.I.D. and the uni-
formed branches of the Police Force, including . . . the creation of a 
Special Branch and integrated reporting of political and subversive 
activities between the various districts . . . [and] there is a marked 
desire among junior officers of the Police Force to better themselves 
now that they see that the Government is taking steps to reform and 
improve the Police Force, which has for so many years remained 
 virtually stagnant.151
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MacIntosh’s post ended when the Iraqi Revolution occurred in 
July 1958.
Until the 1958 revolution, Iraq offered anti-Communist training 
facilities and courses designed for Middle Eastern security offic-
ers. The AC (O) had used Iraq, Britain’s closest ally in the region 
and the most adamant anti-Communist regime, to encourage 
other Middle Eastern authorities to take ‘legislative and admin-
istrative action to combat Communist activities’ through the 
sharing of Iraqi experience in anti-Communist measures.152 Iraqi 
police officers also acted as Commandant of the Police Training 
School in Mukalla, Aden, until 1958.153 Iraq was a bastion of 
British security influence in the region and supposedly a model 
to inspire others. Like Lebanon and France, Iraq also formed a 
quiet battle ground to keep the upper hand over the Americans. 
Unfortunately for Britain, though, the cooperation was cut short.
Jordan’s Arab Legion and the ‘Anti-Communist Triangle’
The Jordanian case was unique in the region as the Arab Legion, 
the chief external and internal security force of the country, 
was commanded by a British officer, General Sir John Bagot 
Glubb, until March 1956. Under this special arrangement, British 
personnel were also involved in training the Arab Legion and 
developing Jordanian military intelligence.154 As Jordan is a rela-
tively small country, where difficult terrain limits areas suitable 
for habitation, Communist activities were almost non-existent 
there. In 1950, the JIC estimated that members of the Jordanian 
Communist Party numbered fewer than fifty.155 While the AC 
(O) rightly considered the Communist problem in Jordan to be 
far less significant than elsewhere, this assessment differed from 
that of the Jordanian government. Since late 1950, Jordanian 
police officers constantly attended ‘special training’ courses in 
anti-Communist measures in Britain, and the Jordanian govern-
ment requested that Britain share any information on Communist 
activities.156
At Jordan’s request, Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, the wartime 
head of the British Security Mission in Lebanon (1941–5), was 
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appointed Security/Police Adviser to Jordan in April 1952. He 
coordinated anti-Communist measures and helped with the reor-
ganisation of the CID and Arab Legion.157 His formal title was 
Director-General of Intelligence of the Arab Legion (1952–6) but 
he was also known as the Head of the Jordanian CID.158 Jordan 
had no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union or other Eastern 
bloc countries, and technically nationals of those countries were 
not allowed to enter Jordan. Colonel Coghill was responsible for 
internal security concerning the movements of foreign nationals 
and subversive activities in the country. He also closely monitored 
the Free Officers movement within the Arab Legion.159
Despite Communist activities being nearly non-existent in 
Jordan, subversion did include Egyptian and Saudi activity, which 
Coghill deemed ‘the worst’ in the country.160 In late 1955, the 
Egyptians were propagating hostile attacks on King Hussein of 
Jordan as one of the ‘imperialists’ and ‘colonisers’ in the region, 
and were also trying to provoke the Israelis by organising the infil-
tration of sabotage groups, disguised as Jordanians, from Jordan 
into Israel. Likewise, the Saudis were bribing the Jordanians, 
including the royal family, politicians and newspapers, to weaken 
the Hashemite influence.161 These activities, perceived as subver-
sive, were indeed in part instigated by Soviet and Egyptian propa-
ganda, particularly their call to arms against ‘imperial powers’, 
and they presented a potential danger to be exploited by local 
Communists.162
In his capacity as the Director-General of Intelligence, Coghill 
reorganised the Jordanian Police, within which he also headed the 
CID, and sent a number of Jordanian police officers to Britain for 
training in counter-subversion.163 It is noteworthy that Coghill 
sent his senior (Jordanian) officers for security/police training not 
only in Britain but also in another Middle Eastern country, Libya. 
In the post-war period, Libya hosted an ‘advanced’ police school, 
which Coghill described as ‘extremely efficient’, run by a retired 
superintendent of the British Metropolitan Police, Arthur Giles, 
who had also served in the Palestine Police before 1948.164 On the 
practical side, Coghill’s (Jordanian) officers often found it difficult 
to understand the meaning of courses in Britain owing to poor 
English. The Jordanian legal system was also principally based on 
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the code of Napoleon, inherited from the Ottoman Empire, the 
whole approach and procedure in the courts of which was differ-
ent from the British system.165 In addition, Coghill also wished 
to avoid sending his officers to Egypt or Iraq for training as both 
states had their own designs on the internal affairs of Jordan. For 
these reasons, security/police training in Libya, where training 
was conducted by a British ex-police officer in Arabic, was ideal 
for Coghill’s purpose.166 A mixture of local security officers from 
different Arab countries attended the course.167
Colonel Coghill’s work with his Arab counterparts was one 
of the most important factors in developing Britain’s regional 
security liaison. He collaborated closely with Farid Chehab, Head 
of the Sûreté Générale, and Bahjat Attiyah, Director of the Iraqi 
CID, by exchanging information on anti-Communist and anti-
subversive matters in the region. Based on his personal relation-
ship, firstly with Farid Chehab and later with Bahjat Attiyah, 
liaison between Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan became gradually 
institutionalised and known in Coghill’s own words as the ‘Anti-
Communist Triangle’.168 This security liaison involved intelli-
gence sharing on subversive activities not only in Lebanon, Iraq 
and Jordan, but also elsewhere, most of which were instigated by 
Egypt and Syria.169
Their security cooperation also included a ‘specially strict’ sur-
veillance request on the leading figure in anti-British activities 
in the region, Haji Amin al-Husseini, the ex-Grand Mufti of 
Jerusalem, whom Colonel Coghill called ‘the most evil power in 
Palestine Arab Nationalism’.170 Coghill’s role in anti-Communist 
work was appreciated not only by the Jordanians but also by the 
Iraqis. Before Duncan MacIntosh took up his post of Security/
Police Adviser in Baghdad, Said Qazzaz, the Iraqi Minister for 
Interior, insisted that he ‘should break his outward journey at 
Amman to discuss his work with Coghill’.171 It was no exag-
geration when Colonel Coghill described the presence of the Arab 
Legion as ‘one of the principal key-stones’ in providing stability 
to Middle Eastern security as a whole.172
One of the most important contributions of the Jordan–
Lebanon–Iraq ‘Anti-Communist Triangle’ was perhaps its coor-
dination of anti-Communist measures with neighbouring Arab 
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states by establishing closer liaison between the regional security 
services. One aspect of this regional initiative came to the fore in 
1954 as the foundation for covert cooperation in ‘the fight against 
Communism and Zionism’ under the Arab League, with partici-
pants from Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and other countries.173 
The united anti-Communist campaign led to the discovery of 
several underground Communist cells in the region.174 Behind this 
regional collaboration, the AC (O) acted as a facilitator, seeking 
to enhance the anti-Communist measures of Middle Eastern gov-
ernments by ‘means of improving liaison and the exchange of 
information’ between the relevant governments.175 In addition 
to Iraq, Britain’s closest ally in the region, the Lebanese Sûreté 
Générale, was also chosen to lead the initiative.176 A senior official 
at the Foreign Office noted that Farid Chehab appreciated ‘the 
need for and the value of liaison between themselves and their 
counterparts in other Arab states’ and that the Lebanese initia-
tive ‘would be less likely to arouse suspicion’ than if it came from 
any other Arab state.177 The cooperation between the Jordan–
Lebanon–Iraq ‘Anti-Communist Triangle’ even extended beyond 
the Arab states, Turkey and Iran from the mid-1950s onwards.178
There were, however, certainly limitations to Coghill’s anti-
Communist measures. That Coghill’s position was filled by a 
British officer had often been a cause of political confronta-
tion between the Jordanian government and political opposition 
groups.179 Eventually, the Jordanian Police were separated from 
the Arab Legion, and placed under the Ministry of the Interior 
from July 1956. King Hussein initiated this move in response to 
a recommendation by the Jordanian Cabinet Committee, and 
also due to public pressure to separate civilian and military func-
tions.180 Before the separation of the Jordanian Police was brought 
into effect, Coghill’s post as the Director-General of Intelligence 
of the Arab Legion abruptly ended as Sir John Bagot Glubb was 
dismissed from the Arab Legion in March 1956.
Despite the volatile political climate in Jordan, especially over 
its connection with Britain, the Jordanian government remarkably 
requested a British security adviser to its Police some three years 
after the dismissal of Colonel Coghill. Duncan MacIntosh, who 
had been the Security/Police Adviser to the Iraqi Police and the 
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Iraqi CID, escaped from the Iraqi Revolution and was appointed 
as the Police Adviser in Jordan in October 1958.181
A letter by Sir Roderick Parkes, British Ambassador in Amman 
(1962–6), indicates that, despite opposition by ‘dyed-in-the-wool’ 
traditionalists and conservatives, as Police Adviser (1958–62) 
MacIntosh achieved his aim of reorganising the Jordanian security 
services ‘on an independent, logical and modern basis’ using his 
experience in Hong Kong as his principal model. In addition, the 
CID’s public security functions were separated out to form a new 
department responsible for ‘all internal security matters outside 
the province of the uniformed police’, including sections dealing 
with Communists and liaising with foreign services. This depart-
ment was established and later named the ‘General Intelligence 
Department [Dairat al-Mukhabarat al-Ammah]’ in accordance 
with Act 24 of 1964.182 Sir Roderick Parkes commented on 
MacIntosh’s achievement in a letter:
I cannot finish this letter without warm tribute to MacIntosh. His 
health has suffered recently, yet the energy, single-mindedness of 
purpose and wisdom with which he has carried out a singularly dif-
ficult assignment have impressed me deeply. He is due to go at the end 
of January, when his six-month contract comes to an end. All those 
Jordanians who have been in touch which him will be sorry at his 
departure. I shall share their feelings.183
Indeed, even after MacIntosh’s retirement from the post, training 
of Jordanian police officers as a part of anti-Communist meas-
ures continued.184 In addition, the British anti-Communist policy 
in Jordan allowed the Americans to participate in the internal 
affairs of Jordan from the mid-1950s onwards, and, since then, 
the United States has enjoyed its own influence over the Jordanian 
government.185
Conclusion
British concerns about Middle Eastern security dovetailed with 
the demands of Middle Eastern governments for British advice 
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on anti-Communist measures. However, Britain did not have a 
security/police adviser in every Middle Eastern country. Placing 
one in Syria, for example, was considered, but the country was 
too unstable for such a liaison to be established.186 Owing to the 
flow of illegal Jewish (and possible Communist) immigrants from 
the Eastern bloc into the newly established state of Israel, MI5 
also contemplated liaison with the Israeli authorities in 1951, 
but there is no archival evidence to suggest that MI5 put this into 
practice.187 In addition, Britain maintained a close connection 
with the Egyptians through the representative of MI5 on anti-
Communist matters until the early 1950s: there was no need to 
place a security/police adviser there.
Placing security/police officers in the heart of Middle Eastern 
governments was advantageous for Britain: the local security ser-
vices, including police forces, were unique assets for intelligence 
and security purposes, and security liaison with them was invalu-
able in at least two ways. Firstly, as Communist movements were 
illegal in the region, intelligence collection on them was carried 
out by the local security services, with physical surveillance of the 
suspects and premises, probably even utilising the power to tap 
telephones and intercept other communications. Security liaison 
with regional police forces meant that Britain was able to access 
intelligence on Communist activities in the region, including police 
records, which would otherwise have been inaccessible. Secondly, 
the training of the security services was seen as the best way of 
containing the spread of Communism in the region. In addition 
to the training of the security services, officials deemed placing 
security/police advisers the best way to influence the conduct of 
anti-Communist measures by Middle Eastern states.
The main problem with these relationships for Britain was that 
they were based on a non-institutionalised agreement in a hostile 
environment, where anti-British sentiment was commonplace, 
and thus an institutionalised arrangement was impossible for 
Middle Eastern leaders who were risking their political careers by 
associating so closely with Britain. As a result, although some per-
sonal connections were maintained, the posts of British security/
police advisers were abruptly ended in the face of a crisis.
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3  The Defence of the Realm in the 
Middle East1
In the minds of many people, it [the British Secret Service] has become 
a dark legend, an organisation of fantastic power, whose tentacles 
extend everywhere. The reality was a little different. Nobody will 
deny the power and ability of the Secret Service, but it is a long way 
from being the ‘all-seeing eye’ of popular legend. What keeps the 
British Secret Service functioning is simply money, and the irresistible 
temptation which money represents to rogues and traitors.
Anwar El Sadat2
Introduction
British intelligence services and their activities were mysterious to 
many. One organisation which remains particularly mysterious 
was SIME, MI5’s regional headquarters run from Egypt during 
and after the Second World War. Little is known about its activi-
ties, relationship with MI6, or its liaison with local authorities.3 
This chapter explores these issues before demonstrating what 
the story of SIME’s closure in 1958 reveals about the shift in 
Whitehall’s conduct of the Cold War. With the prospect of war 
against the Soviet Union reduced, SIME became obsolete in the 
eyes of military planners. This chapter shows that having increas-
ingly become an instrument of the Cold War, the role of SIME 
was not to defend broadly against anti-British movements, but 
rather to focus narrowly on Communism. It further argues that 
the fragile nature of post-war intelligence liaison, when local 
populations became increasingly hostile to the British military 
presence, limited SIME’s activities and effectiveness.
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SIME in the Second World War
A former British Army officer, who served under the Middle East 
Command during the war, once described SIME as ‘MI5 behav-
ing rather like MI6 and doing it better’.4 This is rather mislead-
ing because SIME was never the regional headquarters of MI5 
during the war: it was staffed and administered by the British 
Army and operated entirely under the direction of the General 
Headquarters of the Middle East (GHQ/ME). The exception 
was the Defence Security Officer (DSO) in Cairo, Colonel (later 
Brigadier) Raymond J. Maunsell, an Army officer on the MI5 
payroll.5 SIME’s connections with MI5 developed on an ad hoc 
basis throughout the war, often driven by SIME requiring techni-
cal advice on counter-espionage in the region. As the war pro-
gressed and the ‘double-cross’ deception operations developed, 
MI5 sent SIME instructions to enhance its security practices, 
necessary given its counter-espionage functions.6 Thus, MI5’s 
direct commitment to regional security did not precede the post-
war reorganisation of the British intelligence community, through 
which its overseas commitments expanded substantially.
SIME was a very successful organisation during the war. The 
Middle East at that time consisted of a diverse collection of 
Crown colonies, protectorates, mandated territories and neutral 
countries, where the provision for maintaining internal security 
differed significantly. The complexity of maintaining regional 
security over these territories fostered the organisational devel-
opment of SIME and led to an increase in its activities. While 
SIME originally started in December 1939 as a spin-off from 
the DSO in Cairo, it expanded rapidly in size and territory 
covered. At the height of the war in 1941, SIME was staffed by 
ninety officers and a hundred others, mostly from the Army.7 
A number of military officers served as DSOs across the region 
to liaise with local authorities and to advise on internal secu-
rity in territories covering the Balkans, the Middle East and 
North Africa, including Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Palestine, 
Syria/Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Transjordan, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, 
Egypt, the Canal Zone, Eritrea and Aden.8 An example of 
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Britain’s proactive security measures through SIME can be 
found in the context of Egypt, where the DSO in Cairo closely 
cooperated with the Egyptian security forces such as the Cairo 
City Police. Anglo-Egyptian joint security cooperation in fact 
resulted in the rounding up of Abwehr agents in what was 
known as Operation Condor.9
The wartime conditions also made it necessary for Britain to 
exercise executive powers backed by military support. Some 
reluctant local governments were indeed threatened with military 
measures, with notable examples including the Anglo-Soviet inva-
sion of Iran and the overthrow of the anti-British Prime Minister 
of Iraq, Rashid Ali, in 1941.10 Security measures taken by local 
governments included the detention of enemy agents and suspects 
likely to spy for the Axis Powers or turn to sabotage; the secu-
rity examination of new arrivals in the region from neutral or 
enemy-occupied territory; and border control conducted with the 
field security force of the military police.11 For security purposes, 
detention camps were established in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, 
Cyprus and Egypt, strictly under the control of the Middle East 
Command, under whose direction SIME operated. It was a busy 
time and by November 1944, a total of thirty-two German intelli-
gence officers who had parachuted into the region were detained, 
whilst 1,719 ‘fifth columnists’, who might have acted in favour 
of the enemy powers, were interned.12 In the first six months of 
1944, 11,171 refugees and travellers were examined, excluding 
all the Jewish refugees who were examined by either the Palestine 
Police or SIME.13
SIME only functioned as the regional centre for collation and 
dissemination of security intelligence. Apart from a special section 
which controlled double-agents against the Axis Powers, SIME 
never ran its own agents for use as intelligence sources nor con-
ducted counter-intelligence operations especially in the post-war 
period.14 SIME instead had two main sources of intelligence 
on which it was entirely dependent: MI6 and the outstation 
DSOs. As enemy agents mostly crossed the borders from neutral 
countries such as Turkey,15 SIME needed the close cooperation 
of the regional headquarters of MI6, also known as the Inter-
Services Liaison Department (ISLD). Historians note that a close 
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relationship between SIME and ISLD was naturally maintained 
due to the ‘excellent personal relations between the officials con-
cerned’.16 In addition, SIME shared with ISLD intercepted materi-
als from enemy wireless communications, technically termed ISOS 
(Intelligence Section, Oliver Strachey) materials – Oliver Strachey 
was responsible for solving, decrypting and circulating German 
intelligence messages at the Government Code & Cipher School 
(GC&CS); these decrypts were named after Strachey and issued 
as the ISOS series.17 These decrypts of Abwehr hand-ciphered 
messages proved vital for SIME’s counter-espionage work during 
the war especially in the context of ‘double-cross’ operations 
against the Axis Powers.18
The main functions of the DSOs were not only to advise local 
authorities on any measures necessary to enhance internal secu-
rity, but also to collect intelligence from local security services, in 
most cases the police, through liaison. For instance, intelligence 
obtained by the DSO in Cairo, Colonel Raymond Maunsell (later 
the first Head of SIME, 1939–44), included copies of ‘full surveil-
lance reports on suspects both of European and Arab/Egyptian 
origin’ from a Special Section of the Cairo Police and the Ministry 
of the Interior, which compiled a list of suspects earmarked for 
arrest and internment on the outbreak of war. In addition, under 
the supervision of DSO Cairo, British–Egyptian censorship pro-
vided Colonel Maunsell with the opportunity to examine a special 
‘dirty tricks’ section concerned with ‘secret censorship’ of both 
private and diplomatic mail.19
SIME and Post-War Imperial Defence in the Middle East
The post-war conditions in which SIME operated were entirely 
different from the wartime period. Except for Cyprus, Aden, the 
Palestine Mandate and Arabian/Persian Gulf, the Middle East 
predominantly consisted of independent countries. Intelligence 
organisations that had thrived in the region during wartime thus 
had to be dismantled, returning prime responsibility to MI6.20 The 
first casualty of the post-war reorganisation was the Combined 
Intelligence Centre Iraq/Iran (CICI), a comparable organisation 
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to SIME under the control of the Royal Air Force (RAF). CICI’s 
networks were taken over by MI6.21 Despite working predom-
inantly within foreign territories, SIME was nevertheless pre-
served. While key executive positions (the Head and Deputy Head 
of SIME) and strategically important outstations (Egypt, Iraq and 
the Palestine Mandate) were held and maintained by MI5 officers, 
SIME was not a civilian but a military organisation, the majority 
of staff being seconded from the Army, Navy and RAF on an ad 
hoc basis.22 The purpose of maintaining SIME into peacetime was 
purely to serve the needs of the Chiefs of Staff.
As MI5 had become in loco parentis towards SIME owing to 
the closeness of their relationship during the war,23 the Chiefs 
of Staff logically assumed that SIME would pass into the hands 
of MI5, whose commitment in the region was understood as the 
‘fourth defence force’.24 In addition, the outgoing Commander-in-
Chief Middle East Command – General Sir Bernard Paget, the key 
decision maker regarding the fate of post-war SIME – noted that 
an effective intelligence system in the region should be ‘one organ-
isation for security, one for political intelligence and one for mili-
tary intelligence, i.e. MI5, MI6 and MI [Military Intelligence]’.25 
Dissatisfied with the recent transition of its networks in Iran from 
CICI to MI6, he preferred to preserve SIME and also welcomed 
SIME ‘becoming part of a larger Imperial Security Organisation’ 
under the authority of MI5.26
The post-war SIME did not, however, resemble its wartime 
brilliance. When Sir Dick White, Deputy Director of B (counter-
espionage) Division of MI5 and later both the Director-General 
of MI5 and Chief of MI6, visited the region, he was ‘not at all 
impressed by the general organisation of SIME’ as, since the end 
of the war, it had mostly been staffed by junior officers, who had 
no knowledge about intelligence and security. However, White 
had to accept the need of the Chiefs of Staff to preserve SIME 
and for it to be administered by MI5, noting that a new separate 
security organisation to maintain a British military presence in the 
region would be ‘inadvisable’.27 A formal recommendation was 
made through the JIC (ME) and approved by the JIC in London 
and the British Defence Co-ordination Committee in the Middle 
East (BDCC/ME).28 Thus, in September 1946, SIME finally came 
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under the authority of MI5, and SIME was the regional headquar-
ters of MI5 thereafter.
As the regional headquarters of MI5, SIME functioned similarly 
to MI5 at home but had different commitments. Like the wartime 
SIME, it was responsible for the collation and dissemination of 
security intelligence relating to counter-espionage and counter-
subversion, which might have had implications for British author-
ities throughout the region. Its intelligence customers included the 
Army Commander-in-Chief Middle East; the Naval Commander-
in-Chief Mediterranean; the Royal Air Force Commander-in-
Chief Middle East; the Naval Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet; 
and British Ambassadors, Ministers, High Commissioners and 
Governors.29 In his memoir, Brigadier William Magan, Head of 
SIME (1947–51), notes the responsibility of SIME:
My task consisted in knowing in as much detail as possible the threats 
to the area as a whole and in ensuring that we had the means, the 
knowledge and the understanding to counter them. To that end it 
was my responsibility to pass to MI5 the information of which they 
needed to be informed, and to feed to local authorities the information 
of which they needed to be aware, [and a]lso to advise the individual 
territories on their security organisation and practices. In many of the 
territories we had our own SIME representatives to liaise with and 
advise the local authorities.30
More importantly, the difference between SIME and MI5 was 
that, although MI5 enjoyed no commitments to a particular 
department, SIME was ‘an integral part of the military machine’ 
in the Middle East.31 It was in fact distinctively associated with 
the military forces and planning in the region and had its own 
commitments to the post-war strategy of the Chiefs of Staff.32
However, operating in peacetime did influence SIME’s work. 
Activities were scaled back and the number of SIME person-
nel kept to a minimum: capped at twenty-five staff of all ranks 
under the inter-service agreement reached before the end of the 
war.33 Although the territorial coverage remained equal to that 
under BDCC/ME Command, the number of its outstations – in 
other words, the physical presence of DSOs – was reduced to a 
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few strategically key stations such as Egypt, Iraq, the Palestine 
Mandate and Cyprus.34 The purpose of maintaining its own 
representatives at these outstations was to liaise with local secu-
rity services, especially on advice about security measures in the 
event of war. If war did break out, however, SIME’s staff was to 
increase by at least 50 per cent through secondments from the 
War Office.35 Moreover, in the event of war, when British mili-
tary forces were to reoccupy those countries in the region with 
which Britain had a defence treaty, SIME was expected to ‘keep 
its links going wherever possible, [so] that Middle East Command 
should have a proper security organisation at its back’.36
SIME faced difficulties operating on foreign soil, but these 
arose predominantly in securing cooperation from other depart-
ments of the British government. This was particularly true in 
the case of Iraq, where the RAF’s wartime CICI had been forced 
to close down and was replaced by a new Army-oriented SIME 
outstation. When one of the ‘best’ MI5 officers, John (‘Jack’) 
Percival Morton, former officer of the Indian Police, the Delhi 
Intelligence Bureau (DIB), was despatched from London under 
cover of Assistant Air Attaché to establish his DSO office within 
the British Embassy in Baghdad in 1947, he had to cope with 
opposition from RAF staff serving there.37 As the RAF main-
tained its own headquarters at Habbaniya, a major regional 
airbase, Iraq was considered RAF territory and Morton’s associa-
tion with the Army-oriented SIME made him ‘rather friendless’.38 
Owing to this lack of cooperation, the DSO’s records of the 
Registry, all necessary for Morton’s security work, were kept fifty 
miles away in Habbaniya due to the ‘lack of suitable and secure 
accommodation in Baghdad’.39 The reason for Morton’s physical 
presence in Baghdad was to maintain the close connection with 
the Iraqi CID.40
In addition, Morton’s DSO cover was publicly blown by 
Douglas Laird Busk, the Counsellor at the British Embassy in 
Baghdad, who was ‘cynical about intelligence’.41 The main reason 
for this uneasy relationship with the British Embassy in Baghdad 
was perhaps that Morton was seen as an intelligence officer 
comparable with the wartime CICI operative, who had been 
responsible not only for internal security, but also tribal and 
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political intelligence. During the war, the local CICI operatives, 
named Area Liaison Officers (ALOs), had operated to collect 
‘raw material’ from their several stations in Iraq, but had caused 
trouble for the diplomats in their political dealings with the 
Iraqis who ‘increasingly’ resented the ALOs’ presence.42 The issue 
was resolved only after an investigation by Sir Edward Bridges, 
Permanent Secretary to the Treasury and head of the civil service 
(1945–56), who understood Morton’s liaison work and ‘the intel-
ligence value’ he received from his Iraqi counterparts.43 Owing 
to the importance of ‘the special strategic position’ of the region, 
an interdepartmental meeting chaired by Bridges agreed that ‘the 
work of SIME was essential and should continue’.44
The Relationship between SIME and MI6
It is commonly understood that MI5 and MI6 had since 1931 
(if only in principle) operated under the so-called ‘three-mile 
limit’ rule, whereby MI6 ‘should confine itself to operations at 
least 3 miles away from British territory, and that the domestic 
agencies [i.e. MI5] should operate only within this limit’.45 The 
Attlee Directive of 1948 redefined the jurisdictions of the services 
for the complex era of post-war decolonisation and gave MI5 
authority for imperial security throughout the British Empire.46 
Nevertheless, the Middle East was an exception and SIME had no 
specific role or directive. It operated on an ad hoc basis, governed 
by the broadly defined SIME Charter, which stated: ‘SIME will 
maintain close relations with MI6.’47
Tension existed between MI5 and MI6 over the post-war role 
of SIME and their jurisdiction over the Middle East.48 In order 
to avoid duplication of work, an agreement over the division 
of labour was reached in 1950 through Dick White of MI5 and 
Jack Easton of MI6, which was referred to as the ‘White/Easton 
Agreement’.49 From 1950 onwards, MI6 took charge of the field 
of counter-espionage in the region, with an MI6 officer heading 
the counter-espionage division of SIME, often referred to as the 
Joint Intelligence Division (JID), which was composed of both 
MI5 and MI6 officers on secondment.50 A  similar arrangement 
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was also made with a sister organisation of SIME in the Far East, 
Security Intelligence Far East (SIFE).51 Thus, while intelligence on 
any espionage activities of foreign states was dealt with by MI6, 
intelligence on any subversive activities in the region was chiefly 
handled by MI5. SIME was responsible for the final collation of 
security intelligence (any intelligence on espionage, sabotage and 
subversion) as the regional headquarters of MI5.
Unlike the politics at their headquarters in London, the working 
relationship between the services on the ground seems to have 
been less problematic. Sir Bernard Burrows, Head of FO’s Eastern 
Department, who had assumed both MI5 and MI6 in the region 
were in a ‘struggle for power’, was surprised to find out that their 
working relationship was ‘very much more friendly’.52 The reason 
for the good relationship was that while SIME formed the regional 
hub of security intelligence, MI6 was an intelligence collector. 
Moreover, because the headquarters of SIME was housed within 
(sequentially) the Army headquarters in Cairo (1939–46), Fayid, 
in the Canal Zone of Egypt (1946–53), and Cyprus (1954–8), it 
cooperated closely with the British military in the region. SIME 
officers, including the representatives of MI5 working in the guise 
of DSOs, mostly used the cover of military ranks.53 MI6 was, on 
the other hand, operating with civilian cover mostly associated 
with the Foreign Office, though occasionally with the Ministry of 
Defence. The regional headquarters of MI6 in the post-war period 
was in Beirut, operating under the cover name of the Combined 
Research and Planning Office (CRPO), with which SIME worked 
well.54
SIME and CRPO enjoyed an effective relationship because their 
organisational differences and activities, and the way in which 
they collected intelligence, were mutually beneficial, not competi-
tive. This was due to the division of overt and covert means of 
intelligence collection in the region. MI5’s networks consisted 
entirely of ‘overt’ SLOs, whose presence was declared to the 
host governments and was thus accepted by their local counter-
parts, mostly the local or secret police. MI6, on the other hand, 
was a covert intelligence network in principle, operating without 
the knowledge of the host governments.55 This special arrange-
ment gave MI5 access to particular, and otherwise unobtainable, 
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intelligence. Indeed, as the formation of Communist Parties was 
illegal in most Middle Eastern states, any activities associated 
with them were handled by the local police. Thus, MI5’s special 
overt liaison, especially its ‘close and useful relations’ with ‘the 
local police’, was praised by the local MI6 representative as a 
‘considerable help’ with regard to its own intelligence require-
ments.56 Guy Liddell recorded in his diaries that the demarcation 
between MI5 and MI6 in the post-war period was in fact not 
geographical but functional.57
In return, MI6’s covert networks in the region provided SIME 
with intelligence otherwise unobtainable from its local counter-
parts through DSOs. Unsurprisingly, this was a sensitive issue 
as there was a tacit understanding amongst the intelligence and 
security services that while liaison was maintained, they would 
not be spying on each other. Once the existence of covert activi-
ties by MI6 became known to local authorities, the British, rightly 
or wrongly, explained that they were operating in host countries 
under the ‘third country rule’, whereby MI6 stations were ‘sup-
posed to target neighbouring states, rather than the host nation’.58 
In his memoir, Kim Philby also testifies in relation to his role as 
Head of Station in Turkey that ‘They [the Turkish intelligence/
security organisations] knew of us, and tolerated our activity, on 
the understanding that it was directed solely against the Soviet 
Union and the Balkans, not against Turkey.’59
MI6 therefore operated in line with SIME requirements to 
collect security intelligence – in other words, intelligence on 
subversive activities – in the region.60 In the late 1940s, for 
instance, when Kim Philby was in Istanbul, he was asked by 
William Magan, Head of SIME, to provide another officer from 
MI6 to fill the vacuum in Eastern Turkey.61 Moreover, while the 
DSO in Baghdad, Jack Morton of MI5, was closely cooperating 
with the Iraqi CID as an overt contact, Magan also requested 
an MI6 representative to be posted in Northern Iraq, where the 
Kurdish tribes were a cause for concern for SIME.62 This reflects 
the fact that MI5 and MI6 officers were often working in the 
same country.63 The main sources of intelligence for SIME in 
the post-war period thus remained both MI6 and the local 
authorities.64
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Limitations in Intelligence Collection and 
Counter-Subversion
The strength of SIME was that, unlike MI6, it collated intel-
ligence from all available sources and served as an intelligence 
assessment body. In doing so, it did not always agree with other 
British authorities. One such instance occurred when anti-British 
riots broke out in Egypt in early 1952, and SIME refuted the 
British Embassy in Cairo’s views that they must have been plotted 
by either the Soviet Union or Communists. SIME argued that 
‘no acceptable evidence has been produced in support of them’. 
SIME’s source was ‘a senior official in the Special Section of the 
[Egyptian] Ministry of the Interior’, and the information provided 
by him was checked against all available intelligence.65
Although SIME managed to maintain the quality of intelligence 
reports on regional security, it faced limitations in intelligence col-
lection in the post-war period. Despite the close cooperation on 
counter-espionage between SIME and MI6, the quality of intel-
ligence obtained by MI6 seems to have been less than satisfactory. 
According to Guy Liddell, intelligence from MI6 in the region was 
‘practically valueless’, and MI6 was ‘clearly employing a number 
of agents who were MAUVE’ (a codename for Russian émigrés 
who were unreliable and unverified).66 Anthony Cavendish also 
claims that the sources of MI6 on the Soviet Union were mostly 
MAUVE and that MI6 obtained no valuable intelligence from 
them in the early 1950s.67 To make matters worse, MI6 suf-
fered from a fatal defect: Kim Philby, a Soviet mole, was placed 
at its heart as Head of R5 (counter-espionage), the Head of 
Station in Istanbul, and later in the United States to liaise with 
the Americans.68 An example of his disruption of MI6’s work 
was the Volkov affair of 1946, in which Philby was personally 
involved in disrupting a defection by Konstantin Volkov, an 
NKGB officer stationed in Turkey, who was sent back to Moscow 
due to Philby’s intervention.69 Meanwhile, Donald Maclean, a 
Soviet mole within the Foreign Office, was present at the British 
Embassy in Cairo as Head of Chancery (1948–50), to which DSO 
Cairo was also attached. According to Major A. W. Sansom, the 
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Security Officer at the Embassy, Maclean certainly enjoyed his 
privileged position as he ‘openly went home with a brief-case 
stuffed with secret material whenever he pleased’.70
SIME had a problem with intelligence collection not only from 
MI6, but also from local authorities liaising with DSOs. As the 
relationships were not institutionalised under diplomatic regu-
lations or treaty, intelligence collection and exchange was very 
delicate. MI5’s intimate relationship in the late 1940s and early 
1950s with its Egyptian counterparts illustrates this point. With 
thirty years of personal experience of Egypt and extensive inside 
knowledge of the Egyptian Police, Colonel Geoffrey Jenkins, the 
DSO Cairo (1943–8), enjoyed ‘excellent relations’ and was able to 
obtain ‘much useful intelligence’ through his liaison.71 The intel-
ligence obtained by Jenkins included, for instance, documentary 
evidence of secret negotiations between the Wafd Party, a nation-
alist political party in Egypt, and the Russians suggesting ‘future 
collaboration’.72 However, Alex Kellar of MI5 described the rela-
tionship between Colonel Jenkins and his Egyptian  counterpart 
thus:
While admitting that the Egyptian police as such are unlikely to pass 
information to Jenkins that may harm Egyptian interests . . . their 
liaison with Jenkins on Communist, Russian and Jewish matters has 
nevertheless been, and should increasingly be, of considerable value to 
us. Egyptians of the present ruling classes, and their counter-parts in 
the rest of the Arab countries, hate the Zionists and fear the Russians 
and the increasing influence and strength of the Communists within 
their frontiers. We can therefore always be certain of their willingness, 
while they remain in power, to exchange intelligence with us on all 
these topics.73
Sir Alistair Horne, a former SIME officer, also recalls that whilst 
the Egyptian Police provided intelligence to SIME on ‘Communist 
activities’, SIME supplied the Egyptians with information on 
‘hashish-traffickers’.74
In addition to the Cairo Police, Colonel Jenkins maintained a 
‘close and friendly’ relationship with the Under-Secretary of State 
at the Ministry of the Interior, and with the Director-General of 
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Public Security throughout the war. Once new appointments were 
made after the war, Jenkins had to convince the Egyptians of the 
raison d’être of the intelligence liaison and rebuild mutual trust 
with the Egyptians. For instance, a new but sceptical Director-
General of Public Security questioned the extent of Jenkins’s 
intelligence activities in Cairo, concerned that he was ‘seeking 
intelligence about Egyptian politics’, particularly about the activi-
ties of anti-British figures. Jenkins’s first task was to win ‘the 
goodwill’ of the new Director-General of Public Security.75
This indicates that the extent to which SIME was able to obtain 
intelligence through its own sources (MI6 and DSOs) and to warn 
its intelligence customers in the region was indeed limited. The 
Egyptian coup of 1952 demonstrated these limitations. Despite 
the DSO Cairo being in close contact with his Egyptian counter-
parts during the turmoil of early 1952, SIME had no intelligence 
forewarning of the Free Officers coup. There was no source 
within the Free Officers movement.76 The 1958 Iraqi Revolution 
offers a similar example. Despite SIME being acutely aware of 
disaffection within the Iraqi Army from the early 1950s, informa-
tion which had been passed from the Head of SIME to his Iraqi 
counterparts in the CID of the Iraqi Police,77 no prior warning of 
the coup was provided.78
In a similar vein, there were also severe limitations on SIME’s 
counter-subversive activities in the post-war Middle East. During 
the war, SIME had enjoyed executive and law enforcement powers 
to undertake security measures in each country. However, Britain 
no longer enjoyed such powers over the local authorities in the 
post-war era and SIME therefore struggled to obtain cooperation 
from local actors, many of whom had changed since the war. 
Rising anti-British sentiment in the post-war years made SIME’s 
task even more difficult. Sir John Shaw, Director of the OS (Over-
Seas) Division of MI5, for instance, informed the JIC that the 
Egyptian Police, SIME’s closest ally in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, gradually became ‘hostile’ and SIME received ‘no help’ 
from 1952 onwards.79 Unlike at home, where the role of MI5 was 
to defend its own government against subversion, SIME was not 
necessarily conducting counter-subversion for the benefit of local 
governments. William Magan once explained to his successor, 
The Defence of the Realm in the Middle East
75
Colonel (later Brigadier) Robin ‘Tin Eye’ Stephens (1951–3),80 
that:
Security Intelligence presents a difficulty because it cannot be exactly 
defined for SIME purposes. You have only to consider the impossibil-
ity of drawing a line by definition between an Arab political party 
and an Arab subversive organisation to see the problem. A broad 
definition of Security Intelligence, however, gives rise to that part 
of the intelligence division of the organisation which concerns itself 
with subversive individuals and bodies – ‘subversive’ also, of course, 
cannot be exactly defined.81
The complexity of the demarcation line between subversive and 
anti-British elements caused confusion even among MI5 offic-
ers. With nationalist disturbances and street riots breaking out 
across the Middle East, Colonel Stephens requested MI5 Head 
Office to send more officers to the region as ‘links’ to local 
authorities in places where MI5 was not represented.82 Head 
Office, however, considered the request unnecessary and turned 
it down.83
Nonetheless, Stephens had successfully generated a discussion 
about MI5’s commitments to safeguarding British interests over-
seas. William Magan, former Head of SIME, was at the centre 
of the discussion having recently returned from the Middle East 
to take up a position at MI5 Head Office.84 Magan was soon 
promoted by Sir Dick White in 1953 to Director of E Branch 
(the overseas department in charge of external affairs, liaising 
with all colonial, Commonwealth and friendly foreign countries) 
and remained in executive positions for fifteen years until his 
retirement.85
According to Magan, maintaining law and order – including 
the suppression of disturbances, riots and terrorist activities, even 
when directed by a political organisation – was outside MI5’s 
remit and should be dealt with by the relevant local authorities. 
The police were responsible for maintaining law and order but it 
also made sense for the armed forces to keep their own link with 
the local authorities as they might be deployed ‘in aid of the civil 
power’. Magan also expected local authorities and military forces 
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to take charge of ‘purely local indigenous subversive political 
persons, movements, parties and organizations’ in British terri-
tory. MI5 should only be informed if these organisations were 
categorised as ‘conspiratorially political subversive’, and/or if they 
had the ‘possibility of outside influence, such as contact with a 
hostile foreign power’.86 Referring to the roles and  responsibilities 
of SIME, Magan further commented that:
our resources, whether at home or overseas, are inadequate for a one 
hundred per cent fulfilment of our tasks. This is an inherent feature 
of all defence forces. We must, therefore, follow the age old military 
principle of concentrating on the main objective. I have thus always 
held the view that the wise thing is to stop the holes of the big rats 
properly even if this meant ignoring the little rats, and risking the odd 
nip from them.87
‘The big rats’ referred to by Magan were the Russians and 
Communist movements; he considered anti-British movements 
and disturbances as ‘little rats’. This meant that SIME, as the 
regional headquarters of MI5, was supposed to be concerned with 
‘conspiratorially political subversive’ activities, mostly those asso-
ciated with external threats such as International Communism 
and the Soviet Union. This indicates that SIME was geared more 
towards the Cold War.
The Primacy of Cold War Concerns over Anti-British 
Nationalist Movements
Magan’s approach to MI5’s responsibilities in British territories 
overseas indicates that its main post-war concern was the Soviet 
Union and the Cold War. However, MI5 also had to deal with 
the new challenge of Zionist extremists and terrorism and had 
to learn quickly about how best to manage its overseas commit-
ments.88 During the transition from war to peacetime, SIME was 
mostly ill-equipped to cope with the flow of ‘illegal’ Jewish immi-
gration and with countering Jewish terrorist activities in Palestine. 
With the prime responsibility for internal security in the Palestine 
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Mandate resting with the Palestine CID, which had the intelli-
gence and executive powers necessary to deal with the situation,89 
SIME’s chief concern was the infiltration of Soviet agents into the 
region amidst the flow of illegal Jewish immigrants.90 Despite a 
shortage of staff, SIME also looked for any opportunity to pen-
etrate the KGB in the Middle East.91 SIME was in fact right  to 
be worried about Soviet penetration here as the KGB sought to 
exploit the situation by, as Soviet documents reveal, ensuring 
‘that large numbers of its agents were included in the ranks of the 
Soviet Jews allowed to leave for Israel’.92
Having taken over SIME from the Army as in loco parentis, 
one of the ways in which MI5 sought to improve SIME’s security 
measures was to institute its own standard practice of record-
keeping at SIME’s Registry.93 There was a gradual but clear shift 
in SIME record-keeping by the early 1950s, and SIME and its 
outstations (DSOs) collected and collated intelligence according 
to specific principles. The SIME Central Registry stored all infor-
mation on identifiable officers and proven or suspected agents of 
foreign intelligence and security services, regardless of nationality; 
and the DSOs were instructed to record all information on identi-
fiable Communists, Communist sympathisers, as well as national-
ists at their own Registries.94
In 1953, SIME only had four outstations: Cairo, the Canal 
Zone, Cyprus and Baghdad. The largest outstation was still DSO 
Cairo, which also had the largest Registry, containing an esti-
mated 50,000 card-indexes, covering 40,000 individuals.95 DSO 
Baghdad was the second largest, and its Registry contained 33,000 
cards on about 20,000 individuals. Having inherited records from 
the wartime organisation, CICI, Roger Lees of MI5, DSO in 
Baghdad, noted that a large number of people were carded on 
‘tenuous grounds or for reasons which are now no longer of 
interest to us [MI5]’, but he stored ‘all persons of security inter-
est’, about 12,000 of whom were ‘communists or communist 
suspects’.96 The DSO in the Canal Zone operated on a much 
smaller scale and was mainly responsible for protecting the pres-
ence of the British Army there. Its records held ‘approximately 
2,050 cards’, mostly referring to ‘nationalists and “thugs”’.97 
The DSO in Cyprus stored approximately 10,000 cards: 5,500 
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on Communists or Communist sympathisers, ‘about 1,500 cards 
connected with nationalists’ and 3,000 more on suspects.98
It is notable that while keeping records on ‘subversive’ elements 
for their own security purposes, the prime concern of SIME, and 
thus MI5, was their direct connection to the Soviet Union and 
the spread of Communist movements in the region. A declassified 
MI5 file on the Iraqi counterpart of the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
Jamiyat al Adab al Islamiya, also known as the Moslem Ethical 
Society (MES), shows that SIME recognised the full subversive 
potential of the MES as a strong anti-British force and as a 
‘nationalist movement’, but one whose fate was largely depend-
ent on whether the local authorities were able to resist it.99 While 
the MES was militant and subversive in character and notably 
anti-British, the DSO Baghdad, Jack Morton of MI5, nevertheless 
judged that the MES was of ‘little security interest’ to SIME as 
it was a religious and theological group. SIME’s prime concern 
was whether any leading members of the MES were in contact 
with Soviets who might exploit them; or whether the MES could 
emerge as ‘an effective barrier against Communism’.100
Prime Importance: War Planning
Prioritising records on Communists rather than nationalists 
shows that all post-war activities associated with MI5, and indeed 
SIME, were subordinate to British government policy. As noted in 
Chapter 1, the central components of this policy were the Defence 
Transition Committee (DTC) and the 1948 Government War 
Book.101 Without exception, the War Book was the key driving 
policy for MI5’s activities in the Middle East. SIME was par-
ticularly important in this given that the integrity of the Middle 
East was essential for British war-making, and the Chiefs of Staff 
envisaged the possibility of a Soviet invasion of the region.102 
For this reason, SIME Headquarters and its outstations were all 
attached to British military bases and, under instruction, SIME 
and DSOs prepared security measures and their own ‘arrest lists’ 
in each country for ‘the event of war, or other emergency’ taken 
from their own Registries.103 The lists consisted of subversive 
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individuals and organisations deemed the most likely to engage in 
subversive activities to disrupt allied war efforts against the Soviet 
Union. They were particularly designed to grant the DSOs ‘infor-
mation sufficient to neutralise them, for which purpose it will nor-
mally be adequate to be able to identify their principal directing 
personalities’.104 Amongst all other activities, the preparation of 
arrest lists of those who would be detained in the event of war or 
an emergency was an ‘important SIME commitment’ in post-war 
imperial strategy in the Middle East.105
Implementing these security measures was, however, not an 
easy task. This was primarily because the territorial coverage of 
the BDCC/ME Command consisted of mostly foreign countries, 
with the exception of Cyprus and later the Aden Colony. Since 
these security measures inevitably required the cooperation of 
local authorities, an effective security liaison was essential. Iraq 
offers a glimpse of this process, where the DSO Baghdad became 
the main outstation of SIME in the 1950s after the decline of 
Anglo-Egyptian relations.106 The association between the MI5 
representative and the Iraqi CID, led by Colonel Bahjat Beg 
Attiyah, originated from the establishment of the DSO Baghdad 
in 1947.107
Their close relationship necessitated intelligence sharing on 
certain topics. For instance, following the round-up of some 
160 ICP members, including those of the Executive Committee, 
in 1949, the Iraqi CID duly passed intelligence on the linkage 
between the ICP and the Russians to Philip Bicknell Ray of MI5, 
the DSO in Baghdad (1949–51). Detailed reports over 300 pages 
long on ICP composition, members and their activities, made by 
Philip Ray for MI5 Head Office and the Foreign Office, show 
that the Iraqi CID interrogated the leading ICP members and 
obtained confessions to their having direct connections with the 
Russian Legation in Iraq. ICP members had received financial 
support and propaganda materials, named the ‘Al Qa’ida Press’, 
from the Legation; the latter were also shared with members of 
the Tudeh Party.108 It was also discovered that the Russians had 
made contact with the ICP through a small group of Armenians 
and that the ICP had also intended to spread agitation among 
minority circles such as the Kurds.109
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The relationship between the representative of MI5 and the 
Iraqi CID grew even closer in the 1950s as a result of the 
joint war planning. According to Guy Liddell, the relationship 
between the DSO Baghdad, Philip Ray, and his counterpart, 
the Director of the Iraqi CID, Bahjat Attiyah, was ‘extremely 
close’, and Bahjat Attiyah had a ‘tremendous respect for all the 
advice and help which Ray had given him’.110 The BDCC/ME 
instructed Ray, through the Air Officer Commanding (AOC) 
Iraq Command, to discuss arrangements with the Iraqi authori-
ties for ‘the preparation of lists of security suspects to be arrested 
on the outbreak of war’. His approach was dependent on ‘the 
general deterioration in the international situation’ rather than 
war planning against the Soviet Union as envisaged by the 
Chiefs of Staff.111 As instructed, he also cooperated with Bahjat 
Attiyah on a war plan covering travel control, censorship, inter-
rogation and the protection of vulnerabilities, leading to the 
combination of the arrest lists of both parties.112 The number 
of suspects who were destined to be arrested for interrogation 
in ‘special’ camps at the outset of war was estimated at 2,000 
in the first stage, and would consist mostly of those who were 
associated with the ICP and Soviet Union. Any underground 
Communist members and suspects, or other persons likely to 
engage in subversive activities, were destined to be detained and 
interrogated automatically by the Iraqi CID under the existing 
legal framework.113
The security measures in place in the event of a war in Iraq 
expanded towards the mid-1950s and extended beyond mere 
intelligence liaison. As these measures required the highest level 
of cooperation, Sir John Troutbeck approached the Iraqi Prime 
Minister, Nuri al-Said, in March 1952 regarding the security plans 
for war. Agreeing to the suggestion in principle, Nuri al-Said pre-
ferred using the police as opposed to the armed forces to ‘concoct 
the planning on the Iraqi side’, mainly due to volatile Iraqi senti-
ments towards the West, particularly Britain. He worried that 
the disclosure of war planning would cause ‘a serious political 
storm’ in which his government would be accused of ‘dragging 
the country into war on the side of the Western Powers’.114 He 
decided to delegate the task to Alwan Hussain, known as Alwan 
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Pasha, Director-General of Police, who would later hand the task 
over to Bahjat Attiyah. On the British side, Sir John Troutbeck 
nominated Roger Lees of MI5, DSO Baghdad (1951–3), the suc-
cessor to Philip Ray.115
After an initial discussion between Roger Lees and Bahjat 
Attiyah on the security planning to implement the Iraqi Prime 
Minister’s orders, Lees reported that:
After several meetings [with Bahjat Attiyah] and after examining old 
files covering the last war to see whether any aspects of the planning 
were covered then, which could be adapted for our present needs, 
it became apparent to me that a completely fresh approach in our 
present planning would be necessary. I therefore met both Alwan 
Pasha and Bahjat Beg and it was agreed that I should draw up a 
detailed scheme for their consideration.116
While keeping an updated combined arrest list, the security plan, 
contemplated by DSO Baghdad and the Iraqi CID, was for ‘the 
laying of the foundations of sound security under peace-time con-
ditions, on which efficient war-time measures could be immedi-
ately introduced on the outbreak of hostilities’. For this purpose, 
the Director of the Iraqi CID, Bahjat Attiyah, was given training 
by the British in ‘protective security matters’ during his visit to 
London in June 1952.117 Bahjat Attiyah also visited Guy Liddell 
during his stay in Britain.118
In addition, after examining Lees’s proposed scheme, Alwan 
Pasha gave orders to set up a ‘special planning section’ under cover 
of the Iraqi CID. This small and compartmentalised section was 
headed by Colonel Yusef Peters, Commandant of Police, aided 
by two Assistant Commandants.119 Colonel Peters was also given 
‘detailed instruction’ on the security measures in Baghdad, ‘paying 
particular attention to the oil industry’. During his visit in May 
1953 to Basra, Kirkuk and Khanaqun, where the major oil refin-
eries were situated, Colonel Peters was accompanied by ‘a British 
officer’, presumably DSO Baghdad, Roger Lees, and detailed 
advice was given on ‘protective security matters to the managers 
of oil companies and other important installations’. These secu-
rity measures included the coverage of ‘the oil producing, refining 
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and storage centres, public utility installations, such as water and 
electricity, and certain Government departments’.120
The security planning between Roger Lees and Bahjat Attiyah 
was carried out in ‘great secrecy’. It continued even after the 
resignation of Nuri al-Said in July 1952, and without the knowl-
edge of subsequent Prime Ministers, Ministers of the Interior 
or Ministers of Defence.121 As a result of this close liaison with 
the Iraqis, Roger Lees submitted the security plan to the Local 
Security Board. It was also approved by Sir John Troutbeck.122 
In the event of war, the Iraqis agreed on the provision of a small 
group of British interrogators to the detention camp where all 
suspects on the combined arrest lists would be detained, and, 
more importantly, the provision of British representatives to the 
central censorship headquarters, controlling postal and telecom-
munication censorship throughout Iraq.123 Sir Hugh Stephenson, 
Chairman of JIC in the Middle East, was ‘extremely gratified’ to 
learn of such substantial progress despite the ‘difficulties inher-
ent in the unstable political state in the country’.124 As already 
discussed in Chapter 2, it was in this context that Britain was 
reluctant to allow the Americans to appoint their own security 
advisers to the Iraqi Police and the CID. The security plan was 
constantly reviewed as to whether it was still ‘valid and workable’ 
until at least 1955.125
In addition to SIME, MI6 was also operating in the region 
under the direction of the 1948 Government War Book. The 
limited literature on MI6 suggests that it incorporated the wartime 
sabotage organisation, Special Operations Executive (SOE), in the 
post-war reorganisation of the British intelligence community in 
the late 1940s,126 and, based on the lessons of the war, largely 
those of SOE, the Directorate of War Planning (D/WP), later 
renamed the Special Political Action (SPA) Section, was formed 
in MI6 to establish stay-behind networks in foreign countries.127 
Recently declassified files of the PUSD confirm that from the 
late 1940s, MI6 engaged in war planning.128 In 1952 the Chiefs 
of Staff tasked MI6 to create a stay-behind network in inde-
pendent foreign countries of the Middle East.129 Regardless of 
regional governments’ intentions to cooperate in the event of 
war, the British pressed ahead with war planning, which included 
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establishing stay-behind networks in Egypt130 – one of which was 
established in the early 1950s, headed by James Swinburn.131 
In 1956, after the Egyptian government, which had been aware 
of the Swinburn network since 1953, became more hostile to 
Britain, the stay-behind network was rounded up, although John 
McGlashan, an MI6 officer who had been involved in plotting to 
assassinate Nasser, was successfully smuggled out of Egypt.132
SIME Wound Up: A Shift in Conducting the Cold War
SIME was closed down in 1958.133 With the advent of thermo-
nuclear weapons, it gradually became apparent to British policy-
makers by the mid-1950s that a war with conventionally armed 
forces against the Soviet Union seemed unlikely and that the large 
military presence in the region was thus less important. Britain’s 
defence policy became more focused on European defence and the 
British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) at the expense of committing 
military forces to the Middle East at the outbreak of war.134 This 
gradual shift to reducing conventional defences, often termed 
‘East of Suez’, was at the heart of the 1957 White Paper.135 This 
was the context in which General Sir Gerald Templer conducted 
his review of intelligence organisations overseas, including the 
colonies.136 SIME was only one of many other imperial or quasi-
imperial intelligence organisations being wound up during the 
same period.137 During that period, the British government re-
examined the balance between civilian and military uses of intel-
ligence and the JIC was moved to the Cabinet Office in 1957 
accordingly.138 The closure of SIME should therefore be under-
stood in the wider context of British decolonisation and, more 
importantly, the Cold War, towards which competing approaches 
existed within Whitehall.
The process of winding down SIME had already begun when 
Sir Dick White assumed the position of Director-General of MI5 
in late 1953. The number of personnel was substantially reduced 
and the three supervisory posts (Head of SIME, Deputy Head, 
and Head of the Counter-Intelligence Section) were merged into 
one post.139 SIME was then staffed with thirteen officers and 
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twenty-five female staff.140 While senior MI5 officers complained 
that the Head of SIME was ‘bound to be handicapped in fulfilling 
his advisory responsibilities to the BDCC (ME)’, Sir Dick White 
also abolished the counter-espionage section, the JID, headed by 
an MI6 officer, in late 1955.141 In his mind, SIME had unneces-
sary burdens, and White sought to reduce it to a ‘security advisory 
role’.142 Despite maintaining a good relationship between SIME 
and MI6, Sir Dick White was also concerned about MI6’s activi-
ties in the field of counter-espionage for which MI5 was officially 
responsible.
These reforms extended beyond the Middle East to other places 
where the JIDs of the regional headquarters of MI5, headed by 
MI6 officers, were ‘geared almost as much to the broader objects 
of MI6’.143 This was a reference to MI6’s ‘cold war’ activities, 
associated with clandestine activities including covert operations, 
often referred to as ‘special political action’ or ‘disruptive action’ 
in the British lexicon.144 According to William Magan, White was 
‘worried about the extent to which the JID may be involved in 
steering MI6 stations and concerned in “cold war” activities’.145 
The problem for MI5 was that the ‘cold war’ activities of MI6 
were often a cause for concern regarding their maintenance of 
a good liaison relationship with local authorities who were not 
informed of such clandestine activities. In March 1955, SIME 
only had a total of twelve staff (five officers and seven female 
staff), and was outnumbered by MI6, the strength of which was 
four times larger than that of SIME (with a total of fifty-six staff 
at all ranks: twelve officers, plus two in SIME, twenty-seven 
 secretaries and fifteen operators).146
Not only was MI5 concerned about the activities of MI6 in its 
territory, but there was also a shift under way in thinking about 
the conduct of the Cold War. More precisely, as suggested in 
Chapter 1, there was a growing concern within Whitehall at the 
way in which the Chiefs of Staff were involved in the conduct of 
the Cold War. Since the end of the Second World War, the Chiefs 
of Staff had been one of the key decision makers regarding the 
conduct of the Cold War and in directing the activities of the intel-
ligence and security services, including the clandestine operations 
of MI6. As a result, any attempt at directing intelligence-related 
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activities overseas, especially in foreign territories, by the Chiefs 
of Staff was often considered as interference in matters which 
were ‘essentially the business of the Foreign Secretary’.147
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the 
Foreign Office, was concerned with ‘the inflated size’ of intelli-
gence staff at regional headquarters, particularly those who were 
associated with the military planning of the Chiefs of Staff, which 
he regarded as unnecessary.148 Furthermore, Sir Norman Brook, 
the Cabinet Secretary, also considered ‘large regional intelligence 
organisations [as] being outmoded’,149 whilst Sir Patrick Dean, 
Chairman of the JIC, noted ‘some duplication’ between London 
and the Middle East in ‘the collation of intelligence’ and suggested 
that ‘it would be better if this was done in London’.150 Sir Dick 
White added that the work being done by SIME ‘could be done as 
easily from the UK’.151
Of course, the closure of SIME in 1958 does not necessarily 
mean that MI6’s activities were also reduced accordingly. As Sir 
Dick White left MI5 to succeed Sir John Sinclair as ‘C’ of MI6 
in 1956, he found it difficult to rein in the ‘cold war’ activities 
of MI6, especially in the Middle East. These activities were led 
by so-called robber barons, senior MI6 officials who extensively 
engaged in special operations designed to change world affairs 
by clandestine means.152 Christopher Andrew notes that MI6 
was ‘drawn into increasingly unrealistic plans to bolster Britain’s 
declining influence in the Middle East by covert action’.153 Jack 
Easton, Deputy ‘C’, warned the newly appointed ‘C’, Dick White, 
‘I’ve had to stop a lot of operations in the Middle East. Too 
many are suspiciously unsafe.’154 There was indeed a series of 
attempts by MI6 to overthrow Nasser in the course of the Suez 
Crisis in 1956.155 According to Mohamed Heikal, George K. 
Young, the Vice-Chief of MI6, said to his American counterpart, 
James Eichelberger of the CIA, ‘“[MI6 will] do a Mossadeq” with 
Nasser.’156 MI6 also contemplated using nerve gas to assassinate 
Nasser.157
MI6 was not of course acting alone, but these operations 
were directed by the British government. Above all, it was Prime 
Minister Anthony Eden who wanted Nasser ‘destroyed’.158 At 
the working level, Douglas Dodds-Parker, the Parliamentary 
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Under-Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Overseas 
Planning Committee, formed a special committee with Sir Charles 
Hambro, a former chief of the wartime SOE, to suggest any clan-
destine actions against Egypt and Nasser.159 By mid-August 1956, 
Dodds-Parker was already contemplating Britain’s strategic posi-
tion in the Middle East on the assumption of Britain’s relationship 
with a new Egyptian government after Nasser.160 There was also 
an attempt to overthrow Nasser led by Conservative backbench-
ers, such as Julian Amery, also a former SOE officer.161 Observing 
these British attempts to change the situation in their favour, 
Miles Copeland, a former CIA expert in the Middle East, writes 
that ‘the British weren’t reacting at all like seasoned, cold-blooded 
gameplayers’, and had no real thinking of ‘which Egyptian offic-
ers or civilians might constitute a new government if Nasser 
were to be eliminated’.162 Nevertheless, these attempts failed, and 
Nasser’s popularity grew significantly after the Suez Crisis.
Owing to the inaccessibility of MI6’s archives, the question 
of how Sir Dick White saw the closure of SIME in 1958 from 
his new position at MI6, and how he reconciled the balance 
between security/counter-intelligence on the one side and ‘cold 
war’ activities on the other, remains open. Available evidence 
makes clear, however, that these activities were still favoured by 
civilian policymakers at the time, as well as politicians such as 
Harold Macmillan.163
Conclusion
The role of intelligence and security services is subordinate to 
government policy. SIME was above all an instrument of the Cold 
War and operated as ‘an integral part of the military machine’ in 
the Middle East under the direction of the Chiefs of Staff. Indeed, 
war planning drove SIME’s activities. The story of SIME in the 
post-war period is also revealing regarding the nature of intel-
ligence liaison between the British intelligence services and their 
Middle Eastern counterparts. It was based on mutual benefit but 
was strictly confined to one particular subject of common interest: 
Communist movements.
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Despite close cooperation, especially in the field of anti- 
Communist security measures, the biggest difficulty faced by 
SIME was the maintenance of an effective liaison with local 
authorities in a volatile and politically hostile environment which 
was often detrimental to intelligence liaison. In spite of these dif-
ficulties, SIME and the DSOs maintained their relationship with 
local authorities and worked with them on developing security 
measures in the event of war. It is noteworthy that local authori-
ties maintained knowledge of these security measures, including 
compiling the arrest lists, despite the closure of SIME.
Towards the mid-1950s, MI5 grew increasingly concerned 
about MI6’s activities in its territory. While both services worked 
closely together on counter-intelligence in the region, MI5 feared 
that clandestine operations conducted by MI6 would potentially 
undermine its own relationships with local authorities, which 
had been built on mutual trust. Policymakers in London failed to 
recognise this practical but important concern, and these incom-
patible counter-subversive measures, security liaison and special 
political actions were still carried out in the region under the 
direction of government policy.
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4  Prerequisites of Intelligence Cooperation
The three CENTO Regional countries are governed by dictatorships 
. . . Their Intelligence Services have no continuing tradition of semi-
independent non-political action . . . The senior officers depend for 
their appointments and for funds on their ability to keep in favour 
of a very small ruling minority. They are thus intensely involved in 
politics, both internal and foreign . . . This is a disadvantage; but it 
cannot be helped.
Alex Kellar1
In my personal view the Iranians individually are security conscious 
and are probably well able to take care of their own secrets; but the 
protection of common secrets is another matter. Here the slothfulness, 
venality and love for intrigue and personal animosities of the average 
Iranian, as well as his unwillingness to assume responsibility, are all 
hazards along the road to good security.
Roger Lees2
Introduction
Webs of intelligence networks existed at different levels all across 
the Middle East. As mentioned in the earlier chapters, the British 
cooperated with local security services, trained local officers, and 
implemented security measures against Communists through 
local security forces. These arrangements were not systematic 
and thus were made on an ad hoc basis. At the same time, local 
authorities also cooperated with each other at various levels. 
These intelligence networks at local initiatives were also sporadic 
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and operated on an ad hoc and personal basis between officers 
at a senior level. As noted in Chapter 1, the British considered 
a regional Cold War defence treaty, the Baghdad Pact, later 
renamed CENTO, as the best means to preserve their foreign and 
defence interests in the region, as well as to counter Communist 
movements. They also attempted to institutionalise intelligence 
cooperation, but were plagued by difficulties from the outset. 
As the above quotations indicate, the British found certain char-
acteristics of Middle Eastern intelligence and security practices 
 incompatible with their own approaches.
This chapter explores the nature of the intelligence/security 
liaison between Britain and Middle Eastern states, including both 
necessary preconditions and obstacles. The intelligence liaison 
in the region had two dimensions. Firstly, since any form of 
cooperation required a secure organisation, the British strove to 
improve the security of systems before actual intelligence cooper-
ation began. A by-product of this British effort was the formation 
of the Iranian National Intelligence and Security Organisation, 
known as SAVAK, in 1957. Owing to the lax security of systems 
in the Pact, Britain was also the most reluctant to share its own 
intelligence with the Pact members and sought to exchange intel-
ligence on a bilateral basis. Secondly, intelligence liaison in the 
region was based on different political systems: democratic and 
non-democratic regimes, the latter of which were dominated by 
the presence of strong security services.
Prelude to the Security Cooperation under the Baghdad 
Pact
Intelligence cooperation across national borders was essential 
for maintaining internal security in the Middle East. Michael 
Howard, the military historian who authored British Intelligence 
in the Second World War, vol. 5, has described the nature of 
wartime security work in the region as ‘an intelligence officer’s 
paradise and a security officer’s hell’.3 As the Middle East was 
virtually borderless from a security perspective, the geographical 
conditions inevitably made the local authorities work together 
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with their neighbours for internal security. Middle Eastern poli-
cymakers were also eager to have their intelligence and secu-
rity services liaise with their neighbouring counterparts. Their 
eagerness mainly came from their assumptions that political 
developments and crises were orchestrated by external powers.4 
These conspiratorial views were exacerbated by the nature of 
Middle Eastern politics in which political assassinations, plots 
and intrigues were chronic, and any crisis in one country 
alarmed policymakers in another country. So, working with a 
good neighbour in an alliance or an ad hoc arrangement against 
their common enemy was a natural move for Middle Eastern 
policymakers.
The Baghdad Pact came into existence in 1956, when the desires 
of the Iraqi and Turkish governments to establish their positions 
in the region converged with the interests of both Britain and 
the United States.5 The Baghdad Pact was not only a Cold War 
defence treaty against the Communist bloc, but also an alliance 
for the maintenance of internal security within the Pact area. The 
regional member states were above all eager to tackle subversive 
activities in their countries. High-level policies were not the only 
contributing factor in the formation of the Baghdad Pact; there 
was also a security dimension at work. As briefly discussed in 
Chapter 2, before the establishment of security cooperation under 
the Baghdad Pact, the ‘Anti-Communist Triangle’ alliance, namely 
Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq, had collaborated on subversive activi-
ties in the region since the early 1950s.6 This security cooperation 
was gradually but informally institutionalised following Coghill’s 
appointment in Jordan in 1952 and grew out of a realisation 
amongst the Triangle countries that subversive activities in each 
country were directly connected with, or indirectly instigated by, 
external actors such as the Soviet Union, Egypt, Syria or Saudi 
Arabia.7 The three members of the ‘Anti-Communist Triangle’ 
attempted to involve the Syrian government under Adeeb al-
Shishakli in anti-subversive measures in early 1953 as it was 
believed that most subversive activities in Lebanon, Jordan and 
Iraq were originating from Syria. After attempting for over a year, 
however, they decided to abandon this plan as the Syrians were 
‘far too unreliable’.8
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This also indicates that the nature of Middle Eastern relation-
ships was not monolithic, but highly complex. While Middle 
Eastern governments sought to cooperate on their common inter-
ests, they were hampered by conflicts of interest and politics. 
Although the Arab League existed, there was no effective coop-
eration between the member states. It is not surprising that when 
the Egyptian leader, Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, sought to 
establish a form of intelligence and security cooperation, ‘an 
Anti-Communist Bureau in Cairo’, other states swiftly voiced 
opposition.9 Before sending their own delegations to Nasser’s 
Cairo conference, Coghill, Chehab and Attiyah had met together 
in Beirut to ‘hammer out the line to take to ensure the failure of 
the conference to set up such a Bureau’. They feared that estab-
lishing such an organisation under Nasser’s enterprise would 
‘only increase the power of Egypt’.10 Coghill recorded in his 
diaries that, ‘thanks to the blunt rudeness of the Syrian dele-
gate’, the Egyptians failed to establish their own Anti-Communist 
Bureau.11
While Nasser still sought to exercise his influence over the 
Syrians, Coghill, Chehab and Attiyah successfully expanded their 
opposition with a multilateral secret discussion held in Baghdad 
in January 1956. The three met with the Heads of the Turkish and 
Iranian Security Services to discuss and exchange intelligence on 
subversive activities in the region.12 While there had been bilateral 
talks on the subject between most of these countries, this was the 
first multilateral discussion between the Arab and non-Arab secu-
rity services in the region.13 Before this meeting, Coghill, Chehab 
and Attiyah had conducted a preliminary conference together 
streamlining how they would make the meeting successful to 
gain ‘mutual confidence in one’s opposite number’ by showing 
a united front against subversive activities in the region, which 
was, Coghill noted, ‘the only way of making this sort of liaison 
work’.14
There was a similar ongoing arrangement around the same 
period under the Baghdad Pact. At the inaugural meeting of the 
Pact Council held in Baghdad on 21 and 22 November 1955, 
the Iraqi Foreign Minister raised the dangers of Communist 
infiltration in the Middle East, particularly in Syria.15 The 
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idea of forming ‘joint anti-subversion machinery’ under the 
Pact was then discussed.16 Harold Macmillan, then Foreign 
Secretary, suggested establishing multilateral intelligence and 
security cooperation. He also proposed that Britain ‘make avail-
able technical advice on Communist subversion’ to the members 
drawing on its experience in the Far East, where Britain had also 
been involved in a similar arrangement under SEATO.17 Iran 
was also concerned about the spread of subversive activities, 
despite its more robust counter-measures after the 1953 coup, 
given its problems with the communistic Tudeh Party.18 The 
Iranian Ambassador in Baghdad, who represented Iran for the 
Baghdad Pact, was willing to learn ‘practical measures for com-
bating Communist subversion’ from more experienced countries 
such as Britain.19
Based on the policy laid out by the Baghdad Pact Council 
meeting, a discussion to form ‘joint anti-subversion machinery’ 
between the regional counterparts, later known as the Liaison 
and Counter-Subversion Committees, was then followed by the 
meeting of the Security Committee, where the representatives of 
the security services of the signatories came together for the first 
time. Directed under the policy suggested by Macmillan, Philip 
Kirby-Green, Head of SIME (1955–8) and Britain’s representative 
at the committee meeting, gave a detailed proposal to form such 
an anti-Communist committee at the meeting. Kirby-Green’s pro-
posal was supported by Britain’s closest ally, Bahjat Beg Attiyah; 
A. M. S. Ahmad, a Pakistani counterpart; and an American 
‘observer’.20
The Liaison and Counter-Subversion Committees were for-
mally established after agreement was reached by the Council 
of Deputies of the Baghdad Pact on 25 January 1956. These 
committees under the Pact were intended for collaboration in 
anti-Communist measures between the signatories and the US 
‘observer’. 21 The purposes of the Liaison Committee were to 
‘facilitate exchange of information relating to Communist sub-
versive activities and Soviet bloc espionage’ and ‘recommend 
ways and means by which security services can best discharge 
their tasks’. The Liaison Committee also aimed to ‘facilitate and 
encourage bilateral liaison and practical cooperation between the 
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security services’.22 Throughout the period between 1956 and 
1963, with some exceptional cases, the meetings were routinely 
held twice a year.
Multilateral intelligence cooperation ran parallel to the ‘infor-
mal’ security cooperation on subversive activities that had been 
initiated by the regional security services around the same period. 
At the first meeting of the Liaison Committee in April 1956, a 
copy of the ‘convention’ outlining the cooperation, and signed 
by the members of the so-called ‘Club’, was submitted by the 
Turkish delegate as a foundation for future anti-Communist 
liaison. It was later, however, withdrawn in favour of one sub-
mitted by the British government, which was seen as a more 
experienced ally in this field.23 In fact, the regional counter-
subversive machinery began to be institutionalised on British 
initiatives.
British Concern about the Security of the Baghdad Pact
At the inaugural meeting of the Baghdad Pact, a by-product 
of the discussions was the creation of the Security Committee, 
often referred to as the ‘Security Organisation’ in Foreign Office 
correspondence.24 The Security Committee was formed under 
and directed by the Secretary-General of the Baghdad Pact.25 
The purpose of the Security Committee was to ensure proper 
standards of protective security for the Baghdad Pact, including 
the maintenance of information security (classification of docu-
ments and physical access to classified records) and vetting pro-
cedures under the security regulations of the Pact.26 The Security 
Committee routinely conducted security inspections of the regis-
tries of the signatory powers, where classified CENTO documents 
were handled and held, and recommended improvements in pro-
tective security for each country.27 Setting security standards 
was particularly important for multilateral intelligence liaison 
as information security was a prerequisite for the efficacy of the 
alliance. Britain had its own approach to intelligence, especially 
when it came to intelligence cooperation. For the British, the secu-
rity of systems was the most important prerequisite to making 
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intelligence cooperation effective. However, this approach was 
not shared by the regional counterparts.
Protective security was the domain of MI5. Philip Kirby-Green, 
the regional representative of MI5, was chosen to attend the first 
meeting of the Security Committee in December 1955 to discuss 
security practices with his counterparts in Baghdad.28 At his first 
meeting, Kirby-Green learned that there was no comparable 
protective security in the member states, and was also asked by 
his counterparts to draw on Britain’s experiences in NATO and 
SEATO to provide security training to them.29 After the meeting, 
Kirby-Green warned the Ministry of Defence that, owing to ‘no 
adequate security’ and ‘no proper vetting procedure’ in some 
regional member states, ‘any information passed to other depu-
ties and planners may be in Moscow in a matter of days’.30 With 
an urgent request by the Foreign Office, MI5 was instructed to 
improve the standards of protective security in the Baghdad Pact. 
Michael Clayton of MI5, an expert in protective security, was then 
despatched to Baghdad on 17 January 1956.31 Clayton remained 
as Deputy Security Officer of the Security Committee until the end 
of 1957, providing training in protective security to member states.
Philip Kirby-Green estimated that it would take at least six 
months to get a minimum standard of security within the Baghdad 
Pact.32 This proved deeply optimistic. Despite a series of lectures 
on protective security by Clayton over two years during his tenure 
as the Deputy Security Officer, and despite a range of British 
protective security mechanisms (including security regulations, 
vetting procedures and physical access to classified documents), 
there was not much improvement in the protective security 
regime. Concerned with the state of security at the Registry of the 
Pact headquarters, Sir Michael Wright reported to the Foreign 
Office in November 1956 that there was ‘little appreciation of 
how to classify documents correctly’ amongst non-British civilian 
staff, and classified documents were ‘frequently lost’ and handled 
inadequately.33 Despite some improvement in protective security 
at the CENTO headquarters, the state of security of the individual 
member states remained far below the minimum standard when 
Clayton ended his stint as the Deputy Security Officer at the Pact 
headquarters towards the end of 1957.34
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In 1961, when James Robertson of MI5 inspected the state of 
security of all regional alliances, including NATO, SEATO and 
CENTO, he observed that the representatives of the CENTO 
Security Committee had little ‘support forthcoming from [their] 
superiors’, and also that recommendations for improving security 
in the signatories were ‘hardly carried out’, except for ‘inspec-
tions of CENTO registries in member countries’.35 After a year’s 
attempt at improving the protective security of the Pact, Britain 
decided to abolish the Security Committee in 1963 as the chief 
organisation to maintain the security of the Pact, and instead 
proposed that the Liaison Committee, which was dominated by 
the highest ranking of intelligence and security officials of the 
member states, take over this task. After a series of lengthy 
discussions with the signatory powers, the proposal was eventu-
ally accepted and from 1963 onwards, the Security Committee 
became the Security Sub-Committee under the Liaison Committee 
of the Pact.36
A combination of several factors appears to have prevented the 
improvement of the Pact’s protective security. First and foremost, 
the regional Pact members neglected the importance of security 
measures – they were overwhelmingly concerned with counter-
ing subversive elements in their countries. Sir Roger Hollis, the 
Director-General of MI5, reported at a 1960 JIC meeting that 
the regional members were ‘concentrating unduly on the threat’ 
against the internal security of their countries, while, Hollis 
thought, ‘they should give greater attention to [protective] secu-
rity’.37 Moreover, in addition to the lack of security awareness 
amongst the regional members, Philip Kirby-Green also identified 
at his first encounter with his regional counterparts that some 
members had no understanding of the difference between secu-
rity, counter-intelligence and counter-subversion.38
Secondly, there was also a structural issue at the levels of both 
CENTO and regional members. Unlike the Liaison Committee, 
where very senior officers of the security services responsible for the 
internal security in their countries were represented, the Security 
Committee was composed of middle-ranking security officers of 
the member states who were seconded to the Pact headquarters in 
Baghdad (1955–8) and Ankara (from 1959 onwards). As a result, 
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the regional representatives to the Security Committee were con-
sidered ‘international civil servants’ by their own governments 
and thus ‘cut off’ from direct contact with those governments.39 
There was also a problem at the national level. The problem was 
that, even if these representatives were in close contact with their 
national governments, there were ‘no effective’ security authori-
ties in their countries ‘with whom they could correspond and 
from whom they could obtain such briefs’.40 As a result, it was 
thought that it would be better for the Liaison Committee, com-
prising of the highest ranks of the security  services, to take over 
the duty of protective security in the Pact.
The third problem was departmental infighting over internal 
security in the regional countries. This was the main reason that 
Britain insisted that the Shah of Iran establish the national secu-
rity organisation, later known as SAVAK, and provided training 
in protective security to the Iranians. However, even after SAVAK 
nominally assumed full responsibility for internal security from 
the military in 1957, a conflict of jurisdiction with the military 
was reported in August 1961, when the security organisation of 
the military still sought to represent Iran at the Liaison Committee 
of the Pact.41 These kinds of problems were also common among 
the regional members. In the case of Iraq, which hosted the 
headquarters of the Pact until 1958, there had been antagonistic 
relationships between the police and the military. As a result, the 
CID, which was part of the police and responsible for the inter-
nal security of the country, was unable to inspect the security of 
the military, which might have contributed to the failure of the 
Iraqi government to forestall the coup by a small group of Iraqi 
Army officers in July 1958.42 While Turkey and Pakistan were 
considered to have better security, the responsibility of the mili-
tary for internal security in these countries was still a concern for 
the British.43
The available evidence suggests that Britain was right to be con-
cerned about the security of the multilateral intelligence liaison. 
Classified information was leaking to Egypt from the Iraqis,44 
whilst another member state leaked material to the Soviets. 
According to a KGB defector, Ilya Dzhirkvelov, a conversation 
between Turkish diplomats led to the discovery of a KGB officer in 
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Azerbaijan, A. Guseinov, who was about to defect to the West in 
Turkey in late 1955. The conversation had been recorded through 
a listening device planted in the Turkish Embassy in Moscow. 
Similar to the defection attempt by Konstantin Volkov in 1946, 
which was intercepted by Kim Philby, Guseinov provided fruitful 
information on Soviet activities in the Middle East. According to 
Dzhirkvelov, Guseinov was carried to Moscow semi-conscious on 
a stretcher by a special KGB team. Guseinov’s wife, who was the 
main conspirator in the plan to defect to the West, leapt from a 
third-floor window and killed herself.45
Although Britain had more experience in protective security 
than other members, it too had defects in its own security. Kim 
Philby, despite his treachery being suspected by MI5, was still 
under the patronage of MI6 as a journalist and stayed in Beirut 
from 1956 until his defection in 1963.46 Emir Farid Chehab, 
Head of the Lebanese Sûreté Générale, who was puzzled by the 
behaviour of his British colleagues and could not understand how 
Philby had been allowed to escape, noted that the Sûreté ‘could so 
easily have arranged a small accident’ to arrest Philby.47 In addi-
tion, George Blake of MI6, another Soviet mole, who was at the 
time compromising secrets of Britain’s NATO allies, also stayed 
in Beirut.48 Moreover, records from the Soviet archives smuggled 
out of Russia reveal that the British Embassy in Beirut was also 
penetrated by the KGB through a Lebanese maid and bugging 
devices for a number of years in the later period.49
The British Contribution to the Establishment of SAVAK
According to the existing historiography, the Iranian national 
security and intelligence service, SAVAK, was established in 1957 
under the auspices of the CIA and Mossad.50 Britain’s involve-
ment in this process is little discussed. Indeed, scholarly attention 
to Britain’s continuous interest in Iran in the post-Mossaddegh 
era diminishes once the United States became interested in Iranian 
affairs. However, it is worth pointing out that Britain had long 
regarded Iran as within its sphere of influence. While Operation 
BOOT/TPAJAX to overthrow Mossaddegh was a joint venture 
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with the Americans, the development of the events leading up 
to the coup from 1951 until August 1953 clearly shows that the 
coup was chiefly initiated by the British, and that the American 
involvement came from British, and Iranian, necessity – the logis-
tics, the money and the oil.51 Continuing to maintain influence in 
Iran, Britain deemed a national security service essential. Mansur 
Rafizadeh, a former SAVAK officer, clearly states in his memoir 
that SAVAK was created on ‘the joint advice of the CIA, British 
intelligence service, and Mossad’.52 Supporting this testimony, the 
available documentation attests that Britain was instrumental in 
establishing SAVAK, arising from its concerns with the state of 
protective security in Iran, which would affect the efficacy of mul-
tilateral intelligence liaison under the Baghdad Pact as a whole.
Philip Kirby-Green identified Iran as the weakest link in pro-
tective security at the first meeting of the Security Committee 
in 1955.53 While Michael Clayton was in Baghdad to provide 
courses on security practices, he was also tasked with assessing 
the standards of security in Iran, as well as the necessity of the 
Iranian government to establish an organisation ‘officially charged 
with full responsibility for enforcing security’. Roger Hollis, then 
Deputy Director-General of MI5, also assured Clayton that MI5 
was willing to accommodate a ‘limited number of senior Iranian 
security officials’ for training in Britain if necessary.54 Clayton 
was then told by General Hadjazi, the Iranian representative on 
the Deputy Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact, that Iran 
had ‘no security organisation’ at all.55
Despite an American Military Mission having been stationed in 
Iran since the early 1950s and tasked with ‘the production of an 
adequate security system’, the state of security in Iran remained 
inadequate. Although there had been three organisations respon-
sible for security (the aforementioned ‘G-2’, the counter- espionage 
organisation of the Iranian armed forces; the Special Branch of 
the Iranian Police; and the Military Governors), none of these 
organisations had any responsibility for protective security in 
civilian departments, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Discussing the matter with his Iranian colleagues in Baghdad, 
Clayton soon reported back to Hollis:
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I judge that knowledge of protective security practice is limited to the 
army only . . . There is certainly no national security authority as we 
know it, and no system of interdepartmental security co-ordination 
. . . I agree that the first essential is to establish [a] national security 
authority, but consider that unless we advise on how this should be 
done and additionally give detailed instruction on methods to imple-
ment details of regulations, the prospect of any reasonable degree of 
security in Iran in the foreseeable future is very remote.56
The matter was also discussed in Baghdad between Sir Michael 
Wright, the British Ambassador in Baghdad, and Francis Marten, 
a diplomat at the British Embassy in Tehran. They agreed that 
training a few Iranians in Britain was ‘not enough’, and instead 
suggested the Foreign Office ‘despatch a fully qualified officer 
to Tehran from London’ to advise the Iranians on improving 
their security matters. Sir Michael Wright concluded that ‘unless 
some such arrangement is made, the prospect of a fundamental 
improvement in Iranian security standards, on which the ability 
of the Baghdad Pact to undertake serious planning of sensitive 
matters depends, is remote’.57
Training the Iranians in protective security in either London or 
Tehran was, however, not sufficient to solve the security problems 
in the forthcoming meetings of the Baghdad Pact. To solve this 
short-term problem, the Iranian government was urged to set up 
an interdepartmental organisation responsible for coordinating 
the activities of the various intelligence and security organisations 
in the country. As a result, the Iranian Chiefs of Staff established 
a new joint staff of the armed forces, named J-2, which was 
also given responsibility for national security matters.58 However, 
under the security regulations of the Pact, it was also essential 
for Iran to have a ‘national security authority’ responsible for the 
security of Baghdad Pact classified information.59
The matter was then referred to the British Ambassador in 
Tehran, Sir Roger Stevens (1954–8), who responded to the 
request from the Foreign Office that he would ‘take [the] next 
suitable opportunity to impress on the Shah the importance of 
security’ and to ‘ask him about Iranian plans for establishing a 
“national security authority”’.60 It was noted that ‘the Iranians 
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should be persuaded to settle the identity of their national security 
authority without delay’.61 Consequently, and as requested by the 
Iranian government through the Baghdad Pact, MI5 despatched 
Roger Lees, formerly DSO in Baghdad (1951–3), to Tehran in 
May 1956 to advise the Shah on enhancing the state of security 
in Iran.62 In addition to his career in the Middle East – where 
he had served in Egypt as a SIME officer, assisting the Head of 
SIME, William Magan, until 1950 – and in addition to his role in 
Baghdad, which was highly praised in Whitehall, Lees was con-
sidered well qualified for the task following his long career in the 
Indian Police (over twenty years until 1948), with a supervisory 
role in the Special Branch (Patna).63
Lees visited Tehran twice during the period between 1956 
and 1957 in which the Iranian national security and intel-
ligence organisation was being established. During his first, 
three-month visit to Tehran in 1956, Lees, in the guise of the 
First Secretary at the British Embassy, was personally assigned 
by the Shah himself to give security advice to General Haj-Ali 
Kia, the Chief of Military Intelligence. At the time, the J-2 was 
temporarily responsible for supervising the implementation of 
the security regulations of the Baghdad Pact.64 Once SAVAK 
was established and had assumed responsibility for the internal 
security of Iran, taking over from the J-2, Roger Lees was then 
assigned to advise the first Head of SAVAK, General Teymour 
Bakhtiar (1957–61), and to train the SAVAK officers in protec-
tive security.65
From the outset, Roger Lees’s objective was to ‘train the Iranians 
in the proper implementation of the Baghdad Pact Security 
Regulations’.66 His role in Tehran was thus primarily limited to 
providing the Iranians with an effective security system in the 
country through his advice and the training of senior Iranian 
officers in protective security. During his first visit, he supervised 
the establishment of a Registry system and trained the Iranians in 
handling classified documents and vetting procedures, and also 
drafted a set of ‘national security regulations’. All of his recom-
mendations and drafts were approved by the Shah himself and 
implemented accordingly.67
During his second, six-month visit to Tehran, his primary task 
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was to ensure that the newly established SAVAK would meet the 
security requirements of the Baghdad Pact, including arrange-
ments for the protection of classified documents, which were 
constantly inspected by the members of the Security Committee 
of the Baghdad Pact.68 Meanwhile, Iranian female staff at the 
Registry of SAVAK were trained in London in protective secu-
rity.69 Roger Lees gave his report to the Head Office of MI5 on 
the assessment of his overall achievement at the end of his visit in 
1957. However, he was rather sceptical about the prospects for 
protective security in Iran, and dogmatically noted the Iranian 
national characteristics – ‘the slothfulness, venality and love for 
intrigue and personal animosities of the average Iranian, as well 
as his unwillingness to assume responsibility’ – that would all be 
‘hazards along the road to good security’.70
During the same period, the CIA was also in Tehran to provide 
training to SAVAK officers – not in protective security but in 
foreign intelligence collection, counter-intelligence and intelli-
gence analysis.71 Mansur Rafizadeh, a former SAVAK officer, 
also noted that, unlike the CIA and Mossad, both of which 
were actively involved in interfering with SAVAK’s operations, by 
‘consent of the three foreign [American, Israeli and British] intel-
ligence groups, Britain had no active involvement’ in SAVAK’s 
operational aspects.72 Britain became more actively involved in 
the internal affairs of Iran after losing its closest ally in the 1958 
Iraqi Revolution. However, at the time of the establishment of 
SAVAK, the British contribution mainly came from the need to 
raise Iranian security standards to meet the security arrangements 
of the Pact and assign the responsibilities necessary to establish 
sufficient national security in Iran.73
The Liaison Committee of the Baghdad Pact
The Liaison Committee was one example of high-level intel-
ligence and security cooperation amongst members in the Pact 
area. While Britain and the United States normally sent senior 
officials (of MI5 and the CIA, respectively) to the committee 
meetings, the regional countries were represented by the heads 
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of the intelligence and security services. The Liaison Committee 
focused more on Soviet subversive activities than espionage.
From the mid-1950s onwards, the security services of the 
signatory powers probed activities associated more specifically 
with the Soviet Intelligence Service in the region. The afore-
mentioned Ilya Dzhirkvelov states in his memoirs that a new 
department was established in the First Chief Directorate of the 
KGB at the beginning of 1955 to spy on the Soviet Union’s ‘fron-
tiers’, including Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, India and China.74 
Amongst them, Turkey was the main target as it was a member 
of NATO and maintained close contacts with the Americans 
and British. Dzhirkvelov was personally involved in organising a 
network of agents in Turkey from 1955 onwards.75 During the 
period between the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet Union sought 
to exploit anti-colonial sentiment in the region, such as radical 
Arab Nationalism, so as to eliminate Western influence. Moscow 
still regarded Communist Parties as the instrument to best 
advance its cause, despite anti-Communist  sentiment throughout 
the area.76
Available records suggest that members of the Liaison 
Committee might have cottoned on to the Soviet offensive 
through CENTO intelligence sharing. In May 1957, the Turkish 
representative reported on the methods and techniques employed 
by the Soviets, demonstrating that from at least 1956 the Soviet 
Union targeted ethnic minorities in Turkey for both espionage 
and subversion purposes. They included the use of a former 
young Nazi officer, named Wilfried Herbrecht, and an Armenian-
born reserve officer of the Turkish military service, named Arman 
Vartanian, to obtain information on NATO defence plans and 
the cryptographic system used in NATO communications.77 In 
addition, Herbrecht also confessed to the Turkish authorities 
that the Soviets instructed him to contact a group of Kurds to 
instigate subversion against the Turkish government for Kurdish 
independence.78
One of the advantages of intelligence sharing under the Pact 
was that members shared their knowledge of Communist activi-
ties, which enabled the member states to obtain a better picture 
of the threats posed by International Communism in the region. 
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These discussions were highly important not only to the British, 
but also to the security services of the regional powers as 
their ability to counter internal threats was essential for the 
stability of each government. The subjects of their informa-
tion exchange included, for instance, the strength and activities 
of the Communist Parties; propaganda broadcasts by various 
radio stations of the Eastern bloc countries aimed at instigat-
ing subversive activities in the Pact area; and any scheduled 
Communist-sponsored international meetings.79 The informa-
tion exchanged between the member states also included a 
list of known Communist members in the region. This was 
considered more important after the withdrawal of Iraq from 
the Baghdad Pact; thereafter the members of the ICP operated 
freely and became more active in the region.80 In addition, as 
international organisations and groups were regarded as sources 
of Communist subversion, a ‘watch list’ containing forthcom-
ing Communist and non-Communist meetings or events was 
regularly exchanged for relevant authorities to ‘take action’ 
against it.81 Moreover, their discussions also extended to coun-
ter-measures by the respective governments that had proved 
effective against Communist activities. The consensus amongst 
the regional member states regarding ‘effective’ measures against 
any Communists and their sympathisers was ‘heavy penalties in 
accordance with the Criminal Code’.82
Apart from the RAF bases in Habbaniya, Iraq, and also those 
in Cyprus, Britain faced no direct threat to its security in the 
Pact area. However, unlike the Americans, who were mostly a 
passive participant as an ‘observer’ (at least until 1959), MI5 
actively contributed to discussions about the methods and 
techniques of Communist bloc espionage and subversion, and 
Communist activities.83 Alex Kellar of MI5, who chaired the 
Liaison Committee in January 1961 on a routine basis, used his 
chairmanship to include a report on ‘communist penetration of 
the labour movement’ in the Pact area, and ‘the student problem’, 
covering the ‘causes and nature’ of unrest among students in 
the ‘Afro-Asian area’.84 In addition, as Chairman of the NATO 
Special Committee, Kellar also made available classified NATO 
documents to his counterparts, who were keen on finding out 
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more about ‘Soviet Bloc intelligence operations’ against regions 
outside the Pact and the way in which other security services 
were coping with ‘their own student communities within and 
without their countries and in and around the CENTO area and 
Europe’.85 As the Chairman of both NATO’s and CENTO’s 
Committees, Kellar also decided to exchange security reports 
between the CENTO Liaison and NATO Special Committees 
on the grounds, as he noted, that ‘what was sauce for the goose 
was sauce for the gander’, meaning that the intelligence exchange 
would be valuable to both parties.86 The regional members wel-
comed Kellar’s suggestions.87
Despite the advantages of cooperation on anti-subversive 
measures in the Pact area, there was an inherent problem 
with regional intelligence and security liaison under the Liaison 
Committee. Although the regional members maintained their 
anti-Communist stance throughout the period, their focus on 
subversive activities often extended to non-Communist activities, 
which caused difficulties in coordinating anti-Communist meas-
ures. While a collective effort for anti- Communist measures was 
mostly conducted in the form of propaganda under the Counter-
Subversion Committee, the difficulty of coordination was also 
apparent at the Liaison Committee, where the threat assessment 
reports from each representative were shared and a consensus on 
the threats was sought between the  committee members.88
There was a peculiar aspect to CENTO’s Liaison Committee, 
which Alex Kellar noticed as the Chairman of his first meeting 
in 1961. Kellar pointed out that their discussions were ‘more 
of the kind that one would expect from a political committee’, 
and that the intelligence assessments submitted by his regional 
counterparts ‘trespass[ed] much too much on the preserves of the 
political experts’.89 The implication of this peculiarity was that 
intelligence assessments by the regional members were heavily 
influenced by the policy of their own governments. Since the 
senior intelligence officers present at the Liaison Committee were 
committed to defending the existence of a very small ruling 
minority, who also appointed them, they were ‘intensely involved 
in politics, both internal and foreign’ – heavily politicised and 
‘endemic’ – to make sure of their regime security. Kellar found 
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this disadvantageous for intelligence cooperation in the Pact, but 
also noted that, due to the inherent nature of the cooperation, ‘it 
cannot be helped’.90
The difficulty of reaching a consensus on internal threats 
amongst the member states also came from the limitations in intel-
ligence sharing. Despite their security cooperation at the highest 
level, the Liaison Committee was a place for sharing intelligence-
based assessments between the Pact members. The problem with 
the limitations in intelligence sharing was the fact that the pro-
tection of intelligence sources was a prerequisite for any liaison, 
especially multilateral cooperation. As any intelligence services 
had responsibilities for the security of their own sources, the only 
solution for multilateral intelligence liaison, according to John 
Bruce Lockhart, the Deputy Chief of MI6 (1961–6), was thus 
to only share intelligence in ‘a collated form where it would be 
impossible to identify the source’.91 This, however, often made it 
difficult for other members to verify a claim made by a member 
based on their intelligence-based assessments.
The problem was apparent from the early period of the 
Baghdad Pact. At the meeting of the Liaison Committee in May 
1957, the Pakistani delegate frequently referred to the activities 
of the Indian Communist Party supporting subversive activities 
in Kashmir. The assessment by MI5 confirmed that there was 
indeed a threat from the Indian Communist Party in the form 
of propaganda attacking Pakistan’s self-proclaimed ‘neutralism’, 
and that the situation in Kashmir also presented a ‘substantial 
threat to member countries particularly Pakistan’. However, 
there was no supporting evidence that these subversive activities 
in Kashmir had a direct link to the Indian Communist Party.92 
The heart of the problem lay in the inaccessibility of the sources. 
A report from the Head of SIME to the Head Office of MI5 
recorded:
here is clearly a limit to the degree to which I can over-ride the DIB 
[Director of the Intelligence Bureau: Pakistani Security Service] when, 
complying with the roles of the Liaison Committee, they produce 
their own National Assessment. Equally, there is a limit to which I 
could challenge their evidence, although it was clear that some of 
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their statements were somewhat dubious and others highly exagger-
ated, but when outrightly challenged, SADULLA [Director of the 
Intelligence Bureau] always claimed to have evidence on record to 
support his arguments.93
The Pakistanis’ claim that ‘Indian subversion against Pakistan 
was, in fact, Communist inspired’ was considered by the Foreign 
Office as a technique to widen the mandate of the Liaison 
Committee, as they had used the same technique earlier in the 
SEATO Committee.94
These kinds of local and regional problems were not only 
present in the Pakistani case. All the regional members, the Iraqis, 
Turkish and Iranians, were preoccupied with countering their 
own national subversive elements. The difficulty was then to have 
an agreed assessment on the nature of subversive activities in the 
region. As a result, the coverage of the Liaison Committee was 
widened from ‘Communist’ to ‘Communist-inspired’ threats from 
1957 onwards.95 Non-Communist threats, including Nasserite 
subversive activities, were also included in the category of ‘sub-
versive’ threats to the Pact in 1962.96 This was mainly due to the 
fact that local governments viewed non-Communist threats as 
being equally as subversive as Communist threats in the region, 
and also that non-Communist threats threatened the existence of 
the pro-Western member states, which was ‘directly in the inter-
ests of Communism’.97 A report on the meeting of the Liaison 
Committee in 1964 recorded that ‘the main subjects that had 
been expected to cause difficulty were the respective preoccupa-
tions of Turkey with Cyprus, of Iran with the UAR [Egypt], and 
of Pakistan with India and Afghanistan’.98 The preoccupations of 
the regional members with their local or regional problems con-
tinued throughout the period.
The Limited Contributions to the Liaison Committee
Unlike the other members, who were willing to cooperate on 
subversive activities in the region, Britain was in fact the most 
reluctant to give full assessments to the member states, especially 
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in the early years of the Baghdad Pact. H. P. Goodwyn of MI5 
once noted to the PUSD of the Foreign Office that:
hitherto we have not provided any comprehensive paper on subver-
sion in the Baghdad Pact area. Rather we have confined ourselves 
to snippets of information on individual matters. H/SIME [Head of 
SIME, Philip Kirby-Green] has pointed out that on the last occasion 
the US Observer contributed something a good deal more elaborate 
than anything we have produced and he, H/SIME, has observed that 
it is for consideration whether we (as a matter of fact ‘we’ involves 
mainly your friends [MI6]) should produce a paper something like it 
ourselves.99
Two factors explain Britain’s reluctance to make its own contri-
bution to intelligence sharing at the Liaison Committee: security 
and ability.
As discussed above, the Pact suffered from lax protective secu-
rity. The protection of intelligence sources was a prerequisite 
for any intelligence liaison. Thus, any intelligence shared with 
the member states took the form of intelligence-based assess-
ments, carefully concealing the identities of intelligence sources, 
rather than raw or single-source intelligence. Britain was mostly 
concerned that sensitive information might leak to unintended 
recipients through intelligence sharing with the Pact members. 
John Bruce Lockhart of MI6 notes that ‘if you have nine nations 
together swopping secrets and you include details about sources, 
the security risk of revealing those sources is multiplied by nine, 
or even nine-plus’.100
Britain considered using a more secure bilateral intelligence 
liaison with individual members on certain topics instead of intel-
ligence sharing with all its counterparts in the multilateral form 
of the Liaison Committee.101 This bilateral intelligence exchange, 
sometimes one-way traffic, was mostly conducted through other 
channels than the Liaison Committee. One such channel was the 
Counter-Subversion Office (CSO), a permanent working body at 
the headquarters of the Pact for counter-propaganda purposes; 
the members were mostly seconded from the security services.102 
Using this channel, a report on Communist activities in Syria was 
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passed to the Turkish representative by the British counterpart, 
as the Turks had a ‘thirst’ for finding out more about ‘the Syrian 
situation’.103 On a different occasion, the Turks supplied intelli-
gence to the British demonstrating that ‘Communism in Turkey is 
directed by exiles in Paris.’104
The second factor is Britain’s (in)ability to contribute its own 
intelligence to the Liaison Committee. MI5’s concerns about its 
lack of contribution to the Liaison Committee meetings may have 
come from the nature of its relationship with its regional coun-
terparts. Since it was largely dependent on mutual trust, gaining 
credibility from the member states as a liaison partner was a cause 
for concern for MI5 as the British delegate. MI6 officers were 
also operating a covert network in the region – mostly without 
the knowledge of the local authorities – and the exposure of these 
activities risked undermining the mutual trust of MI5’s liaison 
with the local authorities. Thus, the extent to which intelligence 
could be shared with the Pact members was indeed a very delicate 
concern – the identities of the agents controlled by MI6, and also 
its activities, had to be carefully concealed before sharing any 
intelligence. Available evidence suggests, for instance, that while 
MI5 maintained liaison with SAVAK, MI6 conducted espionage 
in Iran and had its own agents within the Tudeh Party. SAVAK 
was suspicious about British activities in Iran.105
Of course, MI6 was not MI5’s only intelligence source. 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) was, and 
still is, Britain’s largest and most fruitful intelligence organisation. 
Britain maintained listening stations at RAF Habbaniya, Iraq, 
until 1958, and at the Army headquarters in Cyprus throughout 
the period.106 RAF Canberra aircraft modified for signals intel-
ligence (SIGINT) interception/collection were flying from RAF 
Habbaniya and actively collecting wireless communications close 
to the Soviet border.107 A former RAF officer also recollects that 
he flew from Habbaniya with a group of ‘technicians’, who had 
university degrees in Russian, listening in on ‘Russian wireless 
traffic’, and that the recorded and interpreted materials were sent 
to the British Embassy in Baghdad.108 In addition, despite the 
reduction in manpower and the retreat of regional headquarters 
overseas to Britain in the mid-1950s, including SIME, a JIC report 
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recorded that ‘no transfer of SIGINT effort from the ME [Middle 
East] to the UK could be made without reducing the efficiency 
of the service to Middle East consumers’.109 Nevertheless, these 
SIGINT operations were essentially for military purposes, and 
lacked much value for assessing internal security within the Pact 
area.
SIME was also involved in other SIGINT operations in the 
region. During the Second World War, Sir Dick White noted that 
SIGINT was indeed ‘the biggest source of intelligence’ for detect-
ing Axis agents engaged in espionage and subversive activities in 
the region.110 In his memoirs, Sir Alistair Horne writes that the 
headquarters of SIME, attached to the headquarters of the British 
Army in the region, housed its own signals interception unit. He 
notes that:
The heavily protected SIME villa was like a tabernacle within the 
temple of GHQ; and within SIME, where none dared tread or even 
ask what went on, was a small holy of holies, manned by strange 
signals personnel and topped by a tangle of aerials. That was in fact 
the very heart of British intelligence, where all the intercept work of 
SIGINT (signals intelligence) went on – of which none of us normal 
mortals had an inkling until three decades later, when the story of 
Ultra and Enigma came to be revealed.111
Further evidence suggests that Britain’s efforts were targeted at 
not only the Soviet Union but also Middle Eastern states. In 
his memoirs, Peter Wright, a former MI5 officer, notes that his 
efforts to bug the Egyptian Embassy in London, with technical 
support from the Post Office, enabled GCHQ to decrypt the 
Egyptians’ Hagelin code machine.112 This combined MI5 and 
GCHQ operation, he claims, ‘enabled us to read the Egyptian 
cipher in the London Embassy throughout the Suez Crisis’.113 
Britain was indeed able to read Egyptian communications during 
the crisis – the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, congratulated Sir 
Eric Jones, the Director of GCHQ, on his organisation’s success 
in breaking the Egyptian cipher during the Suez Crisis.114 In 
addition, David Easter claims that GCHQ was able to trace the 
connections between Nasser and subversive activities in the late 
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1950s, which were directed against pro-British governments in 
the region, such as Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq.115 Moreover, the 
American counterpart of GCHQ, the National Security Agency 
(NSA), which worked intimately with GCHQ, also targeted 
Middle Eastern states.116
Furthermore, declassified materials from the Second World 
War show that the GC&CS, the predecessor to GCHQ, compe-
tently decrypted the diplomatic communications of most Middle 
Eastern states, including the Pact members, such as Turkey, 
Iraq and Iran.117 This fact indicates that GCHQ may possi-
bly have continuously, or even intermittently, been reading the 
communications of the Pact members in the post-war period. 
In this context, intelligence sharing on a certain topic with its 
Middle Eastern counterparts might also have revealed Britain’s 
intelligence gathering capabilities and compromised its sources. 
Therefore, British contributions to the liaison had to be carefully 
tailored.
There remains, nevertheless, the question of the extent to 
which Britain was able to contribute fruitful intelligence assess-
ments on subversive activities in the region to its counterparts. 
During this period, it is clear that MI6 had limited sources of 
intelligence and so was unable to make much contribution to 
MI5’s assessments. There are four main reasons for this. Firstly, 
MI6 was responsible for counter-espionage in the region, not 
counter-subversion as agreed with SIME in 1951. Secondly, 
British intelligence as a whole was largely dependent on local 
authorities for information on Communist activities. Thirdly, 
MI6 had only very ‘few Arabists’ to understand the nature of the 
Middle East throughout the 1950s. Lastly, but not least, instead 
of collecting intelligence, MI6 was occupied with conducting 
clandestine political operations in the region, including an assas-
sination plot against Nasser.118 In order to overcome this intelli-
gence deficiency, John Bruce Lockhart, the Deputy Chief of MI6, 
held a three-day conference in the summer of 1960, to which all 
MI6 heads of station in the region were ‘summoned’ to discuss 
‘how to penetrate the Nasserite movement [subversive activities 
in the region]’.119
The issue is also true for SIGINT: it is questionable how useful 
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SIGINT was for identifying subversive threats in the region. 
Indeed, the subversive activities of radical Arab Nationalism, 
associated with Nasser, were certainly a concern for the British 
during the period. However, it is important to note that, as is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 5, Nasser’s subversive activities 
were not considered as serious a threat as Communist activities 
until the early 1960s by the Pact – they were certainly a subversive 
threat to the regional members but not to the Pact as a whole, the 
target of which was exclusively set as Communist activities during 
the period between 1956 and 1962. In addition, when the security 
services studied Communist activities in the region and radical 
Arab Nationalist movements associated with Nasser in 1960, the 
members of the Liaison Committee clearly distinguished between 
the two threats.120 It is thus doubtful whether Britain’s SIGINT 
could make much of a contribution to the picture and inten-
tions of underground Communist movements in the Pact area 
 especially during the period between 1956 and 1963.
This point also raises the question of the value of SIGINT 
as a useful source on Communist activities in the region. It is 
known that in the immediate post-war period, SIGINT was a 
critical source for exposing a web of Soviet espionage networks 
(with American Communists) in the United States and elsewhere 
(codenamed VENONA).121 However, no documentary evidence 
suggests that VENONA had any impact on the Middle Eastern 
context.122 Moreover, there was no evidence to suggest that 
Communists in the region were using wireless communication, a 
medium that could potentially be intercepted by GCHQ, at least, 
during the period.
Most importantly, evidence indicates that owing to the nature 
of the Middle East, where Communist activities were prohib-
ited by local authorities, direct contact between Russians and 
Communists in the region were rare. Even if the contact had been 
made by landline or post, for instance, the first organisations to 
intercept the communication by either wiretapping or censor-
ship would have been those of the local authorities – the local 
police but not GCHQ. Furthermore, the techniques and methods 
for contacting local Communists employed by the Russians – 
using selected Communist members or minorities, such as the 
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Armenians and the Kurds, as intermediaries – were exposed by 
the interrogation of ICP members by the Iraqi CID.123
In this context, it is questionable whether Britain had much 
intelligence on subversive activities in the region beyond the 
capacity of MI5 during the period, especially in the early years 
of the Baghdad Pact. Britain may have been largely dependent 
on the intelligence assessments submitted by the members of the 
Liaison Committee. Nevertheless, documentary evidence suggests 
that after the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact, Britain 
had several sources of information on the internal affairs of Iraq, 
including the activities of the ICP.124 In his biography of Sir 
Dick White, Tom Bower notes that, ‘despite the antagonism of 
the Kassem [Qasim] regime’, Britain’s old relationship with the 
Iraqis, including the police, the armed forces and businessmen, 
allowed MI6 to ‘penetrate government agencies’.125
Conclusion
Richard Jasse interpreted the Baghdad Pact as a form of British 
colonialism – it was essentially run by British imperial inter-
ests to maintain Britain’s influence in the region.126 To some 
degree, Jasse’s interpretation is accurate: Harold Macmillan’s 
offer to the regional members to train them in the techniques 
and methods of Britain’s anti-Communist measures was indeed 
intended to prevent the spread of Communist activities in the 
region, and was equally meant to serve British interests in 
maintaining influence over the pro-British governments in the 
region. Nevertheless, despite Macmillan’s desire, intelligence 
cooperation under the Baghdad Pact was not smooth. This was 
mainly owing to the security, or otherwise, of the Pact – Britain 
considered that sharing classified intelligence with the regional 
members was unsafe. A by-product of this lax security was the 
establishment of SAVAK in 1957. The security concern was 
not only about the Iranians, however. Throughout the period 
between 1956 and 1963, Britain sought to improve the security 
of the Pact members. The extent to which the state of CENTO 
security improved after 1963 is a matter of speculation; however, 
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it seems most unlikely that the state of security improved sub-
stantially soon after 1963.
Differences between Britain and its Middle Eastern counter-
parts also hampered liaison. The security services of the regional 
members were loyal to their own governments and thus strongly 
committed to suppressing subversive activities in their coun-
tries by any means necessary. The Communist threat was not 
monolithic, nor clear-cut. Britain (and the United States) was 
mostly concerned about the spread of Communist activities in 
the region, but regional members’ concerns were wider – they 
were not exclusively about Communist activities, but included 
other ‘Communist-inspired’ threats. The difference in percep-
tions between Britain (and the United States) on the one hand and 
Middle Eastern states on the other demonstrates the dynamics of 
the Pact.
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5  Conflicting Interests in Anti-Communist 
Measures
CENTO was a disappointment to the regional members, all of them 
. . . We [US and Britain] took a, very, I’d say, fairly rigid line, that the 
CENTO organization was intended to deal with a communist threat, 
and basically a Soviet Communist threat obviously. Whereas Iran 
would have liked us very much in public statements, the communi-
qués, or actual activities to use the organization against Iraq [after 
Iraq had left] . . . The Pakistanis wanted us to use the organisation 
against India in some fashion or other.
Charles Naas1
Our main concern at the start of the meeting was that the Asian 
members [i.e. the regional members] would tend to interpret counter-
subversion as simply an excuse to discuss and develop operations by 
their own police and security services . . . [comprising] Generals and 
Colonels, who took rather a physical view of counter-subversion, 




According to historian Daniel Pipes, Middle Eastern leaders had 
a ‘conspiracy mentality’ when interpreting regional affairs.3 This 
was compounded by threats of internal subversion, often fanned 
by propaganda. Accordingly, many Middle Eastern leaders 
believed that anti-governmental activities were all instigated 
and propagated by external enemies. As we have seen, regional 
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security services held diverging views on internal security from 
their British counterparts. This rift was most noticeable during 
discussions of the Counter-Subversion Committee and most 
destructive in anti-Communist propaganda.
This chapter explores the nature of the threats that Middle 
Eastern governments encountered; how Britain and the local 
authorities used propaganda as an anti-Communist measure 
under the Baghdad Pact; and the extent to which local authori-
ties understood and conducted anti-Communist measures in 
their countries. It shows that although all members consid-
ered Communist movements the main threat, limitations in the 
Pact’s collective efforts existed. These mainly stemmed from its 
dynamics: while Britain and the United States considered the 
Pact as an alliance against the Soviet Union or International 
Communism, the regional members were more concerned about 
local or regional problems. This problem was reinforced by the 
fact that the Counter-Subversion Committee of the Baghdad Pact, 
the highest policymaking committee for propaganda, consisted 
of the heads of the security services of the regional states, which 
also handled counter-subversive propaganda campaigns in their 
respective countries.4
The Threat from Propaganda
The significance of propaganda in shaping regional affairs should 
not be underestimated. Baruch Hazan’s classic study on the 
techniques of Soviet propaganda in the region makes clear that 
Moscow had been the chief instigator in calling the local popu-
lation to arms against ‘imperialists’ and ‘reactionary’ – or pro-
Western – governments in the region since the late 1940s.5 Despite 
some differences among the Middle Eastern governments in their 
anti-Communist stances, all local security services were engaged 
in anti-Communist measures, including arresting Communists 
and confiscating subversive publications and equipment.
Middle Eastern security services struggled to counter the spread 
of subversive publications. In the case of Lebanon, for instance, 
a British diplomat noted that an illegal publication, Akhbar, was 
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believed to have a circulation of ‘about 10,000 copies a day’, which 
for a country the size of Lebanon was ‘very large’.6 These subver-
sive publications served as the main platform for Communist 
activists to agitate local populations and turn against their own 
governments. In addition, some materials were smuggled into 
countries from outside whilst activists also moved beyond their 
borders. This made life all the more difficult for local security 
services.7 Moreover, the presses printing these illegal publications 
were often reported to be located either in the Soviet Union or in 
the Soviet Embassy itself, against which the local security services 
were unable to take action.8
Communist publications were not only the threat. 
Extraterritorial radio broadcasts were often more subversive 
and even threatened the very existence of local authorities, 
especially ones associated with the West. Fear of internal subver-
sion amongst Middle Eastern leaders was also fostered by the 
rise of radical Arab Nationalist movements in the region from 
the mid-1950s, associated with the Egyptian leader, Colonel 
Gamal Abdul Nasser. It is important to note that, while any 
relationship between the Soviet and Egyptian threats preoccupied 
British thinking, and has subsequently been debated by histori-
ans, regional governments of the Baghdad Pact, or even Lebanon 
and Jordan, gave it little thought.
For the regional governments, the techniques and methods used 
either by Communists, through the Soviets, or by Nasser were 
the same – discrediting the legitimacy of governments, and ruling 
elites, that were associated with the West. These propaganda 
campaigns were subversive and anti-governmental in nature. 
Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, the Director-General of Intelligence 
of the Arab Legion (1952–6), once noted that, in addition to 
Communists, ‘the worst’ subversive activity he had to deal with in 
fact came from Egypt and Saudi Arabia:
They [Egyptians] are entirely unscrupulous . . . [T]hey broadcast a 
stream of vitriolic abuse of Nuri Said in Hebrew. So much for Arab 
brotherly love. For months recently they have been trying to organ-
ise sabotage gangs to operate from Jordan into Israel, in order to 
compromise this country. Their local M.A. [Military Attaché] is the 
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mainspring of this. For all the time I have been here – nearly four years 
– Egypt has flooded the Press and Air of the Middle East with bitterly 
hostile attacks on ‘Imperialists’ and ‘Colonizers’ . . . Saudi Arabia is 
working hand in glove with Egypt . . . – [through] lavish bribes on a 
fabulous scale which include or included subsidies to the Jordan royal 
family – Cabinet Ministers, Deputies and newspapers, one and all on 
their pay-roll. Their principal objects of dislike are the members of 
the Hashemite family . . . So all is directed at weakening Hashemite 
influence.9
Communist and radical Arab Nationalist propaganda was a clear 
threat to local authorities. Egypt, later the United Arab Republic 
(UAR), and the Soviet Union continually targeted their popula-
tions with calls for revolution. As noted by Baruch Hazan, the 
association of the Baghdad Pact with Britain and the United 
States ‘created a community of interests’ between Nasser’s 
Egypt and the Soviet Union as a target for propaganda.10 The 
Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri al-Said, also felt that the existence of 
the Hashemite dynasty of Iraq was threatened by propaganda 
from Moscow, Cairo and Damascus.11 From the mid-1950s, 
the problem only worsened as non-Communist forces, chiefly 
radical Arab Nationalists, grew increasingly hostile to the local 
authorities.
The Egyptian government led by the Free Officers, first General 
Muhammad Nagib and later Colonel Nasser, harnessed the 
power of propaganda to consolidate their position after the coup 
in 1952. In doing so, they were assisted by a small group of CIA 
officers, including Kim Roosevelt, Miles Copeland and James 
Eichelberger.12 Similar to Communist activities, Nasser also 
sought to generate internal subversion, or ‘revolution’ in Nasser’s 
words.13 Yaacov Caroz notes that Nasser ‘considered subversion 
to be a legitimate means of achieving his objectives’.14 By the time 
the Baghdad Pact was formed in 1955, Nasser had recognised 
the power of propaganda and considered it his only weapon 
against ‘imperialists’, that is, the British, and, above all, pro-
imperialist Middle Eastern governments, such as the Hashemite 
dynasty, Iraq, Jordan and pro-Western Lebanon.15 Prime Minister 
Anthony Eden says in his memoirs that there was evidence that 
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Nasser was preparing ‘to mount revolutions of young officers’ in 
various countries in the region.16
According to Mohamed Heikal, Nasser’s closest confidant, 
Nasser understood that the power of words through radio was 
the only way to make the masses become the ‘weapon of the Arab 
Revolution’ beyond the borders of Egypt.17 This was particularly 
true in the cases of Lebanon and Jordan, where Egyptian newspa-
pers were banned and the Egyptian embassies were under surveil-
lance by local security services.18 As Nasser’s popularity grew, the 
reactionary pro-British regimes, including even Iran, felt increas-
ingly threatened by internal subversion.19 The power of radio also 
became an important symbol of emerging nationalism throughout 
the region, and Cairo Radio’s popular programme ‘The Voice of 
the Arabs’ played a role in fostering Algeria’s revolutionary move-
ments as well.20 Diplomatic correspondence in July 1957 records 
that King Hussein of Jordan was being attacked by ‘hostile 
Egyptian propaganda’ through an Egyptian-backed ‘clandestine 
radio station’ named ‘Radio Free Jordan’, and the Egyptians 
were ‘trying to recruit Jordanians’ for revolution.21 Similarly, 
another radio station situated outside Iraq, named ‘Radio Free 
Iraq’, was calling on Iraqis to revolt against the government led 
by Nuri al-Said.22 Sir Sam Falle, the Oriental Counsellor at the 
British Embassy in Baghdad (1957–61), believes that the Iraqi 
Revolution in 1958 was clearly instigated by Egypt’s propaganda 
through ‘The Voice of the Arabs’, and notes that ‘its virulence and 
incitement to violence were horrifying’.23 Wilbur Crane Eveland, 
his American counterpart, also writes that the Iraqi Revolution 
resulted from a series of propaganda efforts emanating through 
‘Nasser’s radio’.24 As the popularity of Nasser grew across the 
region via the power of propaganda, George K. Young, the Vice-
Chief of MI6, complained to his American counterparts that the 
CIA ‘created a monster in Nasser’.25
In addition to the Cairo Radio broadcasts, Egyptian Military 
Attachés also acted as vehicles of revolution in the region.26 
They conducted subversive activities, such as supplying arms and 
explosives to politically motivated locals for use against their 
own governments. Documentary evidence shows that Egyptian 
Military Attachés were expelled from countries such as Iraq, 
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Lebanon, Libya, Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia between 1956 and 
1957.27 This reached the most senior levels of British intelligence. 
In August 1958, the JIC reported that Nasserite ‘influential oppo-
nents’ of regimes such as Jordan and Lebanon had been pro-
vided with ‘weapons and explosives for use in promoting disorder 
and, if necessary, to overthrow the established government by 
revolution’.28
Emir Farid Chehab, the Head of the Lebanese Sûreté Générale, 
believed that Nasser was merely serving the interests of the Soviet 
Union.29 He feared that Lebanese independence was increasingly 
threatened by internal subversion, especially as Nasser’s popular-
ity grew and the Syrians allied with Egypt. His most secret source, 
the wiretapping of the Egyptian Embassy and local politicians, 
revealed that the Egyptian Ambassador and Military Attachés 
in Lebanon were instigating subversive activities and even sup-
plying arms and explosives to local politicians and politically 
motivated activists against the Lebanese President, Camille Nimir 
Chamoun.30
Britain also viewed Egyptian teachers throughout the region as 
subversive propagandists.31 The Overseas Planning Committee 
tasked MI6, MI5 and the IRD to counteract their activities in 
the Arabian/Persian Gulf States in March 1956, noting that ‘we 
should do whatever is possible to counteract Egyptian influence, 
especially the influence of Egyptian teachers’.32 Despite these 
efforts, MI6 reported in 1958 that the number of Egyptian teach-
ers throughout the region had actually increased from about 300 
before the Egyptian coup of 1952 to 3,000 in 1958, and that there 
was ‘evidence’ obtained from various countries, such as Lebanon, 
the Arabian/Persian Gulf States and Jordan, that the Egyptian 
government used ‘Egyptian teachers’ for both espionage and sub-
version. Senior Cold War planners back in London concluded 
that this ‘large and well-placed body of propagandists abroad’ 
presented ‘a grave threat to the future stability of the countries 
in which they are working, and to the Middle East as a whole’.33
From the perspective of the regional members, regardless of 
their political affiliations, these threats were substantial and often 
spread across borders. Although they took the ‘revolutionary 
tendency’ of Communist-inspired threats seriously,34 it was ‘The 
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Voice of the Arabs’, a non-Communist threat, which was most 
vocal in calls for revolutions in the region – and which local 
leaders most feared.35 Nevertheless, countering these threats with 
propaganda under the single authority of the Baghdad Pact proved 
complex. This was mainly due to a lack of consensus at the policy 
level as to whether non-Communist activities constituted a sub-
versive threat. As the perceptions of these substantial threats 
differed between Britain and the United States on one hand, and 
the regional members on the other, this was a significant cause 
of frustration for the regional states who insisted that these non-
Communist activities posed an existential threat to their regimes.
British Propaganda Policy in the Middle East
Britain’s main arm of fighting the Cold War was the Foreign 
Office’s propaganda apparatus, the IRD. This was, as one histo-
rian put it, ‘Britain’s secret Cold War weapon’.36 James Vaughan 
notes that by the mid-1950s, ‘significant evidence’ suggested the 
IRD was ‘extremely successful in establishing high-level contacts 
within Middle Eastern governments’ who were willing to cooper-
ate with the British on anti-Communist propaganda and accepted 
its materials for use in their anti-Communist policy.37 In this 
context, the formation of the Baghdad Pact was an additional 
boost for British anti-Communist propaganda. Once the Counter-
Subversion Committee of the Baghdad Pact was established in 
1956, it provided Britain with the opportunity of obtaining 
additional resources as well as channels through which anti- 
Communist propaganda materials could be circulated.
Although anti-Communist propaganda campaigns were con-
ducted by the regional countries, the significance of the Baghdad 
Pact in this context cannot be underestimated. It proved highly 
advantageous for Britain. Firstly, British involvement in anti-
Communist efforts in the region ostensibly became invisible. The 
Middle East had become a hotbed of anti-British sentiment, and 
British membership of the Baghdad Pact was the source of exploi-
tation by Cairo Radio and Radio Moscow. While Britain main-
tained the initiative in anti-Communist propaganda campaigns by 
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giving guidance and direction, the regional governments assumed 
the front line of anti-Communist propaganda in the Pact area. An 
IRD officer noted that had the public found out about ‘British-
made programmes’, it would have been ‘politically embarrassing’ 
not only to Britain but also to the local authorities.38 As a result, 
the regional governments carefully concealed the source of the 
propaganda materials that came from the British.
Secondly, owing to their inexperience in anti-Communist meas-
ures and especially in propaganda, the regional members wel-
comed British experience and expertise. Britain’s role was thus to 
provide the regional members with technical support including 
training and materials for broadcasting and publications. The 
relationship of the Pact members was characterised as such that 
the regional governments were dependent on the ‘British skill’ and 
‘American material resources’ for their own counter-subversive 
propaganda campaigns.39 This was mutually beneficial for Britain 
and the regional members, as John Speares, First Secretary at the 
British Embassy in Baghdad, noted regarding the Iranian case:
Even if our policemen [the regional representatives of the Baghdad 
Pact] lack propaganda expertise, they have at least in this case issued 
some Western material under a Middle East dateline, and this seems 
important. Although the regular local propaganda services are more 
experienced they may also be more sophisticated and therefore less 
open to our influence . . . these police channels even if they are 
inexpert and incomplete are at least open to us . . . General Kia [the 
Iranian representative, Head of Military Intelligence] has, inciden-
tally, already indicated willingness to accept a training and advisory 
survey of information services.40
This training role served British interests well. By providing the 
regional members – especially the oil producing countries, Iran 
and Iraq – with support for anti-Communist measures, Britain 
hoped to gain the ‘goodwill’ of its regional partners, and thus 
ensure that they would remain in the sphere of Western influence.
Throughout the period, British propaganda efforts were directed 
against not only Communists but also Nasser. The British anti-
Nasserite propaganda policy started in the mid-1950s, but it was 
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during the 1956 Suez Crisis that Britain adopted outright anti-
Nasserite propaganda campaigns through an interdepartmental 
committee comprising both the IRD and the military against the 
strongest anti-British voice, Cairo Radio.41 By the eve of the Suez 
Crisis, the IRD was employed as an instrument of psychological 
warfare against Nasser.42 Jack Rennie, Head of the IRD, was 
given a specific brief to lead IRD’s Middle Eastern operations 
in an anti-Nasserite and anti-Arab Nationalism direction while 
Norman Reddaway, Rennie’s deputy, was left in charge of the 
day-to-day anti-Communist work.43
These anti-Nasserite propaganda operations were conducted 
secretly and codenamed Transmission X.44 They sought to ‘rebut’ 
Cairo Radio’s anti-British propaganda in the Middle East, and ‘to 
discredit Nasser and to expose Egyptian expansionism’ by using 
‘unattributable propaganda’.45 The themes for this propaganda 
included Nasser’s future economic plan, which was portrayed as 
being ill-prepared for building the Aswan Dam; ‘the dangers of 
Egypt’s pan-Arab imperialist ambitions’; and ‘Nasser’s link with 
the Russians’.46
However, the activities associated with Transmission X were 
short-lived. Once the Hashemite dynasty of Iraq was swept away 
in the Revolution of 1958 and after British–Egyptian relations 
began to improve towards the end of 1958, the Foreign Office 
decided to redirect the IRD back to its original anti-Communist 
task of countering ‘Communist-bloc propaganda’.47 The change 
in direction came from a change in British policy towards Egypt. 
Soon after the Iraqi Revolution, Britain re-examined its national 
interests in the region, and decided to adopt a policy of ‘disen-
gagement’: in other words, ‘not taking sides in inter-Arab dis-
putes’.48 This meant that the British anti-Nasserite policy in the 
region also softened.
In order to maintain good relations with the Baghdad Pact 
members, who would be unlikely to welcome Britain’s ‘disengage-
ment’ policy, the British government decided that the Americans, 
who had had so far ‘no wish to support or protect British inter-
ests’ in the region, ‘should be induced to join the new organisa-
tion’.49 While British policy was being repositioned, the process 
of restoring British–Egyptian relations after the Suez Crisis also 
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began in the first half of 1957, and an exchange of Ambassadors 
finally happened in February 1961.50 The negotiations included 
delicate issues such as the release of the MI6 officers, James 
Swinburn and James Zarb, who had been captured during the 
Suez Crisis of 1956.51
The Macmillan Government had stepped up its broadcasting 
and publication campaigns in the region from 1957 – before 
Britain’s anti-Nasserite propaganda policy was reset after the 
Iraqi Revolution. Compensating for cuts in defence spending, 
propaganda was recognised as being of prime importance, and 
the focus of British propaganda efforts shifted away from Europe, 
where ‘BBC broadcasts [we]re doing little good’.52 This decision 
was made on the basis of a committee chaired by the Chancellor 
of the Duchy of Lancaster, Charles Hill, which reviewed the per-
formance of Britain’s information services overseas throughout 
the world in 1957.53 Before this review, Britain spent the most 
money on non-Communist Europe (26.1 per cent – a fourth of the 
total propaganda expenditure), with the Middle East in second 
place at 14.1 per cent.54 After the review, the Middle East, where 
Harold Macmillan had felt that ‘our propaganda’ was ‘not strong 
enough’, was given the highest importance, followed by the Far 
East, Europe and the United States.55
The Macmillan government also oversaw a change in the general 
approach to propaganda in the Middle East – before outright 
anti-Nasserite propaganda campaigns were abandoned in 1959 
– with cultural propaganda efforts put forth to forward British 
interests in the region.56 In February 1957, a working party was 
formed under the chairmanship of William Alfred Wolverson, the 
Director of the Radio Services Department, General Post Office 
Headquarters (1955–60), to consider the possibility of ‘a light pro-
gramme of entertainment and news directed to Arab countries of 
the Middle East’. This soft approach to propaganda in the region 
was intended to attract ‘the uneducated masses’ in the region 
‘away from Radio Cairo’.57 For this purpose, Sharq Al-Adna, 
a Foreign Office owned Arabic-broadcasting station in Cyprus, 
which had unsuccessfully conducted anti-Nasserite propaganda 
campaigns over the Suez Crisis, was handed over to the BBC.58 
Under its new ownership, Sharq Al-Adna started broadcasting 
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‘bazaar’ music throughout the region using a second medium-
wave transmitter of 100 kilowatts.59 According to Douglas Boyd, 
the new Sharq Al-Adna ‘became the most consistently popular 
and credible Arabic-language radio service in the 1960s, 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s transmitting in Arabic’.60
These various changes in the British propaganda policy towards 
the region did not, however, reflect the counter-subversive policy 
undertaken by the regional governments of the Baghdad Pact. 
Their collective propaganda efforts proved far more complex.
The Dynamics of the Baghdad Pact and the Committees
The Liaison and Counter-Subversion Committees of the Baghdad 
Pact were clearly tasked from the outset with tackling Communism 
in the region. Well aware of the potential danger of Communist 
movements, the regional governments maintained a strong anti-
Communist stance and cooperated in anti-Communist propa-
ganda via the Counter-Subversion Committee throughout the 
period between 1956 and 1963. The Iraqis were at the fore-
front of such propaganda until their withdrawal from the Pact in 
1958. After the Iraqi withdrawal, Sir Roger Stevens, the British 
Ambassador in Tehran (1954–8), noted that the Turks became 
‘by a long way’ the leading force, with the Iranians ‘second’ and 
the Pakistanis ‘a very poor third’.61
Beneath the Counter-Subversion Committee, which was the 
highest policymaking body for countering subversive propaganda 
efforts, sat a ‘permanent executive arm’ of counter-subversion, 
the Counter-Subversion Office (CSO). The CSO, consisting of 
representatives from each member, was placed under the admin-
istrative control of the Secretary-General of the Baghdad Pact 
and housed in the headquarters of the Pact in Baghdad (1956–8) 
and Ankara (1958–79).62 Day-to-day contact amongst the Pact 
members took place though the CSO, which essentially coordi-
nated counter-subversive measures between the member states 
and acted as a channel for disseminating propaganda materials.63 
A selection of IRD materials, especially anti-Communist publica-
tions, was shared through the CSO, whose members translated the 
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texts into their own languages and then distributed them through 
their own national channels. These materials included a com-
parative study of Soviet aid to Israel and the Arab states;64 stories 
exposing life in the Communist bloc;65 and unpacking the ideas 
of Communism, in publications such as ‘What Is Communism?’66 
The CSO members constantly visited Britain to attend training 
courses organised by the IRD.67
The CSO also studied the methods and techniques of Soviet 
disinformation activities, such as how the Soviet Union forged 
and disseminated documents throughout the press in the Pact 
area.68 The CSO also facilitated closer bilateral relationships. 
D. C. Hopson of the Foreign Office noted that:
because the CSO has to work on a basis of multi-lateral agreement 
its sphere of activity is necessarily limited. But meanwhile a great deal 
of bilateral co-operation in activities which can be called ‘counter-
subversive’ is taking place on a routine, day-to-day basis between 
the Iranians and ourselves – and, in fact, between all the CENTO 
allies. For example, we are exchanging information about Communist 
activities, helping each other with the training of broadcasting staff, 
arranging educational, cultural and technical exchanges, etc. This 
distinction – between the CENTO allies on a bilateral basis and the 
relatively small but still useful contribution that can be made through 
the CSO on a multilateral basis – is very important.69
As a result of the CSO’s work, for instance, there was an ‘impres-
sive increase’ in anti-Communist material published in Turkey. 
During the first eight months of 1959, over 388 articles ‘based on 
IRD materials’ appeared in the Turkish press.70
Despite close cooperation on anti-Communist propaganda, as 
a multilateral organisation, CENTO was limited in its prop-
aganda efforts. Similar to the Liaison Committee, the meet-
ings of the Counter-Subversion Committee were mostly a site 
of political discussions, where little consensus existed amongst 
its members beyond the Communist threat in the region. For 
instance, the regional members were concerned by the activities 
of the Kurds, and their connection with the Soviet Union. When 
the Turks insisted that Kurdish nationals were suspected of being 
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Communists or at least communist-inspired, for instance, the 
British responded that this was ‘nonsense’.71 In addition, from the 
establishment of the Pact, Pakistan frequently raised its concerns 
about subversive activities in Kashmir and claimed that activities 
were supported and instigated by propaganda from the Indian 
Communist Party.72 Once their claim was rejected, the Pakistanis 
appealed to revise the mandate of the Liaison and Counter-
Subversion Committees to deal not only with Communists, but 
also with all subversion in the Pact area.73
The exclusion of a non-Communist or even Communist-
inspired threat from the Pact’s counter-subversion policy caused 
frustration among the regional members. As a result, and 
despite the Liaison Committee of the Pact having already 
agreed that Nasser was not a Communist puppet,74 the regional 
members, especially the Turks and Iranians, wished to label 
Nasser ‘a tool of Communist subversion’. In doing so, they 
hoped to conduct anti-Nasserite propaganda campaigns under 
the Pact.75 The growing frustration was particularly seen after 
Iraq withdrew its membership in 1958, and Britain aban-
doned its anti-Nasserite policy shortly afterwards. Iran was the 
most concerned with this ‘negative’ approach as it still feared 
‘subversion’ by neighbouring states, the Soviet Union, Egypt 
(through Cairo and Damascus Radio) and Iraq, until the early 
1960s.76 These concerns were frequently raised at the Counter-
Subversion Committee by the Iranian representatives, General 
Teymour Bakhtiar (Head of SAVAK, 1957–61) and General 
Hassan Pakravan (Deputy Head of SAVAK, 1957–61). 77 The 
senior SAVAK officers complained that neither ‘the British nor 
the Americans intended to make the Committee anything more 
than a talking shop’.78
Any decisions for collective propaganda campaigns were taken 
on the basis of consensus, and they were often vetoed by a 
Pact member. Although the members worked well on conducting 
anti-Communist measures in the region, their national interests 
clashed when their policies differed. As a result, the effectiveness 
of  counter-subversive campaigns by propaganda was hampered by 
the dynamics of the Pact. Recollecting his time in Ankara (1964–
7), Charles Naas, a former member of the US State Department’s 
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policy-planning staff, stated that CENTO was a ‘disappointment’ 
to the regional members. While the United States and Britain 
maintained a rigid anti-Communist stance, the regional members 
saw broader threats.79 In this regard, as seen before, the Pact was 
broadly divided into two camps: the regional members on the one 
hand, and Britain and the United States on the other. The regional 
members’ frustration was often directed at Britain and the United 
States.
The American attitudes towards the region merit brief atten-
tion here since the United States’ involvement in the Pact some-
times obstructed propaganda efforts. Despite maintaining the 
official status of an ‘observer’, the United States in fact exer-
cised influence on Pact policy through substantial financial and 
moral support to the regional members, enticing them to focus 
on anti-Communist activities. The United States firmly main-
tained that the scope of the CSO should be placed ‘exclusively 
on meeting the Communist and Communist-inspired subversive 
threats’ and nothing more.80 Nevertheless, while maintaining its 
official neutral position, Washington pursued its own policy to 
contain radical Arab Nationalism by supporting Saudi Arabia 
as a challenger to Nasser’s popularity in the region in the late 
1950s until the end of the Eisenhower Doctrine in September 
1960.81
The Americans’ ambivalent attitude towards the region was, 
nevertheless, unsurprising since their departmental policies were 
often in conflict. Their indecisive and often non-existent national 
strategy, based on a short-sighted and ill-founded policy towards 
the region, has also been criticised.82 For instance, Robert 
McClintock, the Ambassador of the United States to Lebanon 
(1958–61), who himself felt that it was ‘a mistake to be anti-
Nasser’, informally spoke to his British counterpart, Sir Moore 
Crosthwaite, about a division of opinion regarding American 
attempts to undermine Nasser’s popularity in the region.83 The 
indecisive American attitude towards the region was also a cause 
of confusion to the Pact members and was frequently criticised by 
the regional members; for example, the Iranian delegate, General 
Teymour Bakhtiar of SAVAK, complained to his British coun-
terpart that a representative from the Department of State and 
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another from the CIA ‘did not even agree with each other’ over 
what constituted a ‘subversive’ threat in the region.84
As mentioned in the previous chapter, despite the dynamics of 
the Pact, CENTO functioned on the basis of a democratic prin-
ciple: any decisions at either the Counter-Subversive Committee 
or the CSO were made collectively through a majority of the sig-
natories. This principle gradually acted in the regional members’ 
favour, and eventually, after long deliberation at a series of 
committee meetings, a request from the regional members was 
accepted. At a meeting of the Counter-Subversion Committee 
in Lahore in 1962, the term ‘subversion’ was finally broadened 
to include ‘non-communist threats’.85 This was mainly because 
non-Communist threats were equally as important as Communist 
threats in the region, and were threatening the existence of the 
pro-Western member states, which, in turn, was ‘directly in the 
interests of Communism’.86
The Propaganda War
The dynamics of the Pact limited the efficacy of the coopera-
tive propaganda efforts. This does not necessarily mean that 
the regional member states refrained from carrying out propa-
ganda campaigns in their own countries. As the responsibility 
for conducting propaganda operations always remained in the 
hands of local authorities, the regional member states drew upon 
the techniques and CSO materials for their own purposes. For 
instance, while the British policy ordered a halt to the IRD’s 
all-out anti-Nasserite campaigns towards the end of 1959, the 
regional member states did not follow the same practice.
In 1959, the IRD asked its outposts in the region to assess 
the extent to which the anti-Nasserite propaganda materials, 
so-called Transmission X, were still being disseminated in each 
country of the Middle East.87 Given that the IRD had halted the 
supply of such materials to the region, nearly all Arab states, 
including Jordan and Lebanon, were no longer disseminating 
them.88 However, the members of CENTO (then Turkey, Iran and 
Pakistan), where anti-Communist and Transmission X materials 
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were pooled at the headquarters, could – and did – still dissemi-
nate them. In doing so, they slightly tailored the material for their 
own purposes, broadening the focus from not only anti-Nas-
serite but also to anti-Soviet Communism. The British Embassy 
in Ankara estimated that ‘up to 60 per cent’ of Transmission X 
material had been placed in the local press in Turkey, Iran and 
Pakistan.89
At the centre of the propaganda war in the region, the most 
influential broadcasting station was Cairo Radio. Amongst all the 
regional players, Nuri al-Said, a long-standing Iraqi Prime Minister 
who wished to see Iraq lead the Arab countries by unifying with 
Syria, was willing to confront Nasser in a propaganda war.90 In 
order to counter subversive propaganda broadcasting from Radio 
Moscow and Cairo Radio, the British helped to develop Iraqi 
propaganda capabilities and Baghdad Radio was established in 
1956.91 Britain was also involved in developing the broadcast-
ing programmes of Baghdad Radio, in line with the policy of the 
Pact as ‘a Moslem alliance to challenge the pan-Arab doctrines 
sponsored by Egypt’s Voice of the Arab broadcasts’.92 These anti-
Communist propaganda efforts by Baghdad Radio were largely 
targeted at ‘all key moulders’ of ‘public opinion’, especially in 
the spheres of ‘politics, commerce and labour, science, litera-
ture and education’, by exposing ‘Communist aims, tactics and 
pretensions’ through broadcasting and publicity media.93 More 
specifically, particular attention was given to ‘youth, students, 
intellectuals and leading academic figures’.94
Nevertheless, although Baghdad Radio was set up under the 
Baghdad Pact, it was fully controlled by the Iraqis and became an 
instrument of the propaganda war by Nuri al-Said against Nasser. 
Baghdad Radio soon promoted Nuri as the leader not only in 
Iraq, but also throughout the region, against Nasser’s pan-Arab 
Nationalism, with themes that included ‘internal progress in Iraq’ 
and ‘Iraq’s role in international affairs’.95 The Iraqi government 
also appointed Yunis Bakri, the ‘Arab “Lord Haw-Haw”’, a 
‘mercenary prepared to abuse anyone if paid enough’, to conduct 
the propaganda war against Cairo Radio. Nasser broadcasted 
through Cairo Radio that ‘some of the nine clandestine radio sta-
tions’ under the control of the Counter-Subversion Committee 
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of the Baghdad Pact were attacking him, implying that Baghdad 
Radio was propagated by the imperialists.96
As soon as it became apparent that the Iraqis were ready to 
wage a ‘radio war’ against Cairo, Britain decided to distance itself 
from the operational running of Baghdad Radio on the grounds 
that a radio war would only create political instability. Gordon 
Waterfield, Head of the BBC Eastern Services, working closely with 
the IRD, noted that there would be ‘confusion in the Middle East 
air with one radio station fighting another’, and ‘British policy, as 
I understand it, is not to try to divide the Arab world, but to try 
to create understanding and cooperation among the Arab coun-
tries’.97 Michael Hadow, Head of the Levant Department of the 
Foreign Office, also noted that ‘we would not wish it to become 
branded in Arab eyes as an instrument of the Pact rather than an 
Iraqi national station’.98 While there was no reason for not advis-
ing on the conduct of any operational matters, Michael Hadow 
limited British commitment to advising only on ‘future planning’ 
at the request of the Iraqi government, rather than on ‘the pro-
gramming side’. In this way, Hadow also envisaged that the Iraqis 
would be helped by more experienced regional members, such as 
the Pakistanis, who had also been involved in similar operations 
under SEATO.99
Nevertheless, Britain’s regional partners could not compete 
with Nasser’s influential and powerful anti-imperial rhetoric. 
According to official figures recorded by the IRD in 1961, ‘The 
Voice of the Arabs’, one of the most popular programmes extol-
ling Nasser’s concept of Arab Nationalism, was on the air for 156 
hours per week and was broadcast throughout the Middle East 
and North Africa in twenty-three languages.100 Cairo Radio stead-
ily increased its capacity from 1953 and became the most power-
ful broadcasting station in the region with twelve medium-wave 
transmitters (including two 300 kilowatts and one 100 kilowatts) 
and eleven short-wave transmitters (among them, two 140 kilo-
watts and two 100 kilowatts). By comparison, Baghdad Radio, 
established under the Baghdad Pact, had only four 100-kilowatt 
transmitters.101
Growing anti-British sentiment and the rise of Arab Nationalism 
throughout the region, all of which moved in Nasser’s favour, 
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especially after the Suez Crisis, also acted to the anti-Nasserite 
governments’ disadvantage. James Vaughan has observed that 
the development of regional affairs and crises in the mid- and 
late 1950s was a consequence of Nasser’s propaganda war: the 
dismissal of Glubb Pasha; Jordan’s abstention from joining the 
Baghdad Pact; the Jordanian and Lebanese Crises of 1958; and 
even the Iraqi Revolution.102
Dominance of Security Services
One of the difficulties faced by IRD officers cooperating with the 
Pact members was how to establish common ground on which 
to conduct their anti-Communist propaganda efforts. The repre-
sentatives of the regional governments at the Counter-Subversion 
Committee were predominantly members of the security services: 
the Director of the Iraqi CID; Head of the Iranian G-2, later 
replaced by the Head of SAVAK; the Director-General of the 
Turkish National Security Service; and a senior official of the 
Ministry of Interior of Pakistan. On the other hand, Britain was 
represented by an IRD officer. The United States, which remained 
an ‘observer’ until 1959, was represented by either United States 
Information Service (USIS) or CIA officers. The composition of the 
CSO reflected that of the Counter-Subversion Committee. This 
domination by the regional security services often led to situations 
in which the British representative from the IRD was the subject 
of complaints for being too soft on counter- subversion efforts. 
Regional members accused the British of being less  committed to 
the Pact’s collective efforts.
This was particularly the case from the summer of 1956 
onwards, when unrest and instability in Syria was a central 
cause of concern for all the regional members, who became more 
frustrated with the ineffectiveness of the Pact. General Behcet 
Turkmen, the Turkish representative (Director-General of the 
Turkish National Security Service), who chaired the Counter-
Subversion Committee, demanded ‘more drastic weapons’ 
– setting up ‘a sort of SOE’ for conducting more aggressive opera-
tions in Syria. General Haj-Ali Kia, the Iranian representative, 
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sought to give more authority to the Liaison Committee, which 
he chaired, to conduct clandestine operations against Syria on 
behalf of the Counter-Subversion Committee. The Pakistani and 
Iraqi representatives respectively endorsed proposals for creating 
a Pact intelligence service and also underlined ‘the need for action 
in Syria’.103 Nevertheless, the British representative vetoed the 
proposal on the grounds that it would lead to ‘inefficiency and 
confusion’, and was supported by the Americans, who at the time 
sought to maintain their neutral stance towards the region.104 
This sort of proposal was a recurrent theme in the discussions 
between the Pact members, and Britain constantly ‘blocked’ such 
proposals.105
This formed the context of Operation Straggle: based on the 
assertion that Iraq was ‘the central point of British support and 
area stability’, George K. Young, the Vice-Chief of MI6, explained 
to his American counterparts, the operation envisaged that Syria 
and King Saud, in that order, would be overthrown, and then 
Nasser would be eliminated.106 Evidence suggests that the blue-
print for overthrowing the Syrian government was laid out by 
George Young.107 The master plan was entirely initiated and 
conducted by the regional players, and it was above all the Iraqis, 
Nuri al-Said and Abdul Ilah, the Crown Prince, who contemplated 
engineering a coup d’état in Syria – replacing the Communist 
Syrian government with the former Syrian leader, Colonel Adeeb 
al-Shishakli, and also invading Syria with Iraqi troops to force 
Syria into a ‘union with Iraq’.108 This was codenamed Operation 
X by the Iraqis.109 The Turkish government endorsed the Iraqi 
plan and ‘was ready to help’.110 In this, the role of Britain, and 
also the United States, was then to provide financial and material 
support for the Iraqis, and to ‘restrain’ any Israeli actions against 
the Iraqi move.111 However, as the Iraqi Revolution occurred, 
there could be no coup d’état as Nuri al-Said and Abdul Ilah had 
envisaged.
There was also a conceptual difference between the Pact members 
concerning counter-subversion. The term ‘counter- subversion’ 
was understood by the British, as information experts, as largely 
a passive activity – exposing and refuting subversive propaganda 
campaigns by the enemy. However, the regional members felt it 
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ought to be ‘more far-reaching and “forward”’, including offen-
sive counter-subversive measures.112 The difference was rooted 
in their backgrounds and professions – from the viewpoint of 
security officers, counter-subversion often meant the elimination 
of existential threats. They were in ‘the habit’ of dealing with 
 subversive elements ‘by locking them up’.113
The extent to which the regional security services successfully 
contained the spread of Communist movements in their coun-
tries is noteworthy. A document released under the FOIA – a 
threat assessment prepared by MI5 in July 1958 on the indig-
enous Communist Parties in the Pact area and categorised as 
‘Top Secret’ – indicated the effectiveness of the regional security 
services in anti-Communist measures in their countries. Despite 
the anxieties of the regional members, MI5 assessed that the 
Communist threat had been ‘well contained’ by the security ser-
vices of the regional members. The leadership of the party had 
been forced into exile ‘either in Europe or in such Middle Eastern 
countries’ as were not actively hostile to Communism.114 SAVAK 
continued to ‘harry and disrupt’ the Tudeh ‘rump’, which was 
‘split with dissension’, and did not ‘appear to obtain any effec-
tive direction from its exiled leaders’. Likewise, the ICP had been 
‘subject to increasing pressure’ from the Iraqi CID, and appeared 
to ‘find difficulty in maintaining its organisation’. As for the 
Turks and Pakistanis, MI5 reported that ‘the problem does not 
exist in organised form in either Turkey or Pakistan’.115 Although 
MI5’s assessment was circulated to its Middle Eastern counter-
parts, the documentary evidence does not show how regional 
members responded or whether they felt less threatened as a 
result of the assessment.
The strong presence of the security services on the Pact com-
mittees also reflected the dominance of the security services in 
the internal affairs of the member countries. As these services 
regarded counter-subversion as their own domain, it followed 
that counter-subversion by propaganda must also be controlled 
by the same services. General Teymour Bakhtiar of SAVAK, for 
instance, noted that it was not an information expert, but only an 
intelligence or security expert, who ‘could understand the prob-
lems of subversion thoroughly’.116 He also attempted to shape 
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the Counter-Subversion Committee as a ‘psychological warfare 
headquarters’.117
This sort of strong security-minded thinking troubled the 
British representative, who believed that propaganda operations 
should be left out of the hands of intelligence and security offic-
ers. Ironically, the name of the committee, Counter-Subversion, 
encouraged the regional security services to participate in propa-
ganda. As a result of the domination of the security services in 
the Pact countries, information and broadcasting experts were 
‘frightened off’ or appeared ‘not interested’ in getting involved in 
anti-Communist propaganda measures.118 Despite British efforts 
to the contrary, the information experts of these regional coun-
tries were excluded from anti-Communist propaganda measures.
The British representative made several attempts to make 
contact outside the security circle. For example, he contacted the 
Head of the Turkish Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, who was regarded as ‘well qualified on press relations 
and publicity matters, both in Turkey and abroad, particularly 
in the Arab States’. However, he had no success owing to the 
domination of the security officials in internal affairs, confident 
of their own abilities to handle all such matters.119 Philip Adams, 
the Regional Information Officer in Beirut, noted to John Rennie, 
Head of the IRD, that:
The views of delegates expressed at this restricted meeting have of 
course been known to us in general terms all along. They stem from 
the fact that the Asian [the regional member] countries have very little 
in the way of organised information services and from their more 
physical view than ours of what is meant by counter-subversion. I 
am afraid that this difference of approach is bound to continue so 
long as the Asian [regional] member governments are represented on 
the Counter-Subversion Committee by the heads or members of their 
security services.120
From the outset, the fear of the British representative was that 
the presence of the security services on the Counter-Subversion 
Committee would make it unlikely to produce effective plans for 
joint publicity in the sense that the British desired.121
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Even as their propaganda skills and experience grew, there 
remained persistent frustration among the regional representa-
tives who wished to develop the CSO into a ‘“psychological 
warfare” centre’ operating against ‘subversion from the USSR, 
the UAR, Afghanistan and even India’.122 The representation of 
the security services on the Committee continued throughout the 
period of this study.
The Separatist Movement: The Question of the Kurds
In addition to the spread of Communism in the Pact area, the 
Kurdish independence separatist movement, the largest minor-
ity in the region, spread across Turkey, Iraq and Iran, was a 
major concern to these three states. A comment by Wilbur Crane 
Eveland, a personal adviser to Allen Dulles, the Director of the 
CIA, on Middle Eastern affairs, illustrates the different percep-
tions of the various governments, which were directed by their 
own policies:
Iraqi Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa al Barzani was then in Russia 
seeking Soviet support for an independent republic to unite his 
tribesmen with the Kurds in Iran and Turkey. To the Iraqi, Iranian, 
and Turkish governments, the possibility of Moscow’s encouraging 
Kurdish and other tribal separationist movements represented a far 
greater danger than did the growth of local communist parties or 
the threat of an invasion of the Middle East by the Soviet Union. To 
the West, the area’s oil was of primary importance; bolstering strong 
central governments to control the tribes was considered the best way 
to regain access to the oil fields.123
The Foreign Office was in fact fully aware of regional concerns 
about Soviet support for the Kurds from at least 1949, as the 
IRD monitored Kurdish broadcasts from inside the Soviet ter-
ritories, which were directed primarily against the Iranian, Iraqi 
and Turkish governments.124 In addition, the Iraqi government 
sought cooperation with the British, Turkish and Iranian govern-
ments on intelligence sharing on the Iraqi Kurdish leader, Mulla 
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Mustafa Barzani, who was exiled from Iraq and Iran after the 
Second World War and lived in the Soviet Union until 1958. The 
Foreign Office then made available to the Iraqis ‘any information’ 
which might affect security in Iraqi Kurdistan, provided this did 
‘not compromise top secret sources of information’.125
The British Embassy in Baghdad also suggested that the Foreign 
Office take action as, after a field trip to Kurdish areas, Sir Henry 
Mack noticed that the Kurds were generally ‘radio-conscious’, 
and were ‘better informed about what was happening in Korea 
than about affairs in the next village and could only attribute this 
to their habit of radio-listening’.126 The IRD also recognised this 
as a vulnerable point for Communist exploitation, and suggested 
broadcasting anti-Communist programmes in Kurdish through 
Britain’s own Sharq Al-Adna station.127 By late 1950, the Foreign 
Office was also aware that the Soviet Union was skilfully exploit-
ing the Kurdish question as an anti-imperial weapon to damage 
the pro-British governments by giving its moral and material 
support for Kurdish independence. Barzani’s connection with the 
Soviets was confirmed by the Americans.128 While the radio pro-
grammes were broadcasted in the Kormanjo (northern Kurdish) 
dialect, and were thus ‘unintelligible’ to many Iranian and Iraqi 
Kurds, they skilfully highlighted the contrast of ‘the oppression 
of Kurds by the Governments of Iran, Turkey and Iraq with the 
pleasure of being a Kurd in the Soviet Union’.129
Identifying this as a very delicate issue, the Foreign Office 
dropped the suggestions by Sir Henry Mack and the IRD and 
decided not to become actively involved.130 This was mainly 
owing to the long-standing British policy in the region of sup-
porting the Iraqi, Iranian and Turkish governments, all of which 
had actively been assimilating the Kurds in their countries, albeit 
to different degrees.131 Between 1948 and 1963, British repre-
sentatives in the region were encouraged not to bring unnecessary 
attention to the Iraqi, Iranian and Turkish governments unless 
there was any specific request from the regional governments on 
the grounds that they were ‘extremely sensitive about the Kurdish 
minority’.132 As a consequence of this policy, intelligence col-
lection on the Kurds was also not prioritised, and the Foreign 
Office even apparently turned down a Kurdish volunteer who 
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approached the British Embassy in Paris in 1950, wishing to 
enrol himself as an agent for MI6 and offering to travel to Soviet 
Azerbaijan to find out ‘what Mustapha [Barzani] was up to’.133 
When the War Office requested information on Barzani in 1957, 
for instance, the Foreign Office held no information on him at 
all.134 Any intelligence on him and his activities came mostly from 
liaison with the Iraqi, Iranian and Turkish governments, and from 
the United States through the Liaison Committee.135
While the subject of the Kurds was often raised by the regional 
members of the Baghdad Pact for consideration in connection 
with anti-Communist measures, the dynamics of the Pact pre-
vented serious discussion of the issue. There were indeed not only 
political but logical reasons for the regional governments to claim 
a link between the Communists and the Kurds, and that the Kurds 
were working alongside the Soviet Union. Firstly, the intelligence 
collected by local security services proved that the Soviet Union 
was using minority groups, such as the Armenians and the Kurds, 
as a means to contact local Communist Parties. This connection 
became apparent from the interrogation of Iraqi Communists by 
the Iraqi CID in 1949, after which MI5 was also informed.136 This 
Soviet method was also noted by the Lebanese Sûreté Générale.137 
In addition, as noted in Chapter 4, the intelligence shared at the 
Liaison Committee provided by the Turkish representative clearly 
indicated that the KGB incited the Kurds to subvert the Turkish 
central government.
Secondly, there were also committed Kurdish Communists in 
the region. The long-standing Syrian Communist leader, Khaled 
Bakhdash (1936–95), was a Kurd, and was closely observed by 
the Lebanese Sûreté Générale.138 Despite their dismissive attitudes 
towards the Communist–Kurdish connection, the Foreign Office 
also followed Bakhdash’s activities from 1952 as the leader of the 
SCP, and was aware of the Communist–Kurdish connection else-
where.139 In addition, the regional governments were aware that 
the Soviet Union actively supported the Kurds’ efforts to achieve 
independence through propaganda, chiefly led by Mulla Mustafa 
Barzani.
Some accounts of clandestine activities of the Soviet Union have 
begun to appear in recent years. They now tell us that the Soviet 
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Union strategically supported post-colonial liberation move-
ments in the 1950s onwards to win the Cold War.140 In addition, 
Britain and France formed the main targets of the Soviet Union 
in its global grand strategy, both of which were heavily com-
mitted to maintaining their position against insurgents in their 
colonies and territories. The KGB Chairman, Aleksandr Shelepin 
(1958–61), was a chief instigator of this global grand strategy.141 
Vladislav Zubok has shown that Soviet policy supported radical 
Arab Nationalists to undermine Western influence in the Middle 
East.142 More importantly, Mulla Mustafa Barzani (often called 
Mulla Mustafa by his colleagues), whose activities had been at 
the centre of concerns by Iraqi, Iranian, Turkish and even Syrian 
governments, was indeed a long-running KGB agent (codenamed 
RAIS) from the end of the Second World War.143 According to 
Zubok, in July 1961, by which time Barzani had returned to 
Baghdad from his exile in Moscow after the Iraqi Revolution, 
Shelepin suggested to the Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, that 
‘old KGB connections’ with Barzani, now the chairman of the 
Kurdish Democratic Party, be used to ‘activate the movement of 
the Kurdish population of Iraq, Iran and Turkey for creation of 
an independent Kurdish’ state.144
In the second half of the 1950s, when the stability in the 
region began to deteriorate, these three governments were more 
concerned about Mulla Barzani and his influence on the Kurds 
in their countries. During the Suez Crisis, the Iraqi Minister 
of the Interior, Said Qazzaz, was seriously alarmed by Nikita 
Khrushchev’s speech (a probable bluff) over the Suez Crisis. 
The British Military Attaché in Baghdad noted that ‘if the Iraqis 
were not showing themselves very active in support of the 
Egyptians – the Russians might send back Mulla Mustafa with 
some of his partisans and parachute them into Iraq’.145 In addi-
tion, the change in the Iraqi government was proving to be the 
emerging threat in the region not only for political reasons but 
also owing to subversive activities, which were spreading into 
the neighbouring countries such as Turkey and Iran. Once Iraq 
had left the Baghdad Pact in 1958, new threats to the Pact area 
came from the Iraqi Communists, whose activities were toler-
ated by the new Iraqi government, including ‘subversive Kurdish 
Conflicting Interests
139
broadcasts from Radio Baghdad’ directed at the Kurds in Iran 
and Turkey.146
A by-product of the multilateral intelligence cooperation 
under the Pact was bilateral cooperation between the regional 
members. In the wake of the Iraqi Revolution, when a rumour 
spread in the Foreign Office that the Iraqi Kurds were fight-
ing the revolutionary government in Baghdad, the Turkish and 
Iranian governments sought to ‘expropriate’ Iraqi Kurdistan 
in order to keep the Kurds in their countries.147 Once Mulla 
Barzani had returned from the Soviet Union to Baghdad after the 
Iraqi Revolution, there was an influx of refugees of anti-Barzani 
Kurdish tribes to both Turkey and Iran. The Turkish and Iranian 
governments agreed to set up a ‘Turco-Iranian bureau’ to work 
on the matter and to share any intelligence on Barzani’s activi-
ties in Baghdad.148 Counter-subversion efforts by the regional 
governments concerning the question of the Kurds are explored 
further in Chapter 6.
Limitations in Influencing Local Anti-Communist 
Propaganda Measures
After the loss of its strategic ally in the Iraqi Revolution, Britain 
became more proactive in intervening in the anti-Communist 
propaganda measures that local authorities might take. Britain 
found the Iranian government, the only remaining oil produc-
ing country under the Pact, particularly vulnerable to subversive 
broadcasting by Radio Moscow, and Iran was believed to be the 
main target of Soviet propaganda in the late 1950s.149 Aware that 
they were ill-equipped to counter these threats, the Iranians were 
undoubtedly willing to receive British support.
Iranian propaganda efforts largely depended on the British 
and the CSO from the outset.150 The Iranians primarily focused 
on two types of propaganda campaigns, agreed at the CSO and 
directed by the Counter-Subversion Committee. The first type 
sought to discredit the reputations of the Soviet Union and the 
Tudeh Party, exposing life under the Communist regime and also 
envisaging what life in Iran would be like under Communist rule. 
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The second type praised Iranian ‘social well-being’ and economic 
development with support from CENTO.151 One of the methods 
of propagating these campaigns was broadcasting, and there 
were numerous transmitters in operation throughout Iran mainly 
intended for internal radio broadcasting, including propagating a 
factual account of ‘Russian activities during the wartime occupa-
tion of Iran’.152 In addition to broadcasting, publications – such 
as Boris Pasternak’s novel Doctor Zhivago – were supplied by the 
IRD and translated through the CSO into Persian for the purpose 
of dissemination throughout Iran.153
After the announcement of its establishment in October 1956, 
SAVAK gradually expanded the focus of its security duty from 
military to civilian departments.154 SAVAK assumed responsibil-
ity for conducting a range of political, economic and cultural 
anti-Communist campaigns in Iran between 1957 and 1963. One 
theme, on which the Iranians placed much importance, was the 
use of Islam against Communism. While the degree to which 
similar operations were conducted in their countries was differ-
ent, the use of Islam and praise for the monarchy (as well as the 
government) became common practice across Pact anti-Com-
munist propaganda campaigns. This theme was also propagated 
through Baghdad Radio as the Iraqis were ‘very keen to keep up 
this positive aspect of the work’.155
An Iranian delegate, Professor Furuzanfar, who had taught 
at the Religious College of the University of Tehran and then 
worked for the Iranian government, reported on the progress of 
the ongoing programme to the Counter-Subversion Committee in 
June 1956:
After our adherence to the Baghdad Pact . . . We decided . . . to estab-
lish a school where Marxist ideologies would be fought by means of 
religious faith . . . while educating men of religion we are at the same 
time trying to train young men faithful to the nation . . . Actually 
320 students are receiving training in these courses. It is hoped that 
their number will increase to 1,000 by the end of this year . . . in the 
near future we shall be able to have our religious representatives and 
orators in all parts of our country.156
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The main objective of the Iranian government for the use of Islam 
was indeed political. It was designed to train the ‘efficient reli-
gious orators’, through whom ‘political, economic and cultural 
programmes’ were relayed to the population ‘in compliance with 
the directives of the central government’. Professor Furuzanfar 
emphasised that this was the only way to ‘avoid the infiltration of 
harmful elements into the people and obstruct their way in their 
subversive activities’.157
Despite Iranian efforts to counter them, the threats of inter-
nal subversion – riots, disturbances and propaganda against the 
Iranian government and the Shah – were endemic. They protested 
against government policy and were often instigated by both 
Radio Moscow and Cairo Radio. Denis J. Speares, an IRD officer, 
residing as First Secretary of the British Embassy in Tehran (1958–
60), after speaking with the Deputy Head of SAVAK, General 
Pakravan (1957–61), noted:
A particular difficulty was that the Russians did not even have to 
attract people to their own cause in order to carry out their subversive 
aims; any unstable situation in the Middle East tended to react to their 
advantage, so that all they needed to do was to stir up trouble when-
ever an opportunity occurred (he [General Pakravan] particularly 
stressed the Kurdish problem as an example of a situation which could 
easily be exploited by the Russians).158
The frustration of SAVAK officers, who saw internal sub-
version being directed by external threats such as the Soviet 
Union or Egypt, often turned against the British and Americans. 
Consequently, as noted earlier, the Iranians frequently demanded 
the Pact set up a committee of counter-intelligence experts to act 
firmly against these external threats.159
As raised in the aforementioned MI5 threat assessment, SAVAK 
had been successfully containing the domestic Communist front, 
the Tudeh Party, since its establishment in 1956/7, but domestic 
unrest and disturbances were still common in the country. These 
subversive activities were not necessarily Communist-oriented, 
but they were directed against the Shah himself and their slogan 
was the same as that of the Tudeh Party. From the Iranians’ 
The Twilight of the British Empire
142
point of view, the British-led focus on anti-Communist meas-
ures was too narrow. This concern was frequently raised by 
General Pakravan to the British.160 A senior IRD officer, Norman 
Reddaway, observed about the Iranian attitudes towards the 
counter-subversion efforts of the Pact that:
The Iranians . . . feel that the CSO, while useful as a source of train-
ing, information and useful minor operations, hardly touches on their 
major problems. The Iranians worry about the many challenges to 
the Regime. Disaffected students, non-cooperative peasants, unen-
thusiastic officials, critics of the Shah – these are the main preoccu-
pations of the Iranians. They struggle on, recognising that the CSO 
can be marginally helpful by providing information about foreign 
subverters of students, hostile radios and front organisations and by 
getting for them the odd piece of favourable publicity, but they feel 
that the CSO’s help is marginal and that the solution to their prob-
lems lies elsewhere – they have no idea where. The Iranians are sad-
dened but hardly surprised when the Americans and ourselves are coy 
about requests to analyse and do something about Nasser’s anti-Shah 
propaganda.161
The IRD had recognised issues with Iran’s anti-Communist meas-
ures by mid-1959. Peter Joy, an IRD officer in Ankara liaising 
with the regional counterparts, visited Tehran in August 1959 
and observed two main problems associated with the way in 
which SAVAK conducted anti-Communist measures.
The first was that the Iranians’ use of anti-Communist material, 
which was combined with ‘exaggerated eulogies of the Shah and 
the regime’, was causing the Iranian general public to identify 
‘anti-Communist comment solely with the regime and thus to dis-
count it in advance’.162 As a result, the value of anti-Communist 
measures, which were intended to influence and foster the antipa-
thy of the general public towards Communism, became meaning-
less. The second was the compartmentalisation of SAVAK into 
external and internal functions.163 While external liaison with 
foreign intelligence, especially with the Pact members and the 
CSO, was done by the external department, anti-Communist 
measures including information control and propaganda were 
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conducted by the internal department.164 A turf war between 
these departments made the matter even worse.165 As a result, 
counter-subversion was above all chiefly managed by the inter-
nal department, which countered subversive elements against the 
Shah, and was applied to any opposition movements against him.
Security service domination of internal affairs continued to 
raise problems for the British. Although the Iranian government 
had the Department of Publications and Radio, SAVAK had sub-
stantial practical control of the national press and broadcasting as 
anti-Communist propaganda measures were considered a matter 
of national security.166 As a result, SAVAK totally precluded any 
consultation with the Department of Publications and Radio on 
this matter.167 SAVAK was ‘a bottle-neck’ in distributing and 
using anti-Communist materials, so the IRD decided to bypass 
SAVAK and to distribute its own material to the Department 
of Publications and Radio through the IRD officer in Tehran, 
Donald J. Makinson (1960–3).168 Until August 1960, ‘two thirds’ 
of IRD materials were supplied to the Department of Publications 
and Radio without informing SAVAK.169
However, once this ‘breach’ of bypassing SAVAK was dis-
covered, it caused strains in relationships between the British 
and the Iranians and between SAVAK and the Department of 
Publications and Radio.170 After the ‘breach’, Donald J. Makinson 
had to devote most of his time in Tehran to repairing the rela-
tionship with SAVAK and to mediating with the Department of 
Publications and Radio.171 Dealing with the member states on 
domestic counter-subversion was a delicate issue as they exclu-
sively regarded it as their domain. Like other member states, while 
Iran was willing to learn methods and techniques from the British, 
it was averse to being instructed by outsiders on how it should 
approach its own problems. Peter Joy observed in 1960 that, on 
the issue of domestic anti-Communist counter-subversion, the 
regional member states saw only ‘purely local and internal prob-
lems’ that ‘they would each prefer to deal with in their own way 
with the minimum of outside “interference”’.172
Britain was also severely limited in the extent to which it could 
help the Iranians in anti-Communist measures. Although oper-
ating jamming technology as a counter-measure against similar 
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broadcasts in the colonies, Britain did not provide the Iranians 
with such technical support.173 While the topic of jamming had 
been raised in Iran, the IRD made its position clear to Donald 
J. Makinson in 1962 that he should avoid any discussion of 
jamming with the Iranians.174 Firstly, jamming could never tech-
nically be ‘100% effective’; and secondly, the costs incurred by 
jamming were ‘enormously expensive’.175 Most of all, the IRD’s 
policy held that the practice of jamming was also ‘an admission 
of weakness’ and implied that the hostile radio being jammed was 
‘successful in its subversive aims’. Above all, it recorded that ‘it 
goes against the principle of freedom of information, for which 
we stand’.176
Conclusion
The ‘conspiracy mentality’ of Middle Eastern leaders, as Daniel 
Pipes has termed it, grew out of their experiences of dealing with 
threats, and in turn fostered their views on the development of 
regional affairs. The cooperation in anti-Communist propaganda 
under the Pact was often perverse. This was mainly due to the 
Middle Eastern leaders and the British perceiving threats differ-
ently. Britain, as well as the US, sometimes had narrower targets 
than the regional members would have liked. A further difficulty 
stemmed from the way in which security services dominated 
regional members’ home countries and frequently held views on 
security and intelligence that contrasted sharply with the policing 
and information-oriented approach of the British. This rift was 
most noticeable and most destructive in the Counter-Subversion 
Committee.
All members considered Communist movements as the main 
threat and they took it very seriously. However, Britain (and the 
United States) seems to have been more cautious in propaganda 
operations than its CENTO partners, owing to the different 
national interests of the Pact members. Inter-allied tensions in the 
field of propaganda restricted cooperation, just as they restricted 
intelligence sharing. As a result, Britain’s efforts to maximise 
the effectiveness of the anti-Communist propaganda measures of 
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the Pact members suffered since ultimate control was left in the 
hands of the local governments with their own propaganda and 
security objectives. In this regard, Britain’s anti-Communist prop-
aganda must inevitably be seen as a failure. Moreover, Britain’s 
unsuccessful intervention in the Iranian case only reinforces this 
conclusion. The limitations of Britain’s  influence are discussed in 
the next chapter.
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6  The Use and Abuse of State Power and 
the Limits of British Influence
I tried to give them a rough idea of what the Security Service was 
like and what it should do. I began by telling them that it should be 
wholly non-political and merely concerned with the security of the 
State, regardless of the Government in power; otherwise it could have 
no stability and no continuity. This did not, of course, mean that it 
was not entitled to investigate the activities of political parties which 
advocated the overthrow of the State by unconstitutional means. I 
realised from the expressions on their faces how unpractical they felt 
my suggestion was!
Captain Guy Liddell1
[S]cientific interrogation in the world’s intelligence and security organ-
izations has a limit, and wherever, because of a sensitive political situ-
ation, this method becomes somewhat ineffective, torture is resorted 
to in order to get speedy results or to create terror and fear. In normal 
circumstances, the aim of the interrogation is to extract information 
and so naturally the more scientific and thorough the methods the 
better! But in sensitive political situations where security is seen to be 
threatened, the interrogators’ aim is not only at getting information, 
they also aim at breaking the suspect and creating panic in society.
General Hussein Fardust2
Introduction
Britain was heavily involved in Middle Eastern anti-Communist 
measures in various ways. It shared intelligence on Communist 
and Soviet subversive activities; provided training in preventive 
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security, counter-intelligence and propaganda; and, through 
liaison officers, exercised influence over the local legislative and 
administrative measures. As noted in the previous chapters, 
however, the measures conducted by Middle Eastern govern-
ments differed from what the British had desired. This raises sig-
nificant questions about British complicity in undemocratic and 
repressive activity including human rights abuses.
This chapter explores how far Britain was involved in anti-
Communist measures conducted by Middle Eastern governments. 
It discusses the different approaches towards the training of colo-
nial and Middle Eastern security services. It then examines the 
usefulness and limitations of intelligence liaison between British 
intelligence and its Middle Eastern counterparts in influencing 
regional policy. Finally, it examines Britain’s attitudes towards 
the security measures conducted by Middle Eastern governments, 
often in violation of human rights.
Differences between Colonial and Middle Eastern Security 
Services
Intelligence historian Calder Walton argues that Britain success-
fully shaped local authorities’ approaches to intelligence through-
out the Empire. Techniques and methods were transported with 
the movement of MI5 officers from one colony to another.3 
Particular credit has been given to the successful ‘formula’ adopted 
by MI5 for dealing with colonial problems: exporting its own 
model of separating intelligence from law enforcement work to 
local security forces.4 According to Walton, MI5 taught colonial 
security officers that there was a ‘fundamental difference between 
policing and intelligence work’, and that ‘the two required com-
pletely different outlooks for officers’. Walton asserts that this 
was a ‘central tenet’ of the training courses.5 In the words of 
Thomas Plate and Andrea Darvi, the intelligence function is ‘the 
brain’, and law enforcement is ‘the body’.6 The use and abuse 
of the police force as an instrument of political parties in power 
was also a discussion topic at a training course for senior colonial 
police officers. This was aimed at those serving in colonies where 
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the police forces would fall under the control of a new local 
(indigenous) government after independence.7
A distinct characteristic of Middle Eastern states was that they 
were politically non-democratic in the Western sense, with domes-
tic politics dominated by a strong security force, often labelled a 
secret political police.8 Separating ‘the brain’ from ‘the body’ 
was therefore difficult. Despite some specific successes, Britain’s 
track record of developing local security forces in the field of anti-
Communist measures is questionable.
In Britain, the general principles of MI5 were defined by the 
Maxwell-Fyfe Directive in 1952, which served as MI5’s charter 
until 1989 when it was superseded by the Security Service Act. 
Under the Directive, MI5 was to act in the interest of ‘the 
Defence of the Realm as a whole’.9 It was ‘essential’ that MI5 
‘should be kept absolutely free from any political bias or influ-
ence’ and ‘no enquiry is to be carried out on behalf of any 
Government Department’.10 To help achieve this, MI5 opera-
tions were entirely the responsibility of the Director-General of 
MI5, who was responsible to the Home Secretary. But MI5 was 
not part of the Home Office. In addition, the government could 
not direct whom MI5 would investigate. A former Director-
General of MI5, Eliza Manningham-Buller, notes that this was 
‘an important safeguard against the politicisation of the Service’s 
work’.11
Whether this principle was taught to, or understood by, Middle 
Eastern security officers is debatable. More importantly, while a 
new constitution could be introduced to safeguard the position of 
the police forces in the colonies before independence, this was not 
possible in foreign countries. The introduction and implementa-
tion of such a constitution instead rested entirely in the hands of 
foreign governments. When asked to organise anti-Communist 
training courses for foreign police officers at the Police College, 
Sir Frank Newsam, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Home 
Office, wrote back to Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the Chairman of the AC 
(O) Committee: ‘I cannot help doubting whether a foreign police 
officer, however well indoctrinated in British police methods he 
might become after a course at the College, will be able to apply 
them in the very different circumstances of his own country.’12 Sir 
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Frank Newsam was not a member of the AC (O) Committee, and 
his voice was ignored.
Despite being central in organising such anti-Communist train-
ing courses, MI5 was critical of providing training in anti-Com-
munist measures especially for Middle Eastern security officers. 
After a meeting at MI5 Head Office in February 1951, Guy 
Liddell wrote in his diaries about the line MI5 should take with 
the AC (O) Committee about the training of foreign police 
officers:
We wished to point out, first of all, that we were bound to look at the 
problem to some extent from the point of view of defence priorities. 
This caused us to feel that in the matter of building up foreign security 
organisations we should do more profitable work with the Western 
European countries, who thought, at least to some extent, on the same 
lines as ourselves.13
Nevertheless, amongst all foreign police forces, the AC (O) 
Committee prioritised the training of Middle Eastern security 
officers as the defence of the Middle East was given paramount 
importance by the British government in the early 1950s. MI5’s 
views were also ignored by the AC (O) Committee.
In addition to disciplinary differences, there was also the fun-
damental issue of providing training to foreign police forces at all 
and this inevitably limited what MI5 could offer. A major differ-
ence between colonial and foreign police forces was that, above 
all, colonial police forces worked towards the internal security of 
the British Empire, and later the Commonwealth. However, as far 
as the training of foreign police forces was concerned, Guy Liddell 
noted that:
in so far as attempting to teach [the Iranian officers] in London how 
to set up an efficient Security Service in their own country was con-
cerned, it was to a large extent a waste of time; in fact MI5 did not 
stand to benefit at all directly; the only percentage lay with SIS who 
might acquire a certain amount of goodwill which would enable them 
to operate from bases in [Iran] . . . The only people we could teach 
profitably here were those from Western European countries whose 
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conditions were in some measure comparable to our own; we regard 
them as a first priority.14
This indicates that to MI5, or at least Guy Liddell’s mind, the 
benefits of training foreign police forces would be virtually nil.
While the AC (O) Committee considered providing training 
to foreign police forces as one of the pillars of Britain’s anti- 
Communist policy, this was a double-edged sword in practice. 
Providing training for foreign police forces also meant that Britain 
would enhance the counter-intelligence capabilities of foreign 
countries, which could potentially act against them. Guy Liddell 
noted that:
I made it clear at the [AC (O) Committee] meeting that the training 
by MI5 in a general way could not last more than about four days, 
and in some cases not more than two days. It was necessary to take a 
realistic view of what the word ‘training’ meant. You could explain 
the general principles on which a security organisation worked, and in 
some branches you could give a certain amount of detail, but in other 
cases it was not possible to do so without running the risk of our own 
methods being used against us.15
This was indeed the deciding point on what kinds of training 
could be provided for foreign police forces – if a friendly country 
turned against Britain, the training would above all affect MI6’s 
operations on foreign soil.16 This was mainly the reason for Guy 
Liddell’s reluctance to develop the anti-Communist capabilities of 
Middle Eastern security forces.
At the order of the Shah himself, General Hussein Fardust, a 
life-long friend of his, visited Britain at least three times during 
the period between the late 1950s and early 1960s to receive 
training for establishing an intelligence organisation to coordi-
nate and supervise the activities of all intelligence and security 
services, including SAVAK.17 General Fardust oversaw the devel-
opment of the Iranian Intelligence Community from the late 
1950s until 1979.18 He was alone in the first and second visits 
and was escorted throughout his stay in Britain by MI6.19 In 
the four-month training programme of his first visit in 1959, he 
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wrote that he mainly learned the system and the functions of the 
JIC.20 In the four-month training programme of his second visit in 
1961, he received more practical training such as MI6 recruitment 
methods, counter-intelligence, and ‘psychological war’ aimed 
at ‘weakening the enemy’ and also ‘influencing public opinion’ 
through propaganda.21 General Fardust felt that he had only 
been given what he needed to know, and noted that ‘the British 
were always playing safe in their statements and did not talk in 
detail’.22 More importantly, the training provided to him was not 
only aimed at enhancing the Iranian Intelligence Community, but 
also at influencing the domestic policies of the Shah.
The Usefulness and Limits of Intelligence Liaison and 
British Influence
An intelligence liaison with local authorities was essential if 
British policymakers sought to maintain their good relationship 
with them. Intelligence liaison was also the best means of obtain-
ing invaluable information from local authorities. Sir Patrick 
Dean, then Chairman of both the AC (O) Committee and the JIC, 
once noted to the Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan, when 
explaining the functions and responsibilities of both MI6 and 
MI5 overseas, that an intelligence liaison with local authorities 
was ‘one of the functions of the Security Service to obtain secret 
intelligence by its own means’.23 This was particularly true in the 
case of the Middle East, where clandestine Communist move-
ments were exclusively dealt with by the local security services. 
Good relations were particularly important as local security force 
insiders were often the sources of these assessments.24
There was, however, a downside to the over-reliance on intel-
ligence liaisons with local authorities. As noted in Chapter 3, 
while Britain maintained good relationships, it gained no advance 
warning about the series of regional crises erupting at the time, 
such as the Egyptian coup in 1952 and the Iraqi coup in 1958.25 
Concerned that no warning was provided by MI6 about the Iraqi 
Revolution in 1958, Jonathan Bloch and Patrick Fitzgerald argue 
that:
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MI6 had committed a classic intelligence error by recruiting agents 
among its allies rather than anti-British elements. General Daghestani 
[Dashistani], for example, was arrested not because he was an MI6 
agent – which he was – but because he was a leading figure in the 
government.26
They make a fair point: there was indeed a tendency for British 
intelligence to focus on liaison with local authorities as a source 
of intelligence in the region.
This point, however, has to be taken further. More precisely, 
it is worth noting that, while MI6 was closely working with 
General Daghestani on special political action – the aforemen-
tioned Operation X, to overthrow the Syrian regime – MI5’s 
liaison with the Iraqi CID inhibited MI6’s traditional espionage 
role. This suggests that the lack of advance warning should not 
solely be blamed on British intelligence, but ultimately on the 
policy of the British government, which directed all intelligence 
activities at the time. Above all, since British foreign policy 
sought to sustain its relationships with local authorities, the intel-
ligence requirement was to maintain a liaison relationship with 
them.
Intelligence liaisons were made on the basis of mutual trust. 
Even in institutionalised forms – such as the so-called Five Eyes, 
the intelligence cooperation of the Anglosphere nations (Britain, 
the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) based on 
the UKUSA Agreement in 1946 – trust-building was crucial to 
cooperation. In order to establish such a relationship, the liaison 
had to be mutually advantageous. Britain also had to agree not to 
engage in espionage activities without the knowledge of the host 
country.27 If such activities were exposed, trust in the intelligence 
liaison would be undermined.28 According to Anthony Cavendish, 
for the purposes of maintaining a good liaison relationship, Sir 
Maurice Oldfield, as ‘C’, ‘promised the Shah of Iran that while he 
was Chief, SIS [MI6] would not conduct any  internal espionage 
against Iran’.29
This was also one of the main reasons for the closure of SIME’s 
Counter-Intelligence Branch, JID. Sir Dick White became con-
cerned about MI6’s clandestine political activities, which could 
State Power and the Limits of British Influence
153
potentially undermine the credibility of MI5 representatives in 
the host countries.30 Therefore, Britain in fact faced an inherent 
problem of maintaining good liaisons with its Middle Eastern 
counterparts: its intelligence necessarily came from the very same 
local authorities, and not from other local sources. This was the 
reason that no advance warning was provided by local authorities 
– who were also caught by surprise.
Intelligence services have activities that constitute two different 
but interwoven roles. The first is to collect intelligence from their 
agents, and the second is to exercise influence through their offic-
ers and agents, some of whom had a higher level of access than a 
British Ambassador.31 In the context of the Middle East, Anthony 
Cavendish also claims that MI6 officers had more influence on the 
Shah of Iran than anyone else, including British Ambassadors and 
the Americans:
The Shah asked that [Edward] de Haan [of MI6 (1954–7)] and sub-
sequent Station Chiefs, such as Alexis Forter [of MI6 (1958–61)], 
report to him regularly, and the more competent of the MI6 repre-
sentatives in Tehran soon had more influence with the Shah than the 
British Ambassadors, which proved an irritant to most Ambassadors 
[who lost their direct contact with the Shah] . . . The Shah was sur-
rounded by sycophants and there were really only two people who 
could speak freely to him. One was the longstanding British SIS [MI6] 
officer in Tehran and the other was Assadollah Alam, a former Prime 
Minister.32
Other sources support the claim that the Shah had a good per-
sonal relationship with MI6 officers.33 Richard Deacon claims 
that after the coup in 1953 Britain still had closer relations 
with the Shah ‘on an intelligence level’ than did the Americans, 
and that Maurice Oldfield, then Head of Station in Washington 
(1960–4), even ‘helped’ the Shah to ‘accept American aid’ when 
the Shah visited the United States to discuss military  assistance in 
March 1962.34
This indicates in theory that a highly placed asset in a foreign 
government is able to exercise influence on the policymaking of 
that government on behalf of Britain. MI6 also had its own agent 
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right next to the Shah himself, Sir Shapoor Reporter, a personal 
friend of the Shah, who was recruited by Monty Woodhouse 
when he was the MI6 Head of Station in Tehran in the early 
1950s, before the 1953 coup.35 According to General Fardust, 
Reporter was ‘Britain’s top spy’, who was ‘clearly superior to the 
Chief of the MI6 station in Iran’ in being able to exercise British 
influence in the decision-making process of the Shah and other 
high-ranking Iranian officials.36 Archival evidence also confirms 
the scope of his influence on behalf of Britain as an MI6 agent: the 
Ministry of Defence rated him as a ‘close and trusted confidant of 
the Shah’.37 Reporter’s role seems to have been confined to sealing 
arms deals between Britain and Iran, rather than counter-subver-
sive matters, and that, rather than being interested in preserving 
British interests in Iran, his motivation was mercenary. In the end, 
the Shah lost confidence in Reporter in the late 1970s after he 
found out that Reporter merely acted on a profit basis rather than 
as his close friend.38
Britain had far more influential figures in the Iraqi govern-
ment throughout the period until 1958. Above all, the head 
of state, King Faisal II of Iraq, and the Crown Prince, King 
Faisal’s uncle, Abd al-Ilah, who exercised substantial control 
over the administration of the Hashemite Kingdom of Iran, 
were pro-British.39 In addition, the post-war Iraqi government 
was dominated by Nuri al-Said, who also appointed close col-
leagues to his Cabinet, such as Said Qazzaz, the Minister of 
the Interior. British intelligence also maintained close connec-
tions with its Iraqi counterparts, such as Bahjat Attiyah, the 
Director of the CID, later the Director-General of Security, 
and the aforementioned Deputy Chief of Staff, General Ghazi 
Daghistani.40 After the 1958 Revolution, a total of 108 
senior civilian and military officers, including Qazzaz, Attiyah, 
Daghistani, Fadhel Jamali, a former Prime Minister, and Yunis 
Bakri, the Iraqi broadcaster, were interned at Abu Ghraib and 
tried by Military Tribunal.41
These pro-British Iraqis were charged with corruption and ‘con-
spiracy against the state’, meaning that they were acting on behalf 
of the interests of foreign powers, namely Britain, and also con-
spiring in a plot to overthrow the Syrian government.42 Amongst 
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them, Said Qazzaz and Bahjat Attiyah were the first civilians to 
be hanged.43 The death sentence of General Daghistani, who 
admitted Iraq’s Operation X plot and its connection with MI6, 
was later commuted.44 A retired member of the British intelli-
gence community recalls that ‘we had agents hanged in the main 
square in the late fifties’.45 It is arguable whether these pro-British 
figures were actually British agents as they were mostly serving 
the Hashemite dynasty of Iraq under their own government. 
From Britain’s point of view, however, they were invaluable 
assets through whom British interests could be preserved as they 
pursued their own domestic policies.
Yet evidence suggests that the value of liaison as a means of 
influence was questionable. British policy sought to maintain 
friendly governments in a region which was becoming increas-
ingly anti-British. As Andrew Rathmell notes in his study of 
post-war Syria, because the Middle East had experienced a long 
colonial history for centuries, there was a tendency for ‘political 
opponents commonly [to] accuse each other of being agents of a 
foreign power’.46 This was apparent even before the Suez Crisis. 
While King Hussein of Jordan had a long-established relation-
ship with Britain, he also often had to dissociate himself from 
the British, whose role in Jordan was ‘the object of deep popular 
suspicion’ in the eyes of the Jordanians.47 Subsequently, King 
Hussein of Jordan dismissed Glubb Pasha from the command 
of the Arab Legion in March 1956, until which point Britain 
had enjoyed considerable influence over the defence and security 
 policies of Jordan.48
Existence of the intelligence liaison between Britain and Middle 
Eastern governments was kept absolutely secret. From Britain’s 
point of view, this was mostly for security reasons. As Ernest 
Bevin insisted several times, such liaisons would be vulnerable to 
penetration or might become the subject of a propaganda attack 
by the Soviet Union.49 For the Middle Eastern governments, it 
was for exclusively political reasons. Middle Eastern policymak-
ers with links to the West were vulnerable to being attacked 
by political opponents and risked forfeiting their careers, or 
even their lives, as in Iraq. As a result of anti-British senti-
ment throughout the region in the post-war period, intelligence 
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liaisons had to be built on the basis of absolute secrecy, or some-
times at personal discretion, in non-institutionalised forms. They 
remained on unstable foundations until the formation of the 
Baghdad Pact.
Although local authorities constantly asked Britain for advice 
on anti-Communist measures, Britain’s image was far from posi-
tive, even amongst Middle Eastern policymakers. This was espe-
cially the case in Iran. As a result of Britain’s collusion with the 
Americans to overthrow Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953, Britain 
was often seen as a conspiratorial force in international affairs. 
During the Suez Crisis, the Shah became ‘deeply suspicious’ of the 
British collusion with Israel against Nasser’s Egypt, but Sir Roger 
Stevens, the British Ambassador in Tehran, who had no advance 
knowledge, repeatedly assured the Shah that ‘there had been no 
prior collusion with the Israelis’.50 In addition, when the Iraqi 
Revolution occurred, General Teymour Bakhtiar, the Head of 
SAVAK, publicly announced that ‘the British had engineered the 
Iraqi coup d’état’ and the new Iraqi government was ‘the newly 
chosen instrument of the British’.51
Britain itself also seriously undermined its relationship with its 
allies. The Suez Crisis, in which Britain colluded with France, and 
above all, Israel, the enemy of the Arabs, to attack Egypt was a 
case in point. Although Middle Eastern governments maintained 
their existing intelligence liaisons with the British, the political 
costs were much greater in the long term – pro-British Middle 
Eastern governments found it more difficult to handle their 
domestic politics in the face of anti-British sentiment throughout 
the region. During and after the Suez Crisis, anti-British riots 
and demonstrations were forcefully put down by the police in 
Iraq, and, according to the official figure, at least twenty-five 
people were killed.52 Iraq, Britain’s closest ally, became particu-
larly vulnerable to a barrage of hostile propaganda attacks both 
by Nasser and International (Soviet-sponsored) Communists. 
The US Ambassador in Baghdad, Waldemar Gallman, observed 
that, despite all the efforts which Nuri al-Said had put into 
enhancing the reputation of the Baghdad Pact against Nasser’s 
Arab Nationalism, the Suez debacle ‘came close to being Nuri’s 
undoing’. Nuri ‘felt that the British had let the Arab world down 
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badly’, and that ‘Iraq was being forced into a position of opposi-
tion to the British’.53 Not only was Iraqi policy towards Britain 
under attack, but so too was the credibility of the Baghdad Pact, 
questioned by the Iraqi opposition and attacked by Cairo Radio. 
Fadhel Jamali, a former Iraqi Prime Minister, recollected that Iraq 
‘was being undermined from within’, contributing to the Iraqi 
Revolution.54
When subversive activities, riots and student demonstrations 
were commonplace in Iran during the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
Britain’s plan was seemingly to influence local policy through 
General Fardust, one of the Shah’s closest confidants. Britain 
designed specific training courses for him during his four-month 
stay in 1959. They consisted of three sessions, two of which 
mostly involved political education and were taught in Persian. 
The first, led by a ‘Communist professional teacher’, was all 
about Communism, including its social and economic system, 
whilst the second covered Iran’s economy and was led by a 
‘British Iranologist’ who was ‘very critical of Iran’s economic 
conditions’ and believed that the Shah ‘had to make some fun-
damental reforms otherwise his government could not remain in 
power for long’. The third session was concerned with intelligence 
matters and was taught in English through a translator.55
Once General Fardust returned home, he suggested some eco-
nomic reforms to the Shah as instructed by the British Iranologist. 
However, the Shah rejected these outright and replied that the 
British Iranologist had ‘nothing to do with our policies’, and it 
was ‘none of his business’.56 According to General Fardust, the 
instruction given by the British expert on Iran’s economic affairs 
‘ran exactly against’ the Shah’s ‘White Revolution’, a series of 
measures for reshaping the political, social and economic life of 
Iran, which was implemented in 1963, a few years later.57 The 
initiation of the White Revolution was acutely opposed by some 
of Iran’s clergy, including Ayatollah Khomeini, and has been said 
to be the beginning of the fall of the Shah in the course of his long 
battle with Khomeini.58
Iran was not the only ally to act against British wishes. Iraq 
did too. Despite receiving no advance warning, Britain was alert 
to the danger of a coup by the Iraqi Army prior to the 1958 
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Revolution. William Magan writes that, even during his tenure as 
Head of SIME, he had been acutely aware of the disaffection in 
the Army, and he duly passed his concerns on to Bahjat Attiyah, 
then Director of the Iraqi CID.59 A JIC assessment made after 
the coup attests to Magan’s recollection that his concerns had 
been already reported to London, presumably either by Duncan 
MacIntosh or the representative of MI5 in Baghdad.60 But British 
intelligence was hindered by two things. The first was departmen-
tal infighting between the police and the army. The second was 
that, despite repeated warnings by their own chief of the secret 
police, Bahjat Attiyah, Iraqi ministers were completely blinkered 
by their anti-Communist concerns.61
In his memoirs, Sir Sam Falle, the Oriental Counsellor at the 
British Embassy in Baghdad (1957–61), dismisses the idea of Iraq 
as a ‘British lackey’ and states that:
Nuri was very much his own man and nobody’s stooge. The British 
Ambassador, Sir Michael Wright, was in Nuri’s pocket, not the other 
way round. Wright had an immense and quite understandable respect 
for Nuri . . . When I used to give Wright my political observations, 
he would counter with: ‘But Nuri says . . .’ Occasionally and most 
reluctantly, at my most urgent prompting, Wright used to mention 
mildly to Nuri that there was a need for social and economic reforms 
and that it was important to curb the power of the tribal shaikhs. 
Unfortunately, Nuri took absolutely no notice; it might have been 
better if we had been able to exercise some influence.62
All of these limitations raise the question of whether Britain 
enjoyed any influence at all over the policy of Middle Eastern gov-
ernments. Influence is intangible and incredibly difficult to assess 
at the best of times, and this is accentuated by the secret nature 
of the issues discussed here. Moreover, the degree of British influ-
ence depended on the sensitivity of the issue and the convergence 
of the mutual interests of both parties, which was constantly 
shifting with domestic and overseas events. However, the Shah’s 
attitudes towards Britain’s suggestion of Iran’s domestic reforms, 
and Sir Sam Falle’s point about Nuri’s determination to pursue 
his own policies, demonstrate the limitations faced by British 
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intelligence when attempting to exercise influence over the policy 
of the Middle Eastern governments. Middle Eastern governments 
were above all foreign governments – all decisions were in their 
hands and they acted at their own discretion.
Adherence to the Rules of Law: Use and Abuse of Secret 
Police
The practices associated with the secret police were not all illegal. 
Rather, most Middle Eastern states had passed laws defining 
Communist and subversive activities as illegal and authorising 
such practices to counter them. Security service activity was there-
fore mostly lawful under domestic penal codes or defence regula-
tions. These often allowed suspects to be interned without trial 
and, in some cases, executed. However, the rule of law differed in 
each country, with some adopting more extreme measures than 
others. In the case of Iraq, under the Nuri al-Said Government 
from 1954, for instance, the Iraqi penal code covered subver-
sive activities, including Peace Partisan and Democratic Youth 
activities, which were categorised in the same way as Communist 
activities. In addition, the introduction of the ‘Association Law’ in 
1955 gave the Minister of the Interior extensive power over politi-
cal groups and their gatherings. Waldemar Gallman, a former US 
Ambassador to Iraq, observed that under the Iraqi Association 
Law, ‘any party would be completely dependent on the Minister’s 
benevolence for its existence’.63
In addition to such differences in political systems, cultural 
underpinnings made the practices of Middle Eastern security ser-
vices more akin to those of a secret police. For instance, Bahjat 
Attiyah, the long-standing head of the Iraqi CID, once explained 
to Guy Liddell about the adverse conditions for recruiting local 
agents in Iraq, on which Liddell noted that they were ‘very dif-
ferent’ from Britain. In Iraq, Attiyah said, ‘the Police get no vol-
untary assistance whatever from the population’, for whom ‘the 
idea of doing something because it is in the national interest never 
enters their heads’. According to the Liddell Diaries:
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[Attiyah] gave me an example of a murder committed in a café, when 
he and some friends were sitting in an adjoining house. He went round 
himself immediately and interrogated the proprietor, who pleaded 
that he had seen nothing. Even two men who had been sitting on 
the same bench as the murdered man pleaded the one that he was 
reading a newspaper at the time, and the other that he was thinking 
of something else and had only heard the report of the revolver! The 
only method of coping with a situation of this kind, Colonel Bahjat 
said, was to take some fifty people who were present in the café and 
put them all in jail. After some hours of confinement, people began to 
admit that they had seen something and eventually fifteen witnesses, 
corroborating each other’s stories, were procured. This story, he said, 
would indicate how difficult it was to get informants; the only method 
is by using a personal or family connection and exploiting some situ-
ation where money is the primary factor. The average citizen in Iraq 
does not see any reason why he should court trouble by becoming an 
agent, and he further takes the view that it is contrary to the tenets of 
the Koran to act as a spy on his fellow men.64
Whether religion was another factor in preventing Muslims from 
becoming spies or informants for their own country is beyond 
the scope of this research,65 but Iraq was not unique in this case. 
Jordan faced similar difficulties whereby the police did ‘not get 
the co-operation of the public’.66 Attiyah’s story, and similar 
issues in Jordan, demonstrates the different conditions in which 
Middle Eastern security services had to operate, and why some 
secret police behaviour was seen as a necessary instrument for 
maintaining precarious internal security.
No comparable principles to the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive 
existed in the Middle East. Here intelligence and security services 
often served the interests of particular political groups or elites, 
who, in turn, used and abused their power. As a result, secu-
rity services sometimes arrested political opponents simply on 
account of their being threats against the regime. When a group of 
Turkish military officers (both serving and retired) were arrested 
by the Turkish authorities in January 1958 on the grounds of 
a ‘serious plot’ against the government, Sir James Bowker, the 
British Ambassador in Ankara (1954–8), believed the affair to be 
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‘simply another by-product of the general bitterness engendered 
by the elections’. He commented that the Turkish Prime Minister, 
Adnan Menderes, was ‘determined to teach the army a sharp 
lesson about the desirability of keeping out of politics, or at least 
out of opposition politics’.67 The Menderes Government was 
overthrown in 1960 and Adnan Menderes himself was hanged by 
the military government.
Abuse of the security services extended to Iran. It appears that 
Princess Ashraf, the Shah’s sister, ordered SAVAK to ‘eavesdrop’ 
on her boyfriend’s ‘telephone conversations and closely watch 
his activities’ for her own personal reasons.68 The security ser-
vices were also bedevilled by corruption. According to General 
Fardust, during his reign at SAVAK, General Bakhtiar accu-
mulated ‘a fortune’ by confiscating properties from ‘wealthy’ 
bazaar tradesmen with fabricated files accusing them of ‘being a 
Communist’ and throwing them into jail.69 Meanwhile in Jordan, 
corruption was not limited to the security services themselves, but 
also engulfed the ministers who directed them.70
In some monarchical states, the head of state controlled the 
security services, creating further problems from a Western per-
spective. Jack O’Connell, the CIA station chief in Jordan (1963–
71), recalls that when he asked King Hussein of Jordan if he could 
see the head of the Jordanian Intelligence Service, King Hussein 
replied: ‘I’m the head of the Intelligence Service.’71 Similarly, 
Richard Helms, Director of the CIA (1966–73), recollected that 
the Shah of Iran himself was de facto ‘the chief Iranian intelli-
gence officer’.72 As a result, the power of these security forces did 
not reside in the organisation itself but ultimately in the hands of 
the head of state and was therefore more likely to be politicised to 
support the policies of the monarch’s own government.73 In addi-
tion, the head of state often fired members of the security services 
who became too powerful. A notable case is General Bakhtiar, the 
first Head of SAVAK (1957–61), who was dismissed by the Shah 
in 1961 on the grounds of backing a plot against him and was 
exiled to Europe the following year.74
The unregulated extraordinary state power displayed in these 
cases often promoted the misconduct of counter-subversive meas-
ures and violations of fundamental human rights. After the fall of 
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Mohammad Moseddeq in 1953, the Iranian government became 
ever more unsympathetic to the Tudeh Party and conducted a 
security purge of Tudeh sympathisers within the administration 
and security apparatus, mainly among the army and police.75 
The purge was not well conducted: suspects were often treated 
inappropriately and even executed without firm incriminating 
evidence. Observing the situation, David Stewart of MI5, former 
Deputy Head of SIME specialising in Middle Eastern affairs, 
 identified long-term underlying problems. He reported that:
All the officers were young and a high proportion drawn from the 
technical, i.e. better educated, branches of the Armed Forces. The 
Persian Foreign Minister has admitted privately that many were 
honest and efficient and that most were probably idealists driven into 
communism by the rottenness of Persia. This is the general impression 
both inside and outside Persia, and the executions have consequently 
aroused strong feelings, particularly since they have been conducted 
inefficiently. In short the incident has been a particularly successful 
exercise in repression, but emphasises once again the vital importance 
of constructive action by the Persian regime to remedy a situation in 
which so many honest, efficient and idealistic young men can find no 
alternative to communism.76
This statement indicates that these actions were taken as ‘anti-
Communist measures’, which were originally designed to 
prevent, or suppress, subversive activities. However, the Shah 
conducted them too brutally and they served only to cultivate 
anti- governmental sentiment amongst the population.
The eruption of deep discontent amongst the people against 
their own government can also be seen in the context of the Iraqi 
Revolution. As noted earlier, Iraq – Britain’s most reliable ally 
in the region, especially under the premiership of Nuri al-Said 
– was considered to have the strongest anti-Communist govern-
ment in the region, introducing repressive security regulations 
such as the Association Law. Under the law, Said Qazzaz – the 
Iraqi Minister of the Interior and Nuri al-Said’s right-hand man 
for internal security – was exclusively empowered to conduct 
robust anti-Communist measures. It is perhaps unsurprising that 
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after the Iraqi Revolution, Qazzaz and Bahjat Attiyah were the 
first civilians to be executed by the new revolutionary govern-
ment on the grounds of ‘multiple murders and physical torture 
of anti-government demonstrators and political detainees’.77 Sir 
Sam Falle, Oriental Counsellor at the British Embassy in Baghdad 
(1957–61), who observed the developments in Iraq before and 
after the Revolution, recalls that Said Qazzaz’s ‘crime was that 
he was an effective anti-communist’.78 Nuri al-Said, who escaped 
from his house on the morning of the Revolution, was discovered 
the next day disguised as an Arab woman. He was killed and his 
body was dragged through the streets by a mob.79
This raises the important question about whether Britain con-
tributed to the excessive use and abuse of interrogation tech-
niques, such as torture. As torture was illegal in British national 
law, the British Security Service abstained from its use. Eliza 
Manningham-Buller, former Director-General of MI5 (2002–7), 
proudly notes MI5’s strict adherence to the rule of law during 
the Second World War.80 Cases of abuse of power, such as 
the ill-treatment of prisoners, were indeed brought to a court 
martial, as can be seen from the case of Bad Nenndorf, a post-
war interrogation centre in Germany. The Commandant, Colonel 
Robin ‘Tin Eye’ Stephens, faced a court martial for claims of 
ill-treatment and brutality by his subordinates, but was later 
acquitted and employed by MI5.81 It is highly unlikely that 
Scotland Yard’s training course on interrogation techniques given 
to Middle Eastern security services would have suggested torture 
or ill-treatment.82
This assumption is supported from the other side of the Atlantic. 
The CIA was also deeply involved in training SAVAK officers 
and even in interfering in their operational matters. However, 
Earnest Oney – a former CIA officer, whose mission was to train 
SAVAK officers in Iran in the late 1950s (1957–9) and early 1960s 
(1962 and 1964) – has refuted any allegation that the Americans 
were involved in training the officers in the Third Department of 
SAVAK, responsible for the internal security of Iran, and particu-
larly denied training in the use of torture.83 Documentary evidence 
now seems to support his claim. The declassified CIA interroga-
tion manual, codenamed KUBARK – CIA’s Counter-Intelligence 
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Interrogation Manual – drafted in July 1963, states that ‘intense 
pain is quite likely to produce false confessions, concocted as a 
means of escaping from distress’, and that interrogation must be 
‘conducted for the sake of information and not for police pur-
poses’.84 Moreover, according to a former SAVAK officer, who 
noted that the organisation was largely trained by the Americans, 
British and Israelis, SAVAK was ‘trained by those countries not 
for torture’, ‘but to learn how to spy, to do research – that sort 
of thing’.85
As part of his training, the British had also told General Fardust 
that physical torture should not be employed as a technique of 
interrogation. Yet Fardust admitted that ‘the brutal method of 
torture’ was commonplace in SAVAK. According to him, SAVAK 
resorted to such interrogation techniques in sensitive political 
situations, when national security appeared threatened. Torture 
was necessary ‘in order to get speedy results or to create terror 
and fear’. The aim therefore extended beyond acquiring infor-
mation, to ‘breaking the suspect and creating panic in society’.86 
Conditions in the Middle East, with constant rumours of plots 
and coups, helped facilitate excessive security measures. Earnest 
Oney also recalled that SAVAK received ‘dozens of reports of 
plotting against the Shah’ over the years, which was an ‘endemic’ 
condition in Iran.87 Additionally, Sir Sam Falle notes that ‘the 
Shah’s tyranny came from fear’.88 A similar case can be found in 
Iraq, where anti-governmental sentiments were commonplace. 
MI5 itself was also concerned that Nuri al-Said ‘might at any 
moment be assassinated’.89
Britain’s Reaction to the Abuse of Human Rights
Britain did not endorse human rights abuses during various train-
ing courses. Yet this raises a further question of whether British 
personnel became aware of such activity and, if so, whether they 
criticised it. Iraq forms an early example of this issue. In late 1948 
and early 1949, the Iraqi CID raided houses of Iraqi Communists 
and arrested hundreds of revolutionaries, which also led to a 
retrial of the three foremost leaders of the ICP, who were later 
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convicted of ‘having led the party from the prison’.90 In February 
1949, the three leaders, plus another individual, were hanged in 
different squares in Baghdad, and their bodies were ‘left hanging 
for several hours so that the common people going to their work 
would receive the warning’.91 Sir Henry Mack, who had not 
been informed by the Iraqi government about these executions, 
reported to the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, that:
Information received from secret sources indicates that the trial was 
not conducted in accordance with British ideas of judicial impartiality, 
but it must be admitted that the Iraqi Government needed to make an 
example and there is no doubt that these men were intent on under-
mining the Iraqi States. All of them had long records of subversive 
activity . . . [and evidence for their connection with the Soviet Union] 
shows that their aims were revolutionary and Government in Iraq is 
not so firmly established that it can afford to be lenient when such 
men fall into their hands.92
Once the news reached Britain that 160 other alleged Communists 
were still being held in custody and more executions were likely 
to be carried out, Bevin found himself under pressure to inter-
vene. The Foreign Office then tried to stop further executions by 
the Iraqis on the grounds that they were ‘violating fundamental 
human rights’.93 British diplomats also feared that acting too ruth-
lessly against the Communists would only intensify Communist 
activities and would be exploited by propaganda accusing the 
Iraqi government of human rights abuses.94
Observing the executions of the Iraqi Communist leaders, 
Arkady Suvorov, the secretary of the Soviet Legation, queried:
Does Nuri as-Said [al-Said] or the ruling class . . . think that the 
hanging of these men or of others will put an end to the Communist 
movement in Iraq? They are only being foolish . . . They may now 
shatter the party and incarcerate thousands of its members . . . but this 
will not avail them for long. The rotten state of things will of neces-
sity rouse the people and not only the Communists to protests and 
 eventually to revolution.95
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Despite a strong anti-Communist stance by the authorities, 
Communist activities in Iraq actually intensified throughout the 
1950s. The public executions in 1949 marked a turning point for 
the Communist struggle against the Iraqi government. Fahd, one 
of those killed, ‘dead proved more potent than Fahd living’, as 
‘Communism became now surrounded with the halo of martyr-
dom’.96 Sir Henry Mack duly but gently reproved the Iraqi Prime 
Minister, Nuri al-Said, for the deaths, which had ‘gone quite far 
enough’. Nuri al-Said, however, responded that this practice had 
been adopted since 1921 in accordance with the law, and told 
Mack that ‘with a third world war possible it was essential to 
ensure that these anarchists would not be able to repeat what 
they had done in the past’.97 Despite the British intervention, the 
Iraqi government carried out further executions, and another ICP 
leader was hanged in May 1949, though the dead body was not 
exposed in public this time.98
Another case occurred in Iran in the second half of the 1950s. 
British officials became aware of excessive anti-Communist meas-
ures, involving the torture of political prisoners. Britain contem-
plated an intervention, but in the end simply looked on at the 
unwelcome developments. As we have seen, Iranian authorities 
intensified measures against the Tudeh Party after the 1953 coup, 
including purging their members and sympathisers from the army 
and police. The person in charge of this operation was General 
Bakhtiar, then Military Governor of Tehran. Those interned 
have since accused Bakhtiar of flogging political prisoners with 
a whip at ‘the renowned “bath-house” (hammam)’, and being 
personally involved in the torture of prisoners.99 The Iranian 
government kept the British Embassy in Tehran in ignorance of 
developments and the only explanation given by General Bakhtiar 
himself was that he had received an order from the Shah that he 
‘should use whatever methods he considered necessary to gain 
information’.100
As the Tudeh elements and International Communists gained 
ground by exploiting the situation with subversive propaganda, 
diplomats at the British Embassy in Tehran judged that the allega-
tion of torture was accurate. They discussed whether they should 
intervene by suggesting the Shah dismiss General Bakhtiar from 
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his post. The argument for intervention was that ‘our reputation 
will suffer unless we do something about it’.101 However, an MI6 
officer, Edward de Haan, who headed the Tehran Station (1954–
7), intervened and noted that:
Whatever one may say against General Bakhtiar’s methods, he is an 
extremely able individual who is likely to have many years of service 
under the Shah. He is, as you know, highly regarded by the Shah 
. . . [who] has no intention of keeping him in the post of Military 
Governor for very much longer . . . If General Bakhtiar believed that 
he had been dismissed from his post because of British objections to 
his methods of treatment of prisoners, we might alienate him forever. 
This would be a serious blow when he reaches higher posts, as he 
almost certainly will. The price would not be worth improving our 
stock in other quarters of Tehran.102
Indeed, General Bakhtiar relinquished his post as Military 
Governor of Tehran and assumed a new post, the first Head of 
SAVAK. Given his subsequent career as the Head of SAVAK 
(1957–61), which also entitled him to assume the post of Deputy 
Prime Minister, it was most likely that no intervention was made 
regarding his treatment of prisoners. Even if the intervention was 
made, there was no visible consequence.103
Britain’s non-interventionist attitude was more apparent 
towards the treatment of the Kurds by Iran, Turkey and to a lesser 
extent Iraq, throughout the period between 1949 and 1963. As 
we have seen, British policy was to maintain good relationships 
with these governments and, as the regional governments were 
‘sensitive’ to the Kurdish question, the Foreign Office refused 
to raise concerns about their treatment of the Kurds.104 Despite 
British awareness of this politically sensitive issue since the end 
of the First World War, the treatment of the Kurds by the local 
governments had never caught much attention outside the region 
until the heroic return of Mulla Mustafa Barzani from his exile in 
the Soviet Union to Iraq in October 1958. As noted in Chapter 5, 
the Iranian and Turkish governments shared intelligence in order 
to keep a close eye on him and his activities in Iraq. Once Barzani 
announced his proposal for the unification of his Kurdistan 
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Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq and the Kurdistan Democratic 
Party of Iran (KDPI) under a single secretary-general, SAVAK 
readily rounded up ‘250 suspected KDPI activists’ without trial, 
and the KDPI ‘almost ceased to exist’.105
The Turkish government also conducted precautionary security 
measures against the Kurds. Shortly after the civilian Menderes 
Government was overthrown by Turkish Army officers in May 
1960, a group of Kurds began demanding Kurdish autonomy. 
The new military government moved fast and arrested 248 Kurds 
who were ‘believed to have supported agitation for a free Kurdish 
State’.106 Once news about the treatment of the Kurds by the 
Iranian and Turkish governments reached Britain, John Profumo, 
then Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, was asked by William 
Owen, a Labour MP, at the House of Commons in May 1960 
about Britain’s view on ‘the recent disturbances in Turkey and 
Iran’ and if these authorities consulted Britain as a CENTO 
member.107 Profumo replied that Britain was not consulted by 
them and restated Britain’s non-intervention policy towards the 
minority movements that ‘the internal affairs of each country are 
a matter for that country alone’.108
Conclusion
The training of Middle Eastern security services in anti- Communist 
measures was a recurrent theme of Britain’s policy in the region. 
Akin to the security training implemented throughout the colo-
nies, policymakers in London – such as those of the AC (O) 
Committee – also hoped that, through British training, strong 
Middle Eastern security services would safeguard British interests 
in the region. Strengthening the political police certainly fore-
stalled the Communist advance in these countries and sustained 
the existence of local governments, but once internal subversion 
by the Communists, the Soviet Union or Egypt intensified, the 
local authorities felt increasingly threatened. As their security 
services were the only means to keep these governments in power, 
Middle Eastern leaders often adopted more vigorous and ruthless 
counter-measures, including torture of prisoners.
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Despite these efforts, internal subversion persisted, and the 
repression fostered anti-governmental feelings amongst the popu-
lation. As a result, Middle Eastern governments faced internal 
subversion, not by the Communists, but by their own people. The 
inevitable consequence was that local security services became 
part of the problem rather than the solution. To maintain good 
relations with the local authorities, Britain looked the other way 
as the local authorities conducted excessive counter-subversion, 
and ultimately kept intervention at a minimum. Consequently, 
British influence over the policy of Middle Eastern governments 
was also limited.
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Conclusion:  The Twilight of the British 
Empire in the Middle East
Those who consider it [Britain’s engagement in the post-war Middle 
East] to have been a period of failure are the sentimentalists who do 
not understand why things should not have gone on as they were 
before. A more correct judgement is that though we made mistakes 
like everyone else involved, we have so far come through an unusu-
ally difficult and complex period without more damage to our real 
 interests in the Middle East.
Lord Trevelyan1
It is just possible, I suppose, that the West knows how a country like 
Persia ought to be governed in the best interests of the people, but that 
it knows how it could be so governed has always seemed to me very 
unlikely.
Lt.-Col. Geoffrey Wheeler2
The retention of the British Empire was, in the words of esteemed 
diplomat, Lord Franks, ‘part of the habit and furniture of the 
minds’.3 When it looked to be under threat, policymakers expected 
the intelligence services to intervene and protect Britain’s inter-
ests. This worked effectively in many colonies where decolo-
nisation involved a relatively smooth and successful transition 
to Commonwealth, thereby allowing law enforcement bodies 
to play an important role in safeguarding British influence. It 
was more difficult in the Middle East where policymakers also 
expected intelligence to maintain British interests in an altogether 
difference context, this time by working with local authorities 
to promote anti-Communist measures. MI5 and colonial police 
officers were deployed in the region and expected to perform the 
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same tasks as they had in the colonies. Similarly, policymakers 
hoped that British training, again transposed from the imperial 
context, of strong Middle Eastern security services would also 
safeguard their regional interests.
It was often Middle Eastern governments that took the ini-
tiative in requesting British advice on anti-Communist measures, 
but Britain gladly agreed and provided assistance as a means of 
influencing policy. At the time, Middle Eastern governments saw 
Britain as their most reliable ally in fighting subversive elements 
at home. This was mostly due to its reputation for organisational 
reliability, as well as personal relationships developed through 
Britain’s involvement in the region over many years.
Despite Britain’s dominant influence in the region in the early 
post-war period, several crises in the 1950s meant that British 
influence gradually faded away. The year 1958, in which the 
Iraqi Revolution occurred, has received particular scholarly atten-
tion as a turning point for British Middle Eastern policy.4 It was 
certainly a setback for British intelligence and security liaison. 
Duncan MacIntosh’s career as Security/Police Adviser in Baghdad 
came to an abrupt end. A total of 108 pro-British influential 
Iraqis – including key liaison contacts, such as Said Qazzaz, 
Bahjat Attiyah and General Ghazi Dashistani – were arrested and 
accused of being ‘criminal traitors’ by the revolutionary govern-
ment.5 In addition, the Lebanese Crisis in the same year led to 
the resignation of Emir Farid Chehab from his post as the Head 
of the Sûreté Générale.6 Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, meanwhile, 
noted in his diaries that 1958 marked the end of informal regional 
 intelligence/security cooperation between Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, 
Iran and Turkey on subversive activities in the region.7
Yet, a degree of continuity in intelligence liaison remained 
after 1958 and was even sustained beyond the period of this 
study. A notable example is the Liaison and Counter-Subversion 
Committees under CENTO, which continued until the dissolu-
tion of CENTO in 1979.8 Duncan MacIntosh moved to Jordan as 
Police Adviser in 1958, and served there until 1962. Until 1979, 
the Shah of Iran maintained a close connection with MI6 officers, 
including Sir Maurice Oldfield, as well as MI6 agents, Sir Shapoor 
Reporter and General Hussein Fardust. There is also evidence to 
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suggest that MI6 benefited from ongoing relationships with con-
tacts in the Iraqi Police and armed forces and among businessmen 
after the 1958 Revolution. A retired member of the British intelli-
gence community recalls that even the Egyptians in the 1970s and 
1980s, who had been uncooperative during the period of Nasser’s 
rule from 1952 to 1970, were ‘good allies’ with British intel-
ligence, especially against Libya.9 Such continuation of British 
intelligence liaison with its Middle Eastern counterparts could 
not, however, match the relationships of the ‘informal’ Empire of 
the 1950s. British influence in the region declined once it lost its 
strategic allies.
The role of intelligence is to guide the policymaking process. It 
should therefore be asked whether intelligence and security offic-
ers were able to discern the socio-political challenges correctly at 
the time, which, in turn, would then have informed policy. An 
enquiry into state secrets inevitably faces methodological hurdles, 
yet there is no evidence to suggest that intelligence forewarned 
about the loss of British influence. There was no advance warning 
provided of either the Egyptian Revolution in 1952 or the Iraqi 
Revolution in 1958. This was largely because British intelligence 
depended on local authorities in every respect. They relied on these 
local authorities staying in power and relied on their sources for 
information. But whilst these partners proved useful in providing 
anti-Communist intelligence, they were less successful at heading 
off other threats. Intelligence provided to the British invariably 
came from a narrow anti-Communist perspective. In addition, 
liaison made it more difficult for Britain to conduct espionage 
operations on its friends even though this would have provided 
a more accurate picture. Whitehall’s anti-Communist approach 
therefore had an unintended consequence: it hampered Britain’s 
own independent espionage operations through fear of eroding 
goodwill. To make matters worse, MI6 officers also conducted 
their own covert anti-Communist actions, which threatened, if 
uncovered, to erode trust. These were not intelligence failures, 
rather inevitable consequences of an initial policy failure.
There is also no evidence to suggest that MI6 or MI5 officers in 
the region warned policymakers in London that the Communist 
threat was not prominent. There were certainly some sceptics, 
Conclusion
173
such as Guy Liddell and David Stewart, who saw training of local 
services in anti-Communist measures as failing to serve British 
interests. However, their views formed a minority and were over-
ridden by Britain’s strategic, anti-Communist and oil interests in 
supporting the friendly foreign regimes. As a result, instead of 
preventing army disaffection, understanding rapid demographic 
growth, urbanisation and social protest, and assessing the abiding 
strength of political Islam, policymakers in London prioritised 
anti-Communist measures. British intelligence and security 
 officers, as well as IRD officials, were not necessarily blind or 
seeing these challenges through a Cold War lens, but their activi-
ties and priorities were all directed by government policy. And 
British governments were preoccupied with the spread of the 
‘Communist menace’.
The quotation of Lord Trevelyan above suggests that, despite 
some mistakes in the short run, Britain’s engagement in the region 
was successful in the long run. Yet, an examination of the years 
between 1948 and 1963 suggests otherwise. Despite the shared 
anti-Communist attitudes, Britain conducted counter-subversion 
in the post-war Middle East in a similar manner as it had done in 
the British Empire. But there was a key difference which under-
mined the approach. Unlike in colonial territories, measures con-
ducted in the post-war Middle East were inevitably in the hands 
of foreign authorities. Back in London, policymakers ignored the 
fact that many of these regimes had already banned Communism 
and ignored the side-effects of anti-Communist measures.
Throughout the period, the British government attempted to 
rectify the repressive characteristics of Middle Eastern govern-
ments. Towards the late 1950s and early 1960s, General Hussein 
Fardust, the closest aide of the Shah, for instance, was chosen to 
influence domestic policy of the Iranian government. Nevertheless, 
as the above quotation from Geoffrey Wheeler reveals, the British 
proved unable to influence the policy of the Shah. Such limited 
influence also indicates that the ‘informal’ Empire was based on 
narrow grounds of anti-Communism and faded away throughout 
the period.
Above all, Britain’s policy served to prop up increasingly unpop-
ular authoritarian regimes against a rising tide of anti-British 
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sentiment. In this regard, it was inherently flawed from the start. 
We will never know if the Iraqi Revolution would still have hap-
pened if British anti-Communist measures had not been imple-
mented, or if Middle Eastern governments would have been less 
oppressive. It is probable, though, that fewer anti-Communist 
measures would have been conducted by local authorities and 
that pro-British Middle Eastern regimes might have survived 
longer. Lord Trevelyan’s argument that Britain escaped with little 
damage to its interests therefore holds little water since the British 
strategic vision of maintaining influence was short-sighted and 
ended in failure.
Britain was not the only country guilty of this and other 
instances can be found elsewhere in the Cold War. Using similar 
methods to sustain its own short-term interests, the United 
States, Britain’s closest ally against the Soviet Union, also failed 
in the long term, for instance, in Guatemala and Vietnam.10 
From a rather different perspective, similar arguments have been 
made about the Soviet Union with regard to Eastern Europe.11 
More noteworthy is what Britain’s engagement with the post-
war Middle East reveals about intelligence liaison, a ubiquitous 
and fundamental part of the secret world.12 Liaising with local 
authorities was advantageous for Britain insofar as they formed 
unique local assets. Firstly, Britain was able to access intel-
ligence on Communist activities in the region, including police 
records, which would otherwise have been inaccessible. Secondly, 
as a strong security service was regarded as essential to forestall 
Communist subversion, training such organisations was deemed 
the best way to influence the conduct of anti-Communist meas-
ures by Middle Eastern states.
Yet training foreign security forces is a double-edged sword as it 
is difficult to control how the imparted knowledge will be applied. 
Although British intelligence liaison with its Middle Eastern 
counterparts had a shared interest in countering Communism, 
local authorities used their newfound techniques and methods 
to serve their own purposes; and this proved damaging if the 
foreign government was a non-democratic regime. In the end, the 




Clear differences between the UK and the Middle East ham-
pered intelligence liaison. Firstly, despite a close connection with 
the local authorities, there was no common intelligence culture. 
Middle Eastern security services dominated both internal security 
and propaganda in their home countries, and, despite frequent 
interactions with their British counterparts, these services fre-
quently held views that contrasted sharply with the policing and 
information-oriented approach of the British. This rift was most 
noticeable and destructive in the Counter-Subversion Committee 
and in the use of excessive security measures, including torture of 
political prisoners. The intelligence and security culture of these 
Middle Eastern services was derived, to a considerable extent, 
from the political culture of the regimes they served. In some 
cases, such as Iran, there was strong adherence to the military 
culture from which the intelligence personnel sprang. From their 
point of view, MI5’s constitutional principle, stipulated by the 
Maxwell-Fyfe Directive in 1952 as being apolitical in the defence 
of the realm, was totally incomprehensible.
Secondly, British and Middle Eastern governments interpreted 
the subversive threats differently. Britain saw them more narrowly 
and focused on Communist Party members or those who had 
close connections with the Soviets. By contrast, Middle Eastern 
governments saw any subversive activities, including those of 
Communists or minorities, which challenged the status quo as the 
threats. This led to the politicisation of intelligence and political 
considerations defining subversive threats.
Counter-subversion itself was subjective and the demarca-
tion line between Communist and non-Communist subversive 
activities was often blurred. This was particularly the case in 
the Middle East, where Communist activities were illegal and 
often worked in tandem with other underground groups. For the 
Middle Eastern authorities, without differentiating Communist 
from non-Communist threats, these activities were illegal and 
threatened the very survival of the regime. It is also worth point-
ing out that both threats identified by the British and Middle 
Eastern governments served the interests of the Soviet Union but 
their standpoints differed significantly. As a result, despite the 
desire of the British imperial architects to foster anti-Communist 
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measures in the region, local authorities acted against subversive 
elements rigorously, as demonstrated in the attempts to counter 
the Kurds.
Developing local security forces in the Middle East had unin-
tended consequences for Britain. London did not realise that 
most regional governments were already anti-Communist and 
that they maintained strong security services which had the repu-
tation of being secret police, infringing on human rights. Indeed, 
the formation of Communist Parties had already been banned 
across the region. British anti-Communist policy and training in 
counter-subversion could therefore be considered as contribut-
ing simply to the oppressive nature of local security services. 
The post-war Middle East predominantly consisted of foreign 
countries. The local authorities were not puppets or clients of 
the British Empire. The balance of intelligence liaison, as well 
as their relationship in general, was that local authorities were 
often stronger than their patrons. Middle Eastern governments 
listened to and sought advice from the British, but only on the 
narrow issue of anti-Communist measures, which they under-
stood by their own interpretations. In addition, Middle Eastern 
security authorities were right to be labelled secret police. They 
were highly politicised and merely served as an instrument of 
the local authorities. The inevitable consequence of this was that 
Middle Eastern security services became part of the problem 
rather than the solution. Certain Middle Eastern governments 
actually undermined their own security as the repressive nature 
of their regimes alienated and bred resentment among their own 
populations.
Recent works emphasise the role of intelligence in successfully 
assisting Britain’s decolonisation policy.13 Asserting that intel-
ligence was vital for perpetuating Britain’s influence overseas, 
Calder Walton argues that intelligence ‘allowed London to punch 
far above its weight in the years after 1957, for the rest of the 
Cold War’.14 In the case of the Middle East, however, there is no 
evidence to suggest that intelligence delayed the twilight of the 
‘informal’ Empire or rectified the policymakers’ narrow views 
towards the region. Despite the desire of policymakers in London, 
British intelligence and security services, as well as the IRD, 
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struggled to maintain British influence in a similar manner as they 
had achieved in the Empire. Intelligence unintentionally fostered 
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Appendix:  Security Intelligence Middle 
East Charter1
1. Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) is an inter-service 
organisation and a part of the Security Service (MI5).
2. Head/SIME is responsible to the Director-General of the 
Security Service, and for local policy and executive action to 
the Middle East Defence Committee jointly and individually.
3. SIME is responsible for the collection, collation and dissemi-
nation to the interested and appropriate Service and Civil 
Authorities of Security Intelligence affecting British interests 
in the Middle East. It is also responsible for such execu-
tive action as may be approved by the Service and/or Civil 
Authority concerned.
4. SIME will, with the approval of the relevant authorities, 
maintain representatives under appropriate Service or other 
suitable cover wherever they are considered to be necessary 
throughout the Middle East area. Such representatives are 
responsible to Head/SIME from whom they receive directions 
and funds, and locally to their respective Service Commanders 
and/or Civil Authorities.
5. SIME will maintain close relations with MI6 in the Middle 
East to ensure thorough integration of all security informa-
tion affecting the area. It will also maintain liaison as required 
with the Police and/or Security Authorities of the countries 
within the area, and with all representatives and links of the 
Security Service.
6. SIME cannot be called upon to reveal its sources of infor-
mation to any other organisation or outside authority. It is, 
however, within the discretion of Head/SIME to do so in a 
case where he considers it desirable or expedient and subject 
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to obtaining the consent of any other organisation which may 
control or have an interest in the source. In important cases 
the matter should be referred to the Director-General of the 
Security Service.
7. Head/SIME will be a member of the Joint Intelligence 
Committee, Middle East.
8. SIME has an establishment sponsored by the Army which 
allows for any appointment to be held by a member of any of 
the three Services or of the Security Service.
9. The Army will continue to furnish Field Intelligence funds 
upon estimates submitted by Head/SIME. It will also provide 
accommodation and other services.
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